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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on banking theory.
In the first essay (joint with Dr. Kebin Ma) we analyse a possible infor-
mational impact of banking regulations. Banks can take costly actions (such as
higher capitalization, liquidity holding, and advanced risk management) to fend off
runs. While such actions directly affect bank risks, they also carry informational
content as signals of the banks’ fundamentals. A separating equilibrium due to
such signalling, however, involves two types of inefficiency: the high type chooses
excessively costly signals, whereas the low type is vulnerable to runs. This provides
a novel rationale for financial regulations: by restricting banks’ actions, regulators
can maintain a pooling equilibrium where the cross-subsidy among types promotes
financial stability. We build a theoretical model to illustrate the point and also
obtain supporting evidence from the US capital and liquidity regulations.
The second essay (joint with Prof. John Thanassoulis) seeks to provide
a theoretical explanation of the variety of pricing schemes and product bundling
observed in personal current account (PCA) markets. The main motivating fact is
the widespread proliferation of ‘free-if-in-credit’ (FIIC) current accounts in certain
countries (US, UK), in contrast to some other European countries (France, Italy,
Hungary), where even basic current account services are subject to excessive monthly
fees. Existing evidence is consistent with the possibility that FIIC current accounts
are cross-subsidized by exploitative and complicated fee structures on connected
products, in particular by the excessive usage of overdraft facilities. In this research
we propose a novel approach to model competitive aftermarkets, and demonstrate
how certain sources of market power, namely customer naivete´ and adverse selection
interact in equilibrium. This helps to better understand why some markets are more
likely to develop FIIC pricing than others.
In the last chapter I demonstrate how illiquidity is determined endogenously
during crises as a result of equilibrium behaviour of financial institutions subject to
leverage constraints. I show in a simple and intuitive framework that asset liquida-
tion decisions exhibit similar characteristic to a Prisoners’ dilemma: although finan-
cial institutions are given the possibility to dampen the cost of fire-sale spillovers,
the only Nash-equilibrium is where banks ’defect’, and end up coordinating on sell-
ing the more liquid common asset, which in turn becomes illiquid. This reduces
welfare compared to the socially optimal de-leveraging rule.
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays on banking theory. The common theme of these
research papers, and thereby the organizing principle of my thesis is the presence of
various frictions in banking markets, which call for the attention of policy makers,
and potentially require regulatory intervention. The essays are related to relevant
and recently actively debated policy issues concerning the stability of financial mar-
kets, micro- and macroprudential regulation, as well as non-competitive distortions
in the banking sector.
The dominant approach in this thesis is theoretical, and is based on applied
game-theory. As an applied theorist I believe that an important purpose of theo-
retical research is to help to understand various real-world problems, and answer
practical questions. Mathematical rigorousness is a convenient tool to enlighten
non-trivial perspectives, which can eventually lead to better decision making, and
a more smoothly functioning financial system. In this spirit, the three chapters
investigate the following topics: Chapter 2 discovers a novel, information-based im-
pact of regulations in banking, Chapter 3 explores exploitative and welfare-reducing
overdraft pricing practices in retail banking, while Chapter 4 points out a potential
‘liquidity trap’ in a financial crisis situation due to asset commonalities. These is-
sues all require attention, monitoring, and potentially, intervention by the relevant
regulatory bodies.
Chapter 2 (“Bank Signalling, Risk of Runs and the Informational Impact
of Regulations”, joint with Dr. Kebin Ma) is motivated by post-crisis changes in
banking regulation, and presents a novel perspective on the potential impact of those
regulations. Financial institutions often make use of costly actions (such as higher
capitalization, liquidity holding, and advanced risk management) to fend off runs.
While such actions directly affect bank risks, they also carry informational content
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as signals of the banks’ fundamentals. We show that a separating equilibrium of this
signalling game between the bank and its creditors involves two types of inefficiency:
the high type chooses excessively costly signals, whereas the low type is revealed,
and is vulnerable to runs. This provides a novel rationale for financial regulations.
Placing restrictions on banks’ actions in the form of a conventional microprudential
regulatory tool, such as capital requirements or the recently introduced Liquidity
Coverage Ratio, affects the value of information conveyed by risk management ac-
tions as a signalling device, and in turn, the incentives to engage in discretionary
risk management. Our theoretical model shows that a minimum quantitative re-
quirement can eliminate the separating equilibrium by making it more difficult to
signal private information, thereby regulators can maintain pooling, where the cross-
subsidy across types promotes financial stability.
Our model provides a novel perspective on financial regulation, which fun-
damentally differs from the traditional ones that emphasize its role in mitigating
moral hazard or containing potential negative externalities on the real economy. By
eliminating a way in which markets create information, regulators create ignorance,
which is efficient, as it leads to greater financial stability and higher social welfare.
Our mechanism also provides an explanation for financial institutions’ reaction to
the introduction of a new regulation: a sufficiently restrictive regulatory threshold
induces pooling, and institutions initially not constrained by the to-be introduced
quantitative regulation, optimally decrease their level of risk management towards
the new regulatory limit, which now serves as a focal point. This aspect of our
theory emphasizes a latent link between microprudential and macroprudential reg-
ulatory perspective: regulating some individual institutions changes the prevailing
equilibrium, and thereby the behaviour of other market participants, affecting the
stability of the system as a whole.
The model leads to testable empirical predictions. If financial regulations
do squeeze out separating equilibria, we would expect relatively high dispersion
of risk management measures among banks before the introduction of pertinent
financial regulations, and clustering of observations after the introduction of the
regulations. We test this hypothesis on two data sets: cash holdings of US Bank
holding companies (BHC’s), using a difference-in-difference method which exploits
the recent introduction of Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), as well as changes in
capital ratios around the introduction of Basel I regulatory capital regime. We
find two distinct patterns, both consistent with the predictions of our theory: first,
the dispersion of cash ratios for BHC’s subject to the new regulation decreased
significantly more sharply than those which were not subject to the new regulation.
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This is consistent with a successful elimination of separating equilibrium. For the
case of capital regulation, we find an increase of the number of institutions with
large equity ratios, which might be the result of an insufficient regulatory minimum,
being unable to squeeze out, but boosting the signals required to maintain separating
equilibrium.
The model combines signalling with a stylized bank-run game. Our method-
ological contribution is to develop a novel technique to analyse a global game (which
is necessary to arrive at a unique equilibrium prediction) embedded into a signalling
game in a tractable way which also facilitates welfare analysis. We illustrate our ap-
proach with a linear regime switching function which leads to a closed-form solution,
and generalize to a larger class of models satisfying a single-crossing property.
Chapter 3: A different policy issue and market friction is at the centre
of Chapter 3, titled “Current account and Overdraft Pricing in Retail Banking”
(joint with Prof. John Thanassoulis), which brings us to the search for a pricing
equilibrium in retail banking. At first look, the market structure of banking in
developed countries is a puzzle: although it possesses many key characteristics of
competitive, or at least contestable markets, evidence of monopolistic behaviour
in certain segments is widespread. We study a particular market segment: the
markets for overdrafts. In some countries, especially in the US and the UK, the
predominant personal current account pricing scheme is the so-called ‘free-if-in-
credit’ (FIIC) pricing, sometimes loosely referred to as ‘free banking’. Under this
price schedule, banks charge zero monthly or regular fee for the access to the account
and for basic services. However, accounts are usually bundled together with an
overdraft-service - essentially a short-term borrowing facility - which allows the
customer to go into debit in her account, incurring extensive charges in the form of
service fees or interest payments. In contrast, in some other European countries (for
example France, Italy, Hungary) even basic current account services are subject to -
sometimes quite expensive - monthly fees, while overdraft charges are less important
sources of banks’ profit. The purpose of this research is to better understand the
equilibrium consequences of some underlying market frictions, such as customer
naivete´ and information asymmetry, on prices, profits, and on the market structure.
Many observers point out that FIIC-pricing is consistent with a cross-subsidy
across business lines as well as across various groups of customers, with significant
potential welfare consequences. According to the common narrative, hidden and
expensive overdraft fees exploit poorer households — more likely in need of extra
liquidity — to support more sophisticated, wealthier clients, and to generate indus-
try rents. As FIIC-pricing essentially amounts to below-marginal-cost base-good,
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and above-marginal-cost add-on prices, to the extent different groups of customers
differ in their use of the two services, it leads to potential distributional concerns
and welfare effects. To be specific, if overdraft users tend to be poorer households
more likely in financial trouble and in the need of short-term financing, FIIC-pricing
implies a wealth-transfer ‘from the poor to the rich’, leading to an overall reduction
in social welfare. This view has generated a massive policy debate on the potential
role and shape of regulatory intervention. However, existing theories fall short of
explaining why FIIC-pricing develops in certain countries only.
In this paper we analyse a two-stage duopoly model of overdraft pricing which
captures some relevant characteristics of the retail banking sector to illustrate how
FIIC-pricing can emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon. Deviating from much of
the theoretical literature, which treats overdrafts as a monopolistic aftermarket, we
assume that competition for customers is possible even in the overdraft-stage. This
captures the idea that customers’ lock-in is not perfect in a financial services context.
Indeed, the nature of an existing relationship to one’s bank is distinctively differ-
ent from a typical industrial aftermarket situation - the most cited example being
the market for printers and cartridges - where technological linkages tie customers
strongly to the primary-market supplier, while high initial investment costs prevent
switching to another provider. Strictly speaking there is no such technological rea-
son to link payment services (the primary market) to the provision of short-term
customer credit (the aftermarket), yet the market shows similar characteristic: lack
of switching behaviour, and ‘exploitative’ aftermarket pricing.
Our results demonstrate that, despite the possibility of competition in the
second-stage, the presence of naive customers turns to be an important source of
market power and economic profit. Specifically, we show that for an arbitrary low
number of naive customers, prices deviate from marginal-cost pricing, and the unique
Nash-equilibrium of the Bertrand-game on the overdraft market is a mixed-strategy
Nash-equilibrium, where both insider and outsider banks earn positive profit. This
makes overdraft a profitable business, and induces competition in the first stage (on
the market for PCA) to expand market share. When primary markets are sufficiently
competitive, there exist a symmetric ‘FIIC-equilibrium’ for a significant subset of the
parameter space - specifically, FIIC-pricing can prevail even with relatively modest
number of naive customers, and on highly competitive markets.
In the rest of the paper we extend the baseline setup with adverse selection,
and show how the combination of adverse selection and customer naivete´, being the
two most important frictions on banking markets, affect equilibrium pricing, profits,
and customer behaviour. The presence of adverse selection makes it harder for the
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outsider to enjoy the benefits on the aftermarket. As a consequence, the profits
will be tilted towards the bank’s role as an insider. This increases the incentives
to obtain more customers on the primary market, so it decreases first-period PCA
prices even further — making it even more likely that an FIIC-pricing prevails as
an equilibrium. In our model differences in the mass of myopic customers is not the
only possible explanation anymore for the observed differences across countries: ‘free
banking’ may or may not develop depending on the severity of adverse selection, or
the extent of primary market competition as well.
Chapter 4: Endogenous reaction to a systemic shock in an interconnected
banking environment is the subject of Chapter 4 in this dissertation, “Fire sale in
a liquidation game with leverage requirements”. In the aftermath of the financial
crisis, the view that interconnectedness is an important determinant of financial
stability became conventional wisdom among academics and policy-makers. A large
theoretical and empirical literature on systemic risk started to emphasize how var-
ious forms of business relations in the financial sector can turn to a transmission
channel through which shocks propagate in the financial system, eventually leading
to systemic bank failures and causing real economic losses. One potential layer of
interconnectedness, which is the subject of this paper, is indirect linkages through
common investments, or ‘asset commonalities’. If an investor is forced to liquidate
their asset due to some funding pressure, prices may depart from fundamental val-
ues. Mark-to-market evaluation of portfolios forces other investors of the same asset
to re-evaluate their portfolio, which decreases equity value. In turn, the drop in eq-
uity induces additional funding pressure, and those - otherwise healthy - institutions
may be forced to engage in further asset liquidation.
In this paper I explicitly model the asset liquidation decision of financial in-
stitutions under funding pressure, when multiple asset classes are available to adjust
the portfolio. In the model, the ‘funding pressure’, which is the key market friction
behind this phenomenon, is captured by a leverage constraint: following a (sys-
temic) asset-price shock, the banking system may be forced to engage in systemic
deleveraging to restore leverage targets by selling assets and repaying debt. The
novelty of the analysis is to focus on banks’ optimal, equilibrium decision instead of
accounting for rule-based, deterministic de-leveraging spillover effects usually stud-
ied in the academic literature. The investment portfolio on banks’ balance sheets
differ in ex-ante liquidity, measured as the market price impact following an as-
set sale during ‘normal times’. Equity-maximizer financial institutions adjust their
portfolio by choosing to sell assets so that the impact on equity is minimized. In
the presence of asset commonalities, if all banks end up selling the same asset class
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(‘commonality’), liquid assets suddenly may appear illiquid and can be sold only at
a significant fire-sale discount, a phenomenon which was widely observed during the
financial crisis. The endogenous determination of the fire-sale price has to be taken
into consideration by rational financial institutions.
The joint deleveraging decision of interlinked financial institutions induces a
non-cooperative game which we dub ‘the liquidation game’. The main result of this
paper is that as long as the equilibrium liquidation decision of the banks is non-
trivial in the sense that liquidating only one single asset does not strictly dominate,
the emerging unique Nash-equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal. Individual banks could
achieve higher ex-post equity value by choosing another feasible liquidation strategy,
which, however, cannot be maintained as an equilibrium. The market outcome
in equilibrium is reminiscent to a Prisoner’s dilemma: cooperation, which in this
context would mean self-restraint in selling the more liquid asset commonalities and
relying more on idiosyncratic but less liquid assets to restore leverage, could increase
the overall payoffs for each players, but cannot be maintained as an equilibrium. In
the unique Nash-equilibrium banks ‘defect’, and over-liquidate the commonality.
The comparison of the equilibrium and the social planner’s optimal solution
reveals an even more striking feature: the potential loss from the inefficient equilib-
rium may even be larger, if markets appear to be ex-ante more liquid. Intuitively,
more liquid commonality raises the incentives to tilt the liquidation strategy towards
that asset class, which leads to an even larger equilibrium price effect, and further
diminishes equity. This finding has slightly uncomfortable consequences for financial
stability: higher liquidity, although almost unanimously called for by policy-makers
after the crisis, can even be detrimental in highly integrated markets, if fire-sale
decisions following a potential shock are jointly determined in an equilibrium.
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Chapter 2
Bank Signalling, Risk of Runs,
and the Informational Impact of
Regulations
2.1 Introduction
Financial institutions often make use of costly actions to communicate private infor-
mation about their fundamentals.1 A particularly important class of such signalling
devices is banks’ quantitative risk management choices, such as the amount of cap-
ital, or high-quality liquid assets, whose primary goal is to tackle solvency risk and
liquidity risk respectively. These risk management actions are heavily regulated,
requiring banks to maintain adequate levels of such risk measures in circumstances
where externalities or other market imperfections would prevent to reach socially
optimal outcomes as a decentralized solution in a laissez-fair environment.
In this paper we study the interaction between such regulations and the
bank’s incentives to signal private information to its creditors. In our model, plac-
ing restrictions on banks’ behaviour in the form of a conventional microprudential
regulatory tool, such as capital requirements or the recently introduced Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR), affects the value of information conveyed by risk manage-
ment actions as a signalling device, and in turn, the incentives to engage in discre-
tionary risk management. In a no-regulation environment, a separating equilibrium
due to signalling involves two types of inefficiency: the high-type chooses excessively
1A classic example would be banks maintaining high dividend payouts and executive compen-
sation during the crisis, in the endeavour to convince the market of their relatively strong financial
positions.
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costly risk management, whereas the low type is revealed and becomes vulnerable
to runs. In this sense, the private information creation can bear potential social
inefficiency. We show that a minimum quantitative regulation can eliminate sepa-
rating equilibrium and enforce pooling by making it more difficult to signal private
information, thereby mitigating the related inefficiencies.
Our model provides a novel perspective on financial regulation, which fun-
damentally differs from the traditional ones that emphasize its role in mitigating
moral hazard or containing potential negative externalities on the real economy.2
By eliminating a way in which markets create information, regulators create igno-
rance, which is efficient, as it leads to greater financial stability and higher social
welfare. Our mechanism also provides an explanation for financial institutions’ re-
action to the introduction of a new regulation: a sufficiently restrictive regulatory
threshold induces pooling, and institutions initially not constrained by the to-be in-
troduced quantitative regulation, optimally decrease their level of risk management
towards the new regulatory limit, which now serves as a focal point. This aspect of
our theory emphasizes a latent link between microprudential and macroprudential
regulatory perspective: regulating some individual institutions changes the prevail-
ing equilibrium, and thereby the behaviour of other market participants, affecting
the stability of the system as a whole.
Our model combines signalling with a stylized bank-run game, where the
unique equilibrium of the coordination problem of creditors is determined by global
games techniques. We parameterize the strength of the bank by two distinct fun-
damental variables: the bank’s innate and its financial fundamental. While insiders
have private information regarding the bank’s innate ability to effectively make use
of costly risk management tools to fend off runs, a lack of common knowledge re-
garding the financial fundamental drives the global game equilibrium selection in
the second stage of the game.
This model can be solved analogously to a conventional signalling game where
the receivers’ (creditors) unique aggregate responses to any on- and off-equilibrium
action are determined by global-games techniques. Our methodological contribution
is to develop a novel technique to analyse a global game embedded into a signalling
game in a tractable way which also facilitates welfare analysis. We illustrate our ap-
proach with a linear regime switching function which leads to a closed-form solution,
and generalize to a larger class of models satisfying a single-crossing property.
2For example, minimum capital regulation is often justified to correct moral hazard and risk-
taking incentives of shareholders, while the recent introduction of quantitative liquidity regulation
is motivated by decreasing reliance on ‘public liquidity’ and building up sufficient private cushions
to withhold liquidity shocks.
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The first main result of the paper provides conditions for the existence of
a separating equilibrium in which a high-type bank chooses an excessively high
signal. We show that the existence of this equilibrium, as well as the magnitude of
inefficiency, is inherently linked to the precision of receivers’ noisy private signals,
with higher precision leading to larger inefficiencies. Intuitively, higher precision
leads to more correlated aggregate behaviour of creditors in any states of the world,
in turn, leading to more pronounced aggregate responses to (perceived) changes in
unknown parameters. This encourages the low-type to mimic the high-type more
aggressively, who, in turn needs to send a higher signal to maintain separation.
Second, we show that a regulator can eliminate inefficient high signals by
setting a minimum threshold on the bank’s risk management action. Under such
regulations, the minimax payoff for the low-type (i.e. the payoff she could get ir-
respectively of the other type’s behaviour) decreases, which in turn increases the
critical signal that is required for the high-type to maintain separation. For a suffi-
ciently restrictive regulation, this action is too costly, and it is no longer incentive-
compatible for the high-type to maintain the separation. This critical regulatory
minimum also changes with precision: when precision is high, the separating signal
is already high, therefore a relatively low regulatory threshold is sufficient to in-
duce pooling. An implication is that signalling may emerge during turbulent times
(characterized by low precision of observation of the fundamentals): a certain level
of regulation which is just sufficient to maintain pooling during normal times might
not be able to prevent wasteful signalling during turbulent times.
We perform a preliminary welfare analysis tailored specifically to the con-
text of financial regulations. We show that a minimum ratio regulation can indeed
increase ex-ante welfare by squeezing out separating equilibria. A separating equi-
librium in the model leads to two types of inefficiency: the high-type chooses a signal
that is excessively high and costly, whereas the low-type is identified as weak and
becomes vulnerable - resulting in more runs and greater financial instability. In con-
trast, in a pooling equilibrium, the high-type will cross-subsidise the low-type, and
the economy can feature greater financial stability as well as a reduction in costly
signalling. In this sense, financial regulations reduce the information available in
private markets, and the resulting ignorance is efficient. The ex-ante improvement
in expected profits implies that it can be incentive-compatible for banks to accept
financial regulations.
Our model leads to testable empirical predictions. If financial regulations
do squeeze out separating equilibria, we would expect relatively high dispersion
of risk management measures among banks before the introduction of pertinent
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financial regulations, and clustering of observations after the introduction of the
regulations. We test this hypothesis on two data sets: cash holdings of US Bank
holding companies (BHC’s), using a difference-in-difference method which exploits
the recent introduction of Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), as well as changes in
capital ratios around the introduction of Basel I regulatory capital regime. We
find two distinct patterns, both consistent with the predictions of our theory: first,
the dispersion of cash ratios for BHC’s subject to the new regulation decreased
significantly more sharply than those which were not subject to the new regulation.
This is consistent with a successful elimination of separating equilibrium. For the
case of capital regulation, we find an increase of the number of institutions with
large equity ratios, which might be the result of an insufficient regulatory minimum,
being unable to squeeze out, but boosting the signals required to maintain separating
equilibrium.
The methodology of our paper is most related to Angeletos et al. [2006],
and Angeletos and Pavan [2013]. In their pioneering work, the authors consider a
perfectly informed policy maker (sender) who tries to defend a regime with possible
policy intervention and show that once the signalling effect of the policy intervention
is taken into consideration, multiple equilibria will re-surface in a global-game setting
due to the endogeneity of the attackers’ (receivers’) information set. The specific
form of multiplicity in the (semi-) separating equilibrium arises due to the fact that
there is no uncertainty regarding the regime outcome from the sender’s perspective.
As a consequence, any positive policy intervention signals the survival of the regime,
which makes ‘no attack’ a dominant strategy, and the global game is played out over
a truncated posterior distribution on the range of fundamentals when intervention
does not occur.
In contrast to this work, as well as a growing literature on persuasion with
multiple receivers (Inostroza and Pavan [2017], Goldstein and Huang [2016]) the
sender in our model only imperfectly observes the fundamentals. In the context of
banking, insiders such as bank equity holders or managers (i) can have an informa-
tional advantage over their creditors regarding the bank’s resilience to shocks but
(ii) still face uncertainty regarding the fate of the bank. Apart from being more
realistic in the context of banking risk management, the modelling role of residual
uncertainty on the sender’s side is crucial: despite her informational advantage, this
additional uncertainty keeps the sender uncertain regarding the fate of the regime,
therefore policy intervention cannot make even the highest type bank completely
‘run-proof’, although it changes incentives to run.
Related literature. The idea that simple risk management measures such
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as capital or liquidity can signal private information beyond the fact that higher
values can mechanically protect the bank against shocks has been proposed in the
literature before. For example, Hughes and Mester [1998] writes: “Since financial
capital constitutes the bank’s own bet on its management of risk, it conveys a credible
signal to depositors of the resources allocated to preserving capital and insuring the
safety of their deposit”. The signalling role of capital is also well recognized generally
in the corporate finance literature, albeit with somewhat inconclusive predictions
(Ross [1977],Brealey et al. [1977] and Harris and Raviv [1991]). Malherbe [2014]
interprets the bank’s liquid holdings as a signal of the underlying reason for asset
sales, so that a higher liquidity might increase adverse selection in asset markets. In
other papers, asymmetric information concerns the quality of assets, and banks are
sending credible signals either through proper security design (Nicolo and Pelizzon
[2008]) or by retention (He [2009]). An extensive literature in accounting surveys the
signalling role of loan loss provisioning (LLP), with many papers arguing that higher
LLP credibly signals a prudent risk management, and management’s intention to
resolve problem debt situations3.
Our model predicts a positive relationship between the level of risk manage-
ment measures and the value of the bank in case of first-best as well as whenever
separating equilibrium still prevails on the markets. In the case of capital, this
is consistent with Mehran and Thakor (2010), who present an elegant theory and
strong empirical support for a positive cross-sectional correlation between bank cap-
ital and market value. In their model, increased capital has two effects: it increases
the probability of survival and in turn, incentives to monitor (direct effect), while
increased loan monitoring enhances the value of the portfolio (indirect effect). The
overall impact of the two effects is that banks with lower monitoring costs will have
a higher marginal benefit of capital, and in turn, find it optimal to hold more.
The paper is also related to the large literature on bank runs. Since the
seminal contribution of Diamond and Dybvig [1983], it is well known that liquidity
transformation makes banks vulnerable to runs driven by agents’ self-fulfilling beliefs
regarding the behaviour of other agents. In the more recent follow-up literature,
global games theory4 has been routinely used to resolve the equilibrium selection
problem in the Diamond-Dybvig framework (Goldstein and Pauzner [2005]). It has
also been pointed out that liquidity, as well as capital – ceteris paribus – can serve
as a buffer, thereby dampening the probability of distress and increasing financial
stability (Diamond and Rajan [2000], Diamond and Kashyap [2016]).
3Some early contributions are: Beaver and Engel [1996], Scholes et al. [1990], Grammatikos and
Saunders [1990], Griffin and Wallach [1991]
4Carlsson and Van Damme [1993] and Morris and Shin [1998]
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The paper is organized as follows: we introduce our model in Section 2.
In Section 3, we analytically solve the model for a no-regulation equilibrium with
stylized functional forms. Section 4 analyses the impact of a minimum quantitative
regulation and discusses the most important welfare trade-offs. Section 5 provides
some empirical insights. Finally, we generalize some of our results to a larger class
of functional forms in the Appendices.
2.2 Model setup
We consider a two-period game played by two groups of players: a bank and its
creditors. In our model, a continuum of creditors of mass 1 hold demandable claims
of the bank, and simultaneously decide whether to run on the bank or not. The
bank, on the other hand, is incentivized to defend itself from runs by implementing
costly risk management practices.
The bank’s fundamental strength is determined by two random variables, θ1
and θ2, which we assume to be independently distributed. We interpret θ1 as the
bank’s inherent ability to manage its risks, that we dub as skill. The bank can be of
low-quality, θ1 = θ
L
1 , with probability p, or high-quality, θ1 = θ
H
1 , with probability
(1−p), where 0 < θL1 < θH1 . Parameter θ2 captures the financial fundamental of the
bank and is drawn from a uniform distribution with support on the interval
[
θ2, θ2
]
.
In period 1, the bank privately observes the realization of θ1, which is the
bank’s Harsanyi-type. Upon the observation, but before the realization of θ2, the
bank chooses a costly, non-negative risk management action s ∈ (0,+∞) to enhance
its ability to survive runs. The bank’s strategy, therefore, specifies a choice of s for
each possible realization of θ1. The risk management action s influences the ability
to survive runs directly, and also serves as an informative public signal for the bank’s
type.
The bank fails if sufficiently many creditors decide to run. In particular, we
capture the failure of the bank with a continuous, differentiable, and real-valued
regime switching function R(θ1, θ2, s, α). The bank fails whenever R(θ1, θ2, s, α) <
0, where α denotes the mass of creditors who run on the bank. We assume that the
regime switching function is such that the bank’s survival is more likely if any of the
fundamentals or the risk management action are higher, and less likely if the mass of
creditors who run is greater. Furthermore, the more skilled bank benefits more from
the risk management action for any given level of s,5 meaning the fundamental θ1
5These requirements imply that the derivatives of the regime switching function satisfy Rθ2 > 0,
Rθ1 > 0, Rs > 0, Rα < 0, and Rsθ1 > 0.
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is a measure of how effective the bank’s pre-emptive intervention can be in avoiding
bankruptcy.6 For the main part of the paper, we solve the model analytically for
the following functional form.
R(θ1, θ2, s,α) := θ1s+ θ2 − α
The bank’s payoff is specified as follows:
U(θ1, θ2, s, α) =
k − c · s if R(θ1, θ2, s, α) ≥ 00 if R(θ1, θ2, s, α) < 0
where k is the benefit of surviving the bank run, c is the unit cost of risk management,
and the payoff conditional on failure is normalized to zero. One interpretation of the
payoff structure is that k captures the charter value of the bank which would be lost
if the bank fails, while the zero payoff in case of failure reflects the fact that banks
are protected by limited liability. For simplicity, k and c are exogenous constants.
In period 2, the unit mass of creditors perfectly observe the public signal of
s, and each of them receives a private, noisy signal of the bank’s financial funda-
mental θ2. In particular, a creditor i ∈ [0, 1] receives private signal xi = θ2 + σi,
where i ∼ U(−1, 1) is independently and identically distributed across creditors.
The parameter σ > 0 captures the accuracy of the private signals. Based on the
information, the creditors simultaneously decide whether to run on the bank or not,
the two actions we denote by RUN and WAIT. We focus on the symmetric strategy
equilibrium, since creditors are ex ante identical. A creditor’s payoff from choosing
action RUN is normalized to a constant t ∈ (0, 1), while the payoff from action
WAIT depends on whether the bank survives the runs, and is specified as follows.
u(θ1, θ2, s, α) =
1 if R(θ1, θ2, s, α) ≥ 00 if R(θ1, θ2, s, α) < 0
We will assume throughout that fundamentals are such that even the strongest
banks can fail for any risk management actions which is taken in equilibrium, while
for a sufficiently high realization of the fundamental, a bank survives even if all
creditors run on the bank. These assumptions guarantee the existence of dominance
6One may interpret θ1 as the bank’s skill in screening loans and s as the bank’s capital ratio. A
better screening skill helps the bank to maintain a higher asset quality that is privately observed,
and the same level of capital helps a bank better if the bank has higher asset quality. Alternatively,
one may consider s being the amount of liquid asset held by the bank and θ1 being the market
liquidity of those asset in a crisis, or θ1 being the bank’s human capital in advanced risk modelling
and s being IT infrastructure required in its implementation.
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regions, where creditors find it dominant to run (resp. wait).
Assumption 1 We assume that the following parameter restrictions are satisfied:
• For every θ1 ∈ Θ, and for every s ∈ S?, θ2 < −θ1s := θ? where S? is the set
of equilibrium values of signal s
• For every θ1 ∈ Θ, and for every s ∈ S?, θ2 > 1− θ1s := θ?
Assumption 1 implies that the creditors’ bank run game has two dominance regions:
there exist θ? and θ
? such that when θ2 < θ?, RUN is a dominant strategy for cred-
itors independent of their private signals. And when θ > θ?, WAIT is a dominant
strategy for creditors independent of their private signals.
The timeline is summarized in Figure 2.1. Note that the sequence of the game
has a natural interpretation: a bank’s skill for risk management can be slow-moving
and affects the bank’s risk management decisions. In the model, this is reflected in
the exogenous type θ1 and the timing that s is chosen based on the private informa-
tion of θ1. The financial fundamental (e.g., the default rate of the loan portfolio), on
the other hand, can fluctuate more frequently and therefore not (fully) revealed to
the bank when the risk management decision is made. While the creditors’ decision
to run on the bank may be instantly triggered by contemporaneous changes of the
financial fundamental, the bank may not be able to change its amount of liquidity
or capital equally fast in the presence of financial market frictions.
Figure 2.1: Timeline
The simple functional forms for the regime switching function as well as
for the payoff functions are selected to sharpen the intuition and emphasize the
interaction between the signalling and coordination stages of the game.7 In 2.B,
we analyse some of the consequences of these modelling choices and generalize the
results to a broader set of functional forms.
7Indeed, the coordination stage can be straightforwardly recast as a backbone global game of
regime change where imperfectly informed atomistic players (creditors) play a game with strategic
complementarities whether to attack (WAIT) or not (RUN) a regime (the bank) whose survival
depends on its fundamentals (θ1, θ2), actions (s), and the mass of atomistic players attacking the
regime (α).
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2.3 Equilibrium analysis
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as a solution concept. Let s(θ1) ∈ [s,∞)
denote the strategy of the bank, i.e. the risk management action chosen by type
θ1, a(xi, s) denote the action of an agent receiving private signal xi and publicly
observing risk management s, and α(θ1, θ2, s) denote the mass of creditors who run.
We define an equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 A symmetric, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the signalling-global
game consists of (1) a strategy s?(θ1) : {θL1 , θH1 } → [s,∞) for the bank, (2) a strategy
a?(xi, s) : X× [s,∞)→ {RUN,WAIT} for creditors; (3) posterior beliefs on {θ1, θ2}
for creditors upon observing {xi, s}: µi(θ1, θ2|xi, s) : X× [s,∞]→ [0, 1], such that
(1) Bank’s strategy is profit-maximizing given aggregate runs:
s?(θ1) ∈ arg max
s
EU(θ1, θ2, s, α(θ1, θ2, s))
(2) Creditors’ decision whether to run is profit-maximizing given their information
set
a?(xi, s) ∈ arg max
a
Eu(t, θ1, θ2, s|xi, s)
where aggregate attack α is consistent with individual decisions
α(θ1, θ2, s) =
∫ 1
0
a?(xi, s)di
(3) Beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. Strategies are sequen-
tially rational, and consistent with beliefs.
We solve the model backwards: First, we solve the coordination game for any
given risk management level s, then determine the bank’s (sender) optimal choice
of risk management, given the second stage equilibrium.
2.3.1 Symmetric information benchmark
Our model parsimoniously captures the combination of two informational frictions:
first, there is informational asymmetry between the bank and the creditors regard-
ing the value of θ1. Second, there is incomplete information leading to strategic
uncertainty regarding creditors’ beliefs about each others’ actions.
To set up a benchmark, we start the analysis with a version of the game
where the value of θ1 is observed by the creditors as well. Without information
asymmetry regarding θ1, there is no signalling role for risk management action.
Notice that in the complete information version of the game, i.e. in the
one where θ2 is also perfectly observed by the creditors, there would be multiple
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equilibria of the subgame whenever the value of θ2 is outside of the dominant regions,
that is, θ2 ∈ (θ?, θ?). This is caused by the strategic complementarities in the
coordination problem of creditors. We obtain uniqueness of the equilibrium using
standard global games refinement (Morris and Shin [1998], Morris and Shin [2001])
in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 When parameter θ1 is perfectly observed by the creditors, the unique
equilibrium of the coordination-stage that survives iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies is characterized by two thresholds8
xˆ (θ1, s) = t− θ1s+ 2σt− σ (2.1)
θˆ2 (θ1, s) = t− θ1s (2.2)
such that creditor i runs if and only if xi < xˆ, and the bank fails if and only if
θ2 < θˆ2.
Both thresholds are decreasing in type θ1 and in action s, which implies that
higher fundamental, as well as higher intervention, make survival of the bank more
likely.
Proof. See Appendix
As stated by Lemma 1, the equilibrium of the subgame is characterized by a
pair {θˆ2, xˆ} which jointly solves two equations: (i) a creditor who receives signal xˆ
is just indifferent between RUN and WAIT, and (ii) the bank just fails at θˆ2. The
proof in the Appendix derives these two conditions and proves that the solutions
constitute the unique equilibrium of the subgame.
Next, we solve for optimal risk management, given that the bank anticipates
correctly the equilibrium in the second stage. For any choice of s, the equilibrium
quantities {θˆ2(θ1, s), xˆ(θ1, s)} determine the mass of agents who run on the bank
(α), and in turn, the probability of survival. Therefore the expected profit, which is
the bank’s objective function, can be expressed as a function of the exogenous type
θ1 and the endogenous risk management action s:
pi(θ1, s) := E[U |θ1, s] = Pr[θ2 > θˆ2(θ1, s)](k − cs)
The first order condition of bank’s optimal action s? trades off the higher cost of
risk management with an increased probability of survival. Lemma 2 establishes
8Following the literature, we will refer to (variants of) θˆ2 as ‘fundamental threshold’, while xˆ as
‘strategic threshold’.
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optimal risk management action s?(θ1) and the associated payoff.
Lemma 2 When type θ1 is public information, a bank of type θ1 optimally sets
s?(θ1) and obtains payoff pi
?(θ1) as defined below:
s?(θ1) =
1
2
(
k
c
− θ2 − t
θ1
)
(2.3)
pi?(θ1) =
(
c
(
θ2 − t
)
+ θ1k
)2
4cθ1
(2.4)
Provided that kc >
θ2−t
θ1
, both the optimal action and the optimal expected profit
increase in parameter θ1.
Proof. See Appendix
Figure 2.2 illustrates expected profits as a function of the risk management
action s. The optimal s under complete information is higher for the H-type, which
is a direct consequence of the higher marginal benefit of action. The condition in
Lemma 2 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the positivity of the optimal
action, which we will assume in order for the problem to be interesting.
Figure 2.2: Expected profit as a function of risk man-
agement action
H profit
L profit
s High
s Low
s
π
Expected profit is increasing in type, and the optimal
risk management action satisfies s?L < s
?
H
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2.3.2 Separating equilibrium
Moving towards analysing asymmetric information, we first characterize separating
equilibrium. In any pure-strategy separating equilibrium the two types send different
signals
s(θ1) :=
sL if θ1 = θL1sH if θ1 = θH1
and the chosen signal reveals the type perfectly to creditors. Separating equilib-
rium can be maintained if no sender has incentives to deviate. Before formalizing
the incentive compatibility constraints, the first step is to compute payoffs off-the-
equilibrium path.
2.3.2.1 Off-equilibrium payoffs
First, consider the case where a bank of type L chooses an off-equilibrium action
and mimics type H by sending the signal sH . The creditors - believing that they
are facing a H-type bank - behave accordingly as if they were facing H-type with
certainty. Therefore, their optimal response given these beliefs is described by the
strategic threshold defined under Lemma 1 Equation 2.1 for type H:
xˆH := xˆ(θH1 , sH) = t− θH1 sH + 2σt− σ
This implies that the mass of agents who would run upon any realization of θ2 is
exactly the same as if it is under type H, that is, α(xˆH , θ2)
9. The off-equilibrium
fundamental threshold for the deviating type, denoted by θˆL.H2 , is the value of θ2
which solves
θL1 sH + θ2 − α(xˆH , θ2) = 0
which implies, after substituting the expression for α and rearranging terms:
θˆL.H2 =
xˆH + σ − 2σsHθL1
2σ + 1
After substituting xˆH , defining the type difference ∆θ1 = (θ
H
1 −θL1 ), and introducing
the notation θˆL2 := θˆ2(θ
L
1 ) and θˆ
H
2 := θˆ2(θ
H
1 ), we obtain
θˆL.H2 = θˆ
H
2 +
2σsH∆θ1
1 + 2σ
= θˆL2 −
sH∆θ1
1 + 2σ
(2.5)
9The expression for that can be found in the proof of Lemma 1, Equation 2.3.
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Analogously, by replacing indices but keeping the definition of ∆θ1 = (θ
H
1 − θL1 )
fixed, it is possible to define off-equilibrium thresholds for the case when H mimics
L10
θˆH.L2 = θˆ
L
2 −
2σsL∆θ1
1 + 2σ
= θˆH2 +
sL∆θ1
1 + 2σ
(2.6)
To conclude, by mimicking the other type’s action in an off-the-equilibrium
path of the candidate separating equilibrium, the bank can influence the behaviour
of creditors and induce them to behave according to the strategy what they would
follow under the other type. However, he cannot achieve the same fundamental
threshold, since the true type enters directly into the regime change function R,
which determines the threshold.
Before characterizing the equilibrium, we discuss an alternative interpreta-
tion of the off-equilibrium thresholds (2.5) and (2.6). For any given (not necessar-
ily equilibrium) s, the functions θˆL.H2 (s) and θˆ
H.L
2 (s) can be understood as failure
thresholds for type L (respectively H), if its creditors believe it to be the other type.
These functions define an additive decomposition of the difference between the two
types’ complete information fundamental thresholds for a given s. For example,
using Equation (2.5), we can write
θˆL2 (s)− θˆH2 (s) =
2σs∆θ1
1 + 2σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
+
s∆θ1
1 + 2σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect
(2.7)
Equation 2.7 decomposes the difference between the fundamental thresholds under
complete information into a sum of a direct effect, attributable to the fundamental
difference between types L and H, and an indirect effect, which is solely due to
creditors’ beliefs. As we show in the next section, the larger the indirect effect is, the
more a low-type can potentially benefit from mimicking the high type, and similarly,
the larger is the potential loss for a high type for not being able to distinguish himself
from a low type.
If type L is believed to be11 type H at some signal s, she obtains the following
expected payoff:
pi(s, θL1︸︷︷︸
true
, θH1︸︷︷︸
perceived
) = Pr
[
θ2 > θˆ
L.H
2
]
(k − c · s) (2.8)
The optimal off-equilibrium action (that is, optimal action if type L is believed to
10As will be clear in the equilibrium analysis, H would never want to mimic L. Yet, he might find
it optimal to go ‘off-path’, in which case his payoffs are characterized by θˆH.L2
11that happens if she successfully mimics type H
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Figure 2.3: On- and off-path equilibrium payoffs
H eqm
L eqm
L off-path
H off-path
s
π
be type H) is derived from the first-order condition ∂pi/∂s = 0, which implies the
optimum off-equilibrium intervention and expected profits:
s?L.H =
1
2
(
k
c
+
(1 + 2σ)(t− θ2)
2σθL1 + θ
H
1
)
= 0 (2.9)
pi?L.H = pi(s
?
L.H , θ
L
1 , θ
H
1 ) =
(−c(2σ + 1) (t− θ2)+ k(2σθL1 + θH1 ))2
4c(2σ + 1)
(
2σθL1 + θ
H
1
) (2.10)
Analogous expressions can be derived for s?H.L and pi
?
H.L. It is straightforward to
show that the following relationships hold:
s?L < s
?
L.H and s
?
H > s
?
H.L (2.11)
pi(s, θL1 , θ
L
1 ) < pi(s, θ
L
1 , θ
H
1 ) and pi(s, θ
H
1 , θ
H
1 ) > pi(s, θ
H
1 , θ
L
1 ) ∀s (2.12)
Off-equilibrium payoffs and optimal actions are critical in analysing the existence
of equilibrium. In particular, the profit pi?H.L is H-type’s minimax payoff: even with
the most adverse beliefs of creditors (if all believe he is of bad type), he can obtain
payoff at least pi?H.L. Therefore, in any proposed equilibrium, type H’s payoff must
exceed pi?H.L. Note that in contrast, the low type’s (L) minimax payoff is pi
?
L.
Figure 2.3 illustrates on- and off-equilibrium payoffs as a function of an ar-
bitrary policy intervention s. In the next section we establish the values of s which
can be maintained as separating equilibrium.
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2.3.2.2 Characterization of separating equilibrium
Our equilibrium concept does not place any restrictions on the beliefs off-the-
equilibrium path, which are never reached to verify those beliefs. Following the
standard signalling literature, we impose the following belief system: if creditors
observe any off-equilibrium risk management action s 6= {sL, sH}, they believe that
the regime is of low type. Otherwise, if they observe an equilibrium action, they
believe that they are facing with the appropriate type with certainty. Under this
specification, every equilibrium signal which gives at least as much profit to both
types as they would get under ‘low type’ beliefs can be maintained.
Equilibrium requires that no types have incentives to deviate from the pro-
posed equilibrium actions {sL, sH}. First, note that in any separating equilibrium,
types are revealed, so the L-type will find it optimal to set sL = s
?
L, and obtain
profit pi?L. A separating equilibrium in which the high-type sets some value sH and
the low type sets her optimum value s?L can be maintained if and only if
pieq(s?L, θ
L
1 ) ≥ pioff (sH , θL1 , θH1 ) (ICL)
pieq(sH , θ
H
1 ) ≥ pioff (s?H.L, θH1 , θL1 ) (ICH)
where pieq is equilibrium payoff given the specified belief system, while s?H.L is the
best deviation for the high-type, specified in the previous section. Let us denote by
scriL the value of sH which solves [ICL], that is, the value of a separating signal at
which the L-type is just indifferent between mimicking the high type, or setting s?L
and obtaining her minimax profit. This is the value of s which solves
Pr
[
θ2 > θˆ
L
2 (s
?
L)
]
(k − c · s?L) ≥ Pr
[
θ2 > θˆ
L.H
2 (s)
]
(k − c · s)
The right-hand-side is a quadratic function with a negative coefficient of the quadratic
term and with maximum value exceeding the constant on the left-hand-side, so the
corresponding equality has two solutions
(
scriL,1 < s
cri
L,2
)
. Incentive compatibility re-
quires that sH /∈ [scriL,1, scriL,2], otherwise L-type would have an incentive to mimic the
H-type. In this case pieq(scriL.1, θ
H
1 ) < pi
eq(scriL.2, θ
H
1 ) implying that the individually
rational choice for the good type is to send a high signal, and the level which can
maintain a separating equilibrium must fulfil sH ≥ scriL.2.
Similarly, define scriH to be the critical s which is incentive-compatible for
type H and solves [ICH ]. This is the level of intervention at which the profit for a
H-type in a separating equilibrium is at least as much as his best achievable profit
if he is believed to be of low-type. This latter utility is the high-types’ minimax
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payoff - irrespectively of creditors’ beliefs, he can always achieve at least pi?H.L by
setting the off-equilibrium profit-maximizing level of s.12 After substituting the
profit functions, [ICH ] leads to:
Pr
[
θ2 > θˆ
H
2 (s
?
H)
]
(k − c · sH) ≥ Pr
[
θ2 > θˆ
H.L
2 (s
?
H.L)
]
(k − c · s?H.L)
which, by similar argument,, has two solutions: scriH.1 and s
cri
H.2. We can characterize
the existence of a separating equilibrium in terms of the thresholds derived above
as follows.13
1. A separating equilibrium exists and it restores the symmetric information
benchmark if and only if scriL.2 ≤ s?H .
2. A separating equilibrium exists and in this equilibrium the high-type sets
inefficiently high risk management action if and only if s?H < s
cri
L.2 ≤ scriH.2.
3. A separating equilibrium does not exist if and only if scriH.2 < s
cri
L.2.
We derive closed form analytical formulas for the critical values in the Ap-
pendix along with some limiting cases, which we will use in the following discussion.
Theorem 1 establishes the link between the cost of risk management, precision of
private signals, and the existence of separating equilibrium.
Theorem 1 There exists an ‘efficient’ separating equilibrium in which signals coin-
cide with the symmetric information benchmark if and only if the noise in creditors’
private observation is sufficiently large, that is, if and only if
σ ≥ σ
Whenever σ < σ, and c > cˆ, there exists an ‘inefficient’ separating equilibrium in
which the bank must choose a higher-than-the-first-best risk management interven-
tion, where cˆ is defined as
cˆ =
√
∆θ1(kθL1 )
2(
3θL1 + θ
H
1
) (
θ2 − t
) (2.13)
Whenever c < cˆ, there exists a lower boundary σ(c) such that separating equilibrium
does not exists for every σ < σ(c).
12Note the difference here: L-type’s minimax payoff is pi?L while type H’s minimax payoff is pi
?
H.L
under the specified beliefs.
13We concentrate only on the ‘upper’ regions, which is relevant for our application. It is straight-
forward to extend the analysis to the lower part.
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Figure 2.4: Separating Equilibrium
H eqm
L eqm
L off-path
H off-path
s high
s low
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(a) The first-best is restored in Separating
Equilibrium with high σ (low precision)
H eqm
L eqm
L off-path
H off-path
s high
s low
s
π
(b) High-type sends inefficiently high inter-
vention with low σ (high precision)
Proof. See Appendix
The Theorem is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The precision of creditor’s sig-
nal (1/σ) has a critical role in determining which type of equilibrium can survive.
If information is less precise, the potential benefit/loss from mimicking the other
type decreases. This is because if type L mimics type H, the (off-the-equilibrium-
path) strategic threshold xˆ is pinned down according to the equilibrium of type
H, but the fundamental threshold, which enters directly into the integral bound-
ary of the expected profit, is not.14 More noisy private information pushes the
realized fundamental threshold upwards, which decreases the profit which can be
obtained by mimicking type H. This, in turn, decreases the critical threshold of
low-types incentive compatibility constraint, scriL.2, which approaches s
?
L as σ → ∞.
Since lim scriL.2 < s
?
H , due to continuity there exists an σ (denoted by σ) at which
scriL.2(σ) = s
?
H . Consequently, if and only if the fundamental is observed with large
enough noise (σ > σ) the separating equilibrium is efficient (i.e. restores bank-
optimal first-best). If the equilibrium is inefficient, the distortion increases as the
noise becomes more precise.
Intuitively, the more precise receivers’ private observation is, the more cor-
related is creditors’ behaviour. This implies, with higher precision the effective
strategy, defined as the probability of run for any realization of fundamental θ2, is
more ‘extreme’ (see Figure 2.5). In particular, with σ → 0, the effective strategy
converges to a limiting case where all creditors run if and only if xi ≤ θˆ1, and no
14A way to think about this is: in the standard global game, the fundamental threshold is fixed
when precision in varied, and the strategic threshold adapts to the changes. In contrast, when L
mimics H, the strategic threshold is fixed and the realized fundamental threshold varies. When the
strategic threshold of H shifts to the left due to increased noise, the fundamental threshold must
shift to the left as well.
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agents attack otherwise (2.5a). However, the more extreme is the effective strategy,
the more important it is to ‘get the other parameters right’. The aggregated strate-
gic error by following a certain strategy which happens to be wrong is largest when
the information which determines the strategy is the most precise. On the other
hand, with lower precision the effective strategy is more ‘flat’, and the effect of not
knowing the other parameter (θ1) correctly is smoothed out by the relative flatness
of the effective strategy (2.5b). This decreases the potential benefit of mimicking
the H-type.
Figure 2.5: Equilibrium determination as a function of noise
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(a) High precision leads to highly coordi-
nated behaviour...
L runs (α)
L threshold
H runs (α)
H threshold
L.H threshold
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
(b) ...while low precision maintains uncer-
tainty regarding creditor’s behaviour.
2.3.3 Regulation in separating equilibrium
In this section we show how a minimum threshold regulation can eliminate sepa-
rating equilibria. Let us denote the regulatory minimum by sp. Under a binding
risk management regulatory regime the action space of the bank is restricted to the
interval s ∈ [sp,∞).
A minimum requirement changes minimax payoffs for both types. We will
assume that minimum policy is high enough to be binding for both types in the
sense that it exceeds their minimax strategies, i.e.
sp ≥ s?H.L
This single condition is sufficient, since s?L < s
?
H.L, so the constraint will always be
binding for L-type. Then, we can reformulate IC’s for a separating equilibrium as
pieq(sp, θ
L
1 ) ≥ pioff (sH , θL1 , θH1 ) (ICL)
pieq(sH , θ
H
1 ) ≥ pioff (sp, θH1 , θL1 ) (ICH)
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Figure 2.6: Impact of regulation on the equilibrium
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librium survives
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(b) Regulation is effective: separating equilib-
rium fails
where sH denotes the signal an H-type sends in a separating equilibrium. Similarly
to the previous (no-regulation) case, we can define scriL (sp) and s
cri
H (sp) as the value
of s which solves the two IC’s respectively with equality, now both regarded as a
function of regulatory threshold sp. Then, the critical regulatory threshold level
which guarantees that separating equilibrium does not exist is determined by the
equation:
scriL (sp) = s
cri
H (sp) (2.14)
Theorem 2 As long as the regulatory minimum policy sp exceeds a critical reg-
ulatory minimum scrip as defined by equality 2.14, that is, sp ≥ scrip , separating
equilibrium does not exist. The critical regulatory level is defined as follows:
scrip =
(
(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
∆θ1
+
k
2c
)
−
√[
(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
∆θ1
]2
+
[
k
2c
]2
(2.15)
The pooling equilibrium in which all types of banks set scrip Pareto-dominates from
the banks’ perspective all other pooling equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix
Figure 2.6a depicts a situation where, despite a quantitative minimum reg-
ulation for policy being in place, a separating equilibrium still survives, as scriL (the
policy which is just incentive-compatible for the low type) is lower than scriH (just
incentive-compatible for the high type). The regulator must increase the minimum
policy to at least scrip , where s
cri
L = s
cri
H , so no separating equilibrium exists anymore
(figure 2.6b).
Now we state a result which has interesting implications for the effect of
regulation during a crisis situation.
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Corollary 1 The critical regulatory threshold decreases in precision 1/σ
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. We have seen that with
high precision, the inefficiency in a separating equilibrium is very high as high-quality
institutions are sending excessively high signals to distinguish themselves from low-
quality institutions. However, this is exactly the situation when it is relatively easy
for a regulator to squeeze out the separating equilibrium by setting a relatively low
pooling threshold. Since the incentive compatibility constraints for the H-type are
already close to binding, a little bit more pressure induced by the regulator can
be sufficient to break down separation. Figure 2.7 illustrates the level of critical
regulatory minimum as a function of noise (σ) in private information.
Figure 2.7: Critical regulation
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
σ
sp
cri
Critical regulatory threshold increases
in the noise of private information
It is possible to interpret this result in the context of the cyclicality of banking
regulations. Noisy private signals are consequences of turbulent economic periods, as
increased uncertainty amplifies strategic uncertainty and information asymmetries
among creditors. In this case, as we discussed before, there is relatively little to gain
from mimicking the other type, so it is easier to maintain a separating equilibrium.
On the other hand this means that a regulator must maintain a relatively strict
minimum policy if he wants to squeeze out separation. In contrast, in normal
times - represented by a small idiosyncratic noise in our model - there is more
temptation to mimic high-types, leading to highly inefficient separating signal levels.
An already high risk management signal is however relatively easy to squeeze out.
This effect can explain why - observationally - signalling seems to be more prevalent
during turbulent times. A regulation in place which is just sufficient to impose
pooling in a normal market environment, might not be sufficient to achieve the
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same during turbulent times, when strategic uncertainty is greater, so financial
institutions engage more and more in costly signalling as the markets shift towards
a crisis period.
2.3.4 Pooling equilibrium
In any pooling equilibrium the same signal is chosen by both types of banks, which
conveys no information to the creditors. Equilibrium of the coordination stage is
determined analogously to a standard global game with an important twist: given
creditors’ strategy, represented by the threshold xˆ, which must be the same under
both types of banks in a pooling equilibrium, the fundamental threshold for the
two types will be different. This has to be taken into consideration by the creditors
when calculating equilibrium strategies. In conclusion, any pooling equilibrium
is characterized by a common strategic threshold for creditors xˆ, and a distinct
fundamental threshold for each type of banks, θˆL2 6= θˆH2 , such that (i) creditors run
if and only if xi ≤ xˆ, and (ii) a bank of type L (resp. H) fails if and only if θ2 ≤ θˆL2
(resp. ≤ θˆH2 ). The equations determining the equilibrium of the global game change
accordingly: (i) a creditor who receives private signal xˆ should be just indifferent
between actions RUN and WAIT, given that banks of type {L,H} fails if and only
if the fundamental θ2 is below the respective threshold and the (posterior) beliefs
are (pL, pH), and (ii) a bank of type L(resp. H) fails exactly at θˆ
L
2 (resp. θˆ
H
2 ) if
creditors run if and only if xi < xˆ. Pooling equilibrium thresholds are characterized
by Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In any pooling equilibrium where banks follow the same risk management
strategy sp, the equilibrium of the stage 2 subgame (coordination stage) is charac-
terized by fundamental thresholds θˆL,P2 and θˆ
H,P
2 and strategic threshold xˆ where
θˆL,P2 (sp) = t−
spθ1
1 + 2σ
− 2σspθ
L
1
1 + 2σ
θˆH,P2 (sp) = t−
spθ1
1 + 2σ
− 2σspθ
H
1
1 + 2σ
and
xˆ = 2σt− σ + pLθˆL,P2 + pH θˆH,P2
Proof. See Appendix
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From Lemma 3, the thresholds can be rewritten as
θˆL,P2 (s) = θˆ
L,FI
2 (s)−
pH∆θ1
1 + 2σ
s
θˆH,P2 (s) = θˆ
H,FI
2 (s) +
pL∆θ1
1 + 2σ
s
where FI index stands for the full-information threshold. Some consequences can be
seen immediately. First, for every s we obtain that θˆH,FI1 (s) < θˆ
H,P
2 (s) < θˆ
L,P
2 (s) <
θˆL,FI1 (s). In this sense, pooling among the two types of banks implements a cross-
subsidy across types, as for any given level of risk management, increases L-type’s,
while decreases H-type’s payoff. Second, as the noise of private information in-
creases, the pooling thresholds continuously approach the full-information thresh-
olds, so the cross-subsidy effect of pooling decreases. Intuitively, similarly to the
case with separating equilibrium, with an increasing noise in the private signals,
fundamental thresholds become less-and-less responsive to other parameters of the
game, dampening the effect of the shift in the strategic threshold. Finally, as the
ex-ante percentage of low (high) types increases, the strategic threshold in pooling
approaches the full information low (high) threshold.
The following Corollary will turn out to be useful to characterize welfare
effects:
Corollary 2 The average fundamental threshold in any pooling equilibrium is a
linear function of the average type θ1 = pLθ
L
1 + pHθ
H
1 . Precisely,
θ
P
2 (s) = t−
s(pLθ
L
1 ) + pHθ
H
1 )
1 + 2σ
− pL 2σsθ
L
1
1 + 2σ
− pH 2σsθ
H
1
1 + 2σ
= t− θ1s
Now we turn to the question of which risk management actions can be main-
tained in a pooling equilibrium. The complication arises from the fact that the
equilibrium concept we used so far does not place any restrictions on the beliefs
off-the-equilibrium path, which are never reached to verify those beliefs. First, we
assume that agents’ beliefs are characterized as follows:
• (Equilibrium path) If agents observe the pooling level intervention, sp they
play according to respective coordination game, as defined above;
• (Off-the-equilibrium path) if agents observe any other intervention s 6= sp they
believe that the regime is of low type.
This belief system is often used in the signalling literature as a benchmark. Under
this specification, every level of risk management which gives at least as much profit
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to both types as they would get under ‘low type’ beliefs can be maintained. Since the
privately optimal levels for the two types are different, there is no Pareto-dominant
pooling equilibrium.15 However, any policy intervention sp /∈
[
sL?p , s
H?
p
]
is Pareto-
dominated by some intervention level sp ∈
[
sL?p , s
H?
p
]
.
Banks may be pooling on various values of action s, which potentially leads
to a continuum of pooling equilibria. This set of equilibria is limited by the usual
incentive compatibility constraints: in any proposed equilibrium, both types should
get a higher payoff than in any off-equilibrium path. Because according to the spec-
ified belief system, on any off-equilibrium path banks are perceived to be low-types,
their best deviation is to implement the optimal action, given that the perceived
type is ‘low’. Thus, any candidate equilibrium sp is such that
pioff
(
s?L; θ
L
1 , θ
L
1
) ≤ pipeq(sp; θL1 ) (2.16)
pioff
(
s?H.L, θ
H
1 , θ
L
1
) ≤ pipeq(sp, θH1 ) (2.17)
These incentive compatibility constraints select a critical value — denoted
by smaxp — as a maximum incentive-compatible signal in a pooling equilibrium
16.
Theorem 3 There exist a pooling equilibrium where both types of banks send a sig-
nal sp for every sp ∈ [s?, s?], where the critical values solve the incentive compatibility
constraints in Equation 2.16 and 2.17.
Proof. Follows from above.
2.4 Payoffs and incentive-compatible regulations
In this section we analyse ex-ante expected payoffs for the bank and the creditors
separately, and draw some conclusions regarding the welfare effects of regulation. For
the ease of exposition let’s denote any equilibrium as Q := {sL, sH , θˆL2 , θˆH2 , xˆL, xˆH},
where {sL, sH} are equilibrium first-stage strategies of a bank of type L,H, {xˆL, xˆH}
are strategic thresholds and {θˆL2 , θˆH2 , } are fundamental thresholds of type L,H.17
15This is in contrast to, for example, a simple Spence-model, where zero education by both types
Pareto-dominates all other pooling equilibria.
16Precisely, they will select also an sminp and for the lower boundary the first IC may be binding,
but the upper boundary is the interesting one for our application.
17If Q is a pooling equilibrium, {sL = sH} and {xˆL = xˆH}
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2.4.1 Bank’s expected payoff
Let piQL (resp. pi
Q
H) denote the low (high) type’s ex-post expected payoff in any
equilibrium Q, and p the probability mass of low-type banks. Then the expected
payoff for a bank from ex-ante point of view (i.e. before learning his type) can be
formulated as:
E
[
piQ
]
= ppiQL + (1− p)piQH (2.18)
Recall that (irrespectively how the threshold and in turn the probability of survival
is calculated) the bank’s payoff can be written generally for τ ∈ {L,H} as
piQτ =
1
2η
(
θ2 − θˆτ,Q2 (sQτ )
) (
k − csQτ
)
where the variables θˆτ,Q2 and s
Q
τ are the equilibrium-Q values for type τ .
Pooling equilibrium [PE]: In any PE sQτ = sp for all τ , so for an arbitrary sp,
EpiPE = ppiL(sp) + (1− p)piH(sp) = pi(θAV1 , sp)
=
1
2η
(
θ2 − θˆ2(θAV1 , sp)
)
(k − csp)
The simple formula facilitates easy comparative statics: the ex-ante expected payoff
in pooling is not a function of noise, and is decreasing in p 18.
Separating equilibrium [SE]: We focus only on the least-costly SE, which is
well defined by exogenous parameters. Recall that in this equilibrium the separating
action by the low-type is the optimum value according to the symmetric information
benchmark s?L, and she obtains her minimax profit, while the high-type sets the
appropriate critical value scriH.2 and obtains a profit which is (weakly) less than the
benchmark value. The ex-ante expected payoff to the bank is therefore always
(weakly) below the symmetric information value, and the welfare loss relative to
this benchmark is concentrated on the high-type. Formally, we have:
EpiSE = ppiL(s?L) + (1− p)piH(scriH.2),
From ex-ante point of view the bank prefers pooling over separation if and only if
EpiPE(sp) > EpiSE (2.19)
This can be calculated analytically, however, is tedious due to the complicated
formula for separating equilibrium expected payoffs, and we resort to numerical
18The derivative is ∂
∂p
= − 1
2η
(k − csp)sp∆θ1 < 0
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Figure 2.8: Illustration of banks’ ex-ante expected payoff
Expected payoff is larger in pooling then in separation from ex-ante point of view,
and for the both types separately (dashed and dotted lines)
analysis. The ex-ante expected pooling profit is a concave function of sp (blue
curve in Figure 2.8). As long as the optimal pooling, derived analytically in 2.A.6.1,
exceeds profits from separating equilibrium (red), there exists a compact interval of
risk management actions at which pooling is ex-ante preferred to separation. We
focus on the upper threshold of this region which we denote by notation scrip . If this
threshold exists, pooling is preferred by the banks from ex-ante point of view for all
sp < s
cri
p .
In the context of the welfare impact of regulations, this implies that pooling is
preferred by banks whenever the regulatory requirement required to induce pooling
is not too large. From the banks’ point of view, the optimal regulatory threshold
would be the one which is just sufficient to squeeze out incentives for inefficient
signalling, but not too large yet to impose an extra burden for both types of banks
in the form of a too restrictive regulation. Notice that as can be seen from the figure,
similar conclusions follow not just from ex-ante point of view (when types are not
known), but after the realization, for the two types separately. The high-type bank
benefits from the reduction of costly signalling, why the low-type benefits from the
cross-subsidy effect in the resulting pooling equilibrium.
The critical value scrip strictly decreases in p. In particular, in the limit where
p → 0 (almost all banks are H-types), scrip = scriH.2, that is, the critical regulatory
level equals the risk management level in a least-costly separating equilibrium. This
means every pooling below this value is welfare-improving (Figure 2.9a). It might
be useful to note that the least-costly separating equilibrium does not depend on
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Figure 2.9: Illustration of banks’ ex-ante expected payoff:
Limiting cases
(a) Banks’ ex-ante payoff as p→ 0 (b) Banks’ ex-ante payoff as p→ p?
the type distribution: maintaining separation is just as costly if there is only one
single low-type bank as if there are many19. Consequently, being in a separating
equilibrium is more ‘inefficient’, therefore more costly overall, when the mass of
low-type banks is low (small p).
In the other limit, as p→ 1 the critical value scrip converges to the low-type’s
minimax payoff, and pooling is never welfare-improving. The intuitive reason is that
pooling is not particularly desirable for either types when very large number of low-
type banks are present, as low-types have little to gain while high types have much
to loose. Using continuity arguments it is possible to show the existence of a critical
probability level p? such that a (critical) regulatory threshold which just imposes
pooling improves ex-ante payoff if and only if p < p? (this situation is depicted in
Figure 2.9b). Formally, this is the value of p which solves expression (2.19) with
equality.
Finally, the critical value scrip strictly decreases in the creditors’ private noise
σ, and this implies the existence of a critical noise σcri such that pooling is beneficial
if and only if σ < σcri. Intuitively, pooling is more likely to be preferred by banks
if the noise in creditors’ private information is not too large, because in this case
maintaining separation is relatively costly, just as discussed before in more details.
To sum up the intuition, we can conclude the followings: (i) ex ante, banks
may (but do not necessarily) prefer pooling on not too large risk management
actions. This prevents them from sending inefficiently high signals in a separating
equilibrium, and boosts payoff due to cross-subsidy. (ii) Lower noise / higher preci-
sion increases the costs of inefficient separation for the high-type. This makes banks
19The difference compared to a hypothetical payoff in a pooling equilibrium, however, is not
distribution-independent.
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to like pooling even more, and to prefer it over separation at even higher (regulatory)
levels. In addition, lower noise in private information pushes down the minimum
threshold which is required to force out separating equilibria. (iii) With more high
type banks in the population, costly signalling happens more often, therefore banks
prefer pooling even more from ex-ante point of view.
2.4.2 Creditors’ expected payoff
The creditor’s payoff is t if she withdraws, 1 if the bank survives and she stays, and 0
in case of bankruptcy. The expected payoff reflects that (i) higher risk management
action has a fundamental stabilizing role, so ceteris paribus creditors would always
prefer higher signals; (ii) when comparing pooling with separation, the benefits of
high-types’ (excessive) risk management signals are weighed against low-type’s lower
action.
Separating equilibrium: In Appendix we derive creditors’ ex-ante expected
payoff analytically. Because in any separating equilibrium types are perfectly re-
vealed, the ex-ante payoff is the probabilty-weighted average of the symmetric in-
formation benchmark payoffs using the prior probability distribution (p) as weights.
Lemma 4 The (conditional) expected payoff to the creditors of a bank with known
(or correctly deduced) type τ ∈ {L,H} who exert an arbitrary risk management
action s is
E1[u|τ ] = 1
2η
(
(θ2 − tθ2)− σt(1− t)− (t− θτ1s)(1− t)
)
, where θ2 = θ2 − 2η.
Proof. See Appendix
We are particularly interested in the unique, least-costly separating equilib-
rium, in which the risk management signals send by low (high) type respectively
are given by s?L and s
cri
H.2. The ex-ante expected payoff in the least-costly separating
equilibrium is
E0u = pE1[u(s?L)|L] + (1− p)E1[u(scriH.2)|H]
=
1
2η
(
(θ2 − tθ2)− σt(1− t)− (1− t)
(
t− pθL1 s?L − (1− p)θH1 scriH.2
))
Ceteris paribus creditors prefer higher risk management action because of their
stabilizing role. In a separating equilibrium the high-type sends higher signals which
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directly improves creditors’ payoff, but the low-type’s low action decreases creditors’
payoff compared to pooling on some higher value.
Lower precision of creditors’ private signal decreases payoff, as it increases
strategic threshold, while keeping the fundamental threshold fixed. That increases
the likelihood of making both types of errors (withdrawal if the bank eventually
survives or stay while it fails). Lower precision has another indirect effect which
points to the same direction: it decreases the separating signal level, which decreases
payoff of the creditors.
Pooling equilibrium: Expected payoff in a pooling equilibrium is slightly
more tedious to calculate because we have to take into account that the two types of
banks are facing a mass of creditors who follow the same strategy in equilibrium, but
the banks have different failure thresholds. Nevertheless, the calculations are fairly
straightforward using the expressions derived under Pooling Equilibrium section.
Lemma 5 In any feasible pooling equilibrium when banks pool at risk management
signal s, creditors facing the type {L,H} respectively obtain the following expected
payoffs:
E1[u|L] = 1
2η
(
(θ2 − tθ2) + (t2(1 + 2σ)− tθAV1 s− 2σt) + tσ − σ(t−
spH∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2 − θˆLP
)
E1[u|H] = 1
2η
(
(θ2 − tθ2) + (t2(1 + 2σ)− tθAV1 s− 2σt) + tσ − σ(t+
spL∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2 − θˆHP
)
The ex-ante expected payoff is therefore
E0u =
1
2η
(
(θ2 − tθ2) + t2(1 + 2σ) + θAV1 s(1− t)− σt− σpL
(
t− spH∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2
− σpH
(
t+
spL∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2
− t
)
where pL = p and pH = 1− p.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is possible to analytically determine the region where a pooling equilibrium
is preferred by creditors from ex-ante point of view, but the calculations are tedious.
When p = 1 (all types are low-types), the SE-payoff equals to the PE-payoff if s
is set to s?L. Pooling on every other value higher than that improves the creditors’
payoff. In contrast, when p = 0 (all types are high-types), the SE-payoff equals
the pooling payoff if pooling were set to the separating (high) level action. In this
situation imposing pooling at any level s < scrii reduces the payoff to creditors (but
leaves more profit to the banks). In every point between those extremes, there exists
a pooling level s0p which is just sufficient to make sure that EuSE < EuPE . This
value is decreasing in p (with more low-type banks, a lower pooling level is sufficient
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Figure 2.10: Illustration of creditors’ payoff
to increase utility of creditors).
Creditors’ payoff is increasing in precision in all equilibria. This is due to the
decrease in both types of errors what creditors make due to the effective strategy.
Higher precision means higher separating signal for the high type, as established
in the ‘separating equilibrium’ section. That means, a higher sp is required to
‘compensate’ creditors. Higher precision pushes s0p upwards.
2.5 Empirical analysis
We illustrate our model with two simple empirical analyses. The first example builds
on the recent introduction of Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) in the US. In essence,
the LCR places a quantitative lower bound on the amount of liquid assets which
must be held by financial institutions at all time. In the analysis we exploit the fact
that the rule only applies to ‘large, internationally active’ bank holding companies
and show that - consistently with the idea of squeezing out separating equilibrium
- the introduction of LCR regulation was followed by a larger decrease of volatility
of cash ratios for holding companies which were subject to the newly introduced
regulation, compared to those below the threshold of qualifying for regulation.
Our second example investigates changes in equity ratios around the intro-
duction of the first generation of Basel capital regulations in 1988. Interestingly,
the data shows a significant increase of the number of banks with high capital ratios
after the introduction of the new regulatory regime. According to our theory, this
is consistent with a quantitative regulatory requirement set too low, and therefore
being unable to squeeze out separating equilibrium.
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2.5.1 Liquidity Coverage Ratio
As part of its regulatory reform package in response to the financial crisis known
as Basel III, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision has put forward a series
of measures concerning the liquidity risk framework of financial institutions. The
agenda consists of two key elements: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requires
banks to hold an adequate amount of highly liquid assets to cover outflows in a
crisis scenario over a 30 days period, while the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
supplements this measure by ensuring a sustainable asset-liability maturity structure
over a longer time horizon. In our analysis we focus on the former measure.
The Basel Committee announced the final version of LCR in January, 201320
and adopted a gradual approach for implementation, with the full version in effect
from January 2019. In November 2013, US authorities proposed an LCR regulation
largely consistent with the guidelines set forth by the Basel Committee. The final
rule was adopted in September 2014, being in effect from January 2015, with a much
shorter transition period than the Basel III proposal “to preserve the strong liquidity
positions many U.S. banking organizations have achieved since the recent financial
crisis”.
For our analysis, we have constructed a ‘treatment’ sample consisting of in-
ternationally active bank holding companies (BHC’s) with Total Assets more than
$50bn, and we look at changes of cash ratios (defined as Cash / Total Assets) from
2011 to 2016, based on FR-Y-9C filings. Our control sample consists of BHC’s with
Total Assets between $10bn and $40bn, which consistently reported throughout the
whole sample period. Table 2.1 summarizes the treatment and control sample.
treatment control
nrBanks 32 73
avgCashRat 0.0142 0.0143
stDevCashRat 0.0067 0.0082
totalAsset 441 765 936 16 799 271
Table 2.1: Overview of treatment and control samples
Findings
We find that both the mean and the standard deviation of cash ratios de-
creased during the period for both the treatment and the control sample. However,
following the announcement of Basel III LCR, and especially around the introduc-
20Basel III, B.C.B.S. “The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools.” Bank
for International Settlements (2013).
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Figure 2.11: Distribution of cash-ratios of large BHC’s
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tion of the follow-up US regulation, the standard deviation of cash ratios in the
treatment sample started to decrease significantly more sharply than that of the
control sample (see Figure 2.12). This was mainly driven by the disappearance of
larger values (i.e. BHC’s with too high cash ratios, see Figure 2.11), which, in the
context of our model, can be interpreted as an elimination of separating equilibrium.
We plot the six BHC’s with the biggest cash drops on average before/after the event
date in Figure 2.13a. To further emphasize this finding, in Figure 2.13b we plot the
difference of average standard deviation for the sample and treatment group before
and after the date of announcement of US regulation. The increasing difference jus-
tifies the larger clustering of observations in the treatment sample relative to control
as an effect of introducing liquidity regulation.
Finally, we perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to mechanically compare the
distributions of treatment and control samples. Before the announcement of LCR
regulation, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the two distributions are the
same (p-value: 0.79), while it can be rejected after the event (p-value: 0.01).
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Figure 2.12: Standard deviation of cash ratios
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Dispersion of cash-ratios decreased more sharply for BHC’s above
the regulation threshold than those of below the threshold.
Figure 2.13: Impact of LCR regulation
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2.5.2 Basel I Capital Regulation
Our second empirical analysis focuses on the introduction of minimum capital reg-
ulations under Basel I. The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) pub-
lished the requirements in 1988 and required banks to maintain a minimum ratio of
capital over total risk-weighted asset. Although we do not attempt reconstruct the
nominator (weighted sum of various elements of banks’ capital) or the denominator
(risk-weighted assets), we believe that for our purposes the plain equity ratio defined
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Figure 2.14: Distribution of equity ratios
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will suffice. Figure 2.14 plots the distribution of equity ratios of the top 100 (by
Total Asset) US-regulated bank in the period 1985-1996. Even without any formal
statistical analysis, a significant structural change is recognizable around the intro-
duction of Basel I (although announced in 1988, the capital requirements were bind-
ing from 1992). First, the bottom-end of the distributions notably shifted upwards,
consistently with the regulatory intention behind the new set of rules.21 Another
visible characteristic however, which was certainly not an explicit regulatory aim,
an increase in variance, and especially an increase of the number of ‘outliers’, i.e.
institutions maintaining significantly larger equity ratios.
In the context of our model, this effect is consistent with a quantitative
regulatory minimum which is not sufficiently large to squeeze out separating equi-
librium. Indeed, as we have shown in Section 2.3.3, an insufficiently high regulatory
minimum can preserve the incentives for signalling and even increase the minimum
signal which is required to maintain separation.
21Note that this notable upward shift is missing from the time series of distributions of cash
ratios. This is due to the fact that cash holdings have significantly increased during the financial
crisis, but already were on a downward trajectory, and one of the reasons of the swift introduction
of LCR in the US was to prevent the elevated levels to fall below pre-crisis levels.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a model which combines signalling and global games to
understand the informational impact of risk management measures and the possible
effect of regulation in banking. We established two main results: (i) absent regu-
lation, banks have incentives to signal their quality and may engage in ‘excess risk
management’, which is inefficient; (ii) a financial regulation can squeeze out ineffi-
cient separation and improve welfare by introducing a quantitative minimum of the
given risk measure. Our results provide a novel perspective on understanding some
consequences of financial regulation.
The model has testable empirical predictions: for example, in the context of
liquidity holdings, in the absence of quantitative regulation in place, we expect high
dispersion of liquidity ratios, which is consistently found in bank as well as mutual
fund databases. Introducing liquidity regulation neutralizes this incentive, so we
expect clustering of observations around the requirement. We find that changes in
cash ratios following the recent introduction of LCR ratios in the US are consistent
with this hypothesis. Changes in equity ratios, however, around the introduction of
Basel I regulatory capital regime are rather consistent with an insufficiently large
regulatory minimum, unable to squeeze out separation.
40
2.A Appendix A - Proofs
2.A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the Lemma in two steps. First, we focus on equilibria in monotone strate-
gies, and show the existence of a unique threshold equilibrium in monotone strate-
gies. The proof uses the contraction mapping theorem to show that the result holds
for a large class of functional forms for R. Then, we apply the procedure of itera-
tive elimination of strictly dominated strategies (ISD) and show that this threshold
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium which survives ISD, therefore, no other equi-
libria exist. We will assume throughout the proof that fundamental uncertainty is
such that with some probability even the strongest banks can fail, while even the
weakest bank can survive for any risk management actions which may be taken in
any equilibrium.
Assumption 2 We assume that there exists θ2? and θ
?
2 such that
• Lower dominance region: ∀θ1 ∈ {θL1 , θS1 }, and ∀s ∈ S?, ∃θ2? > θ2 such that
∀θ2 < θ2?:
R(θ1, θ2, s, 0) < 0
• Upper dominance region: ∀θ1 ∈ {θL1 , θS1 }, and ∀s ∈ S?, ∃θ?2 < θ2 such that
∀θ2 > θ?2:
R(θ1, θ2, s, 1) > 1
where S? is the set of equilibrium values of signal s.
Part 1: Equilibrium in monotone strategies:
Suppose that creditors run on the bank if and only if their private signal
satisfies xi < xˆ. Given this strategy, let us denote the aggregate size of the run
for any realization of the fundamental θ2 ∈ [θ2, θ2] by A(xˆ, θ2). Now we define
the expected difference in utilities between actions WAIT and RUN for a creditor
receiving signal x as
V (x, xˆ) :=E [u(θ1, θ2, s,A(xˆ, θ2))− t|x]
=Prob[R(θ1, θ2, s,A) < 0|x](0− t) + Prob[R(θ1, θ2, s,A) > 0|x](1− t)
(2.1)
Let us introduce the notation ν(x, xˆ) for the posterior probability assessment of
the bank’s survival by a creditor who receives a private signal x, given that the
41
equilibrium is that creditors run if and only if x < xˆ.
ν(x, xˆ) := Prob[R (θ1, θ2, s,A(xˆ, θ2)) > 0|x]
With this notation, we can rewrite the difference utility function as
V (x, xˆ) = ν(x, xˆ)− t (2.2)
For every θ2 ∈ [θ2, θ2] the aggregate size of a run is
A(xˆ, θ2) = Prob[xi ≤ xˆ|θ2] = Prob(θ2 + σi ≤ xˆ|θ2) = Prob
(
i ≤ xˆ− θ2
σ
)
Given our assumption on the stochastic structure of the game, that  is distributed
uniformly, this implies
A(xˆ, θ2) = min
(
max
(
xˆ− θ2 + σ
2σ
; 0
)
; 1
)
(2.3)
As A(xˆ, θ2) monotone decreases in θ2, and R strictly monotone decreases in A, the
function R monotonically and continuously increases in the fundamental θ2. Fur-
thermore, due to the existence of lower and upper dominance regions (Assumption
2), by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a unique value of θ2, denoted
by θˆ2, which is the implicit solution of the following equation:
R(θ1, θˆ2, s,A(xˆ, θˆ2)) = 0 (2.4)
As a consequence, the bank fails if and only if θ2 < θˆ2(xˆ) (existence of fundamental
threshold).
BecauseA(xˆ, θ2) is strictly monotone increasing in xˆ, the fundamental thresh-
old θˆ2(xˆ) is increasing in xˆ.
Given the existence of a unique θˆ2, the posterior probability that a credi-
tor receiving signal x and correctly anticipating equilibrium strategic threshold xˆ
attaches to the event of bank’s survival is
ν(x, xˆ) = Prob[θ2 > θˆ|x] = 1− Pr[θ2 ≤ θˆ2|x] = Pr
(
 ≤ x− θˆ2
σ
)
=
x− θˆ2(xˆ) + σ
2σ
The function ν(x, xˆ) is decreasing in xˆ, increasing in x, and is continuous in x.
Therefore, it is possible to define a unique function h(xˆ), such that the solution of
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the equation x = h(xˆ) also solves
V (xˆ, xˆ) = 0
The function h(xˆ) summarizes best responses of the game, is continuous and in-
creasing in xˆ, therefore its fixed points coincide with the monotone equilibria of the
game.
The last step of the proof is to show the existence of a unique fixed point of
the function h(xˆ). For simplicity we show this first to the main example functional
form, then generalize. With R = θ1s+θ2−A(xˆ, θ2), we can solve 2.4 explicitly, and
we obtain
θˆ2(xˆ) =
xˆ
1 + 2σ
− 2σ
1 + 2σ
θ1s+
σ
1 + 2σ
(2.5)
Recall the function V (x, xˆ):
V (x, xˆ) =
x− θˆ2 + σ
2σ
− t (2.6)
which implies that the function h(xˆ) can be written explicitly as
h(x) := 2σt− σ + θˆ2(xˆ) (2.7)
Solving for the fixed point of h amounts to solving the equation x = h(x), which
gives the unique solution
xˆ = t− θ1s+ 2σt− σ (2.8)
Substituting back gives the result for equilibrium fundamental threshold
θˆ2 = t− θ1s (2.9)
This concludes the existence proof for the example functional form.
The general proof: Now we generalize the last part of the proof to an
arbitrary function R(·) satisfying certain conditions. Notice that the critical part is
to show the existence of a unique fixed point of function h(x). We will demonstrate
this by showing that the best response function is a contraction. A sufficient condi-
tion for contraction is that the derivative of a function is less than 1 everywhere on
its domain. We are therefore looking for the derivative
∂h(x)
∂x
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Notice that the generic functional form 2.7 is valid for an arbitrary R, therefore
∂h(xˆ)
∂xˆ
=
∂θˆ2(xˆ)
∂xˆ
(2.10)
The function θˆ2(xˆ) is implicitly defined in Equation 2.4. First, suppose that R only
depends on θ2 directly and through the effect on A, but not interacting with other
variables. We can use Implicit Function Theorem to write
∂θ2
∂x
= − ∂R/∂x
∂R/∂θˆ2
= −
∂R
∂A
∂A
∂x
∂R
∂θ2
+ ∂R∂A
∂A
∂θ2
Because ∂A/∂x = 1/2σ and ∂A/∂θ2 = −1/2σ it simplifies a little bit:
∂θ2
∂x
= − ∂R/∂x
∂R/∂θˆ2
= −
1
1σ
∂R
∂A
∂R
∂θ2
− 12σ ∂R∂A
The assumptions ∂R/∂A < 0 and ∂R/∂θ2 > 0 are sufficient to guarantee that this
expression is smaller than 1, and that is sufficient condition for contraction mapping.
We have established the existence of a threshold-equilibrium in monotone
strategies for an arbitrary function of R satisfying the assumptions of our model.
Part 2: Uniqueness of equilibrium.
First, we maintain as an assumption that for all s ∈ S?, there exists θ2(s)
such that R(θ1, θ2(s), s, 0) < 0, where S? is the set of values of intervention s which
may be taken in any equilibria. In this lower dominance region the bank defaults
even with no runs (α = 0). Denote this critical value by H0(s).
22 Under the
most optimistic beliefs, a creditor whose posterior belief over the fundamental θ2
places some positive weight on θ2 < H0(s) believes that the bank fails if and only
if θ2 < H0(s). Because the conditional probability Pr(θ2 < ξ|xi) is decreasing in
xi (a lower signal increases the probability of a lower θ2), it decreases the difference
utility under these beliefs. Therefore, there exists a critical signal, denoted by h0(s)
such that all creditors with signal xi < h0(s) find it dominant to run on the bank.
The critical signal ho(s) is determined implicitly by the indifference condition of
that creditor:
Pr[R(θ1, θ2, s,A) > 0|ho(s)] = t
where
Pr[R(θ1, θ2, s,A) > 0|ho(s)] = Pr[θ2 > H0(s)|h0(s)] = h0(s)−H0(s) + σ
2σ
22For the example functional form of R: H0(s) = −θ1s
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therefore
h0(s) = H0(s) + 2σt− σ
We have established that it is always strictly dominant to run whenever xi < h0(s).
For n ≥ 0 define the sequences Hn(s) and hn(s) as follows:
R(θ1, Hn(s), s,A(hn−1(s), Hn(s)) = 0 (2.11)
and
hn(s)−Hn(s) + σ
2σ
= t (2.12)
Equation 2.11 implicitly defines a sequence for the value of fundamental θ2 which
solves R(·) = 0, given that only creditors with xi < hn−1(s) run on the bank.
Because R is increasing in θ2 and decreasing in A, and A is increasing in xˆ and
decreasing in θ2, we conclude that Hn(s) is increasing in hn−1(s). The sequence
hn(s) in Equation 2.12 defines the value of a private signal x, such that for a creditor
it is strictly dominant to run, given he believes that the bank fails if and only if
θ2 < Hn(s). The sequence hn(s) is clearly monotonically increases in Hn. Because
both sequences are bounded and monotonically increasing, they converge to some
value h and H. But h must be a fixed point of the function h(xˆ) defined previously.
What we have proven: even creditors with the most optimistic beliefs regard-
ing other creditors’ behaviour will find it iteratively dominant to run on the bank if
xi < xˆ.
Analogously, it is possible to construct iterative deletion of strictly dominated
strategies from above: this will show that even with the most pessimistic beliefs,
that means, RUN always whenever it is not strictly dominant to WAIT, it is never
rationalizable to RUN if xi > xˆ. The two parts together implies that the unique,
rationalizable action profile for creditors is RUN if and only if xi < xˆ.
2.A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The objective function of the bank is to maximize expected profit, conditional on
the equilibrium in the second stage. That is, the bank’s program is
max
s
pi(θ1, s)
where pi(θ1, s) = Pr[θ2 > θˆ2|θ1, s] (k − cs)
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Let η = θ−θ2 denote the “prior noise”, and introduce ρ(·) to denote the probability
of survival:
ρ(θ1, s) = Pr[θ2 > θˆ2|θ1, s] = 1
2η
(
θ2 − θˆ2(θ1, s)
)
Then we can write the expected profit for any given signal s as
pi(θ1, s) =
∫ θ2
θˆ2
(k − c · s)µ(·)dθ2 = ρ(θ1, s)(k − cs)
where µ(·) denotes the prior on θ2. The bank’s optimal risk management action
trades off cost of the signal with an increased probability of survival. The first-order
condition
∂pi
∂s
=
∂ρ
∂s
(k − c · s)− ρc = 1
2η
(
θ1(k − c · s)− cθ2 + c(t− θ1s)
)
= 0
implies the optimal intervention s?(θ1) and the associated optimal profit pi
?(θ1) as
s?(θ1) =
1
2
(
k
c
− θ2 − t
θ1
)
pi?(θ1) =
(
c
(
θ2 − t
)
+ θ1k
)2
4cθ1
Next, we calculate the first derivatives with respect to θ1 for both the optimal signal
and the optimal profit. For the optimal signal:
∂s?
∂θ1
=
1
2
θ2 − t
θ21
This is always strictly positive whenever the problem satisfies the natural parametric
assumptions θ2 > 1 > t. For the optimal profit:
∂pi?
∂θ1
=
k2θ21 − [c(t− θ2)]2
4cθ21
=
1
4
(
k2
c
− c
2(t− θ2)2
θ21
)
the derivative is strictly positive whenever the following condition holds.
k
c
≥ θ2 − t
θ1
Note that the condition trivially implies s? ≥ 0. 
46
2.A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Separating equilibrium can be maintained if the following two incentive compatibil-
ity constraints are satisfied:
pieq(s?L, θ
L
1 ) ≥ pioff (sH , θL1 , θH1 ) (ICL)
pieq(sH , θ
H
1 ) ≥ pioff (s?H.L, θH1 , θL1 ) (ICH)
where the functions pieq(s, θ) and s?L(·) are defined in Lemma 1, while pioff (s, θ, θ)
and s?L.H are derived in equations 2.8 and 2.9 in the main text. Let us denote
by ρi(s) the probability that a bank of type i ∈ {L,H} survives if they creditors
believe that it is of type i with action s, while ρi.j the probability that a bank of
type i ∈ {L,H} survives if they creditors believe that it is of type −i:
ρi(s) := Pr[θ2 > θˆ
i
2(s)] ∀i ∈ {L,H}
ρi.j(s) := Pr[θ2 > θˆ
i.j
2 (s)] ∀i ∈ {L,H}
With this notation the incentive compatibility constraint for ICL can be written as:
ρL(s
?
L)(k − cs?L)− ρL.H(s)(k − cs) ≥ 0 (2.13)
After substitution of the expressions for probabilities, we have
1
2η
(
θ2 − θˆL2 (s?L)
)
(k − cs?L)−
1
2η
(
θ2 − θˆL.H2 (s)
)
(k − cs) ≥ 0
Recall that θˆL2 (s) = t − θL1 s, s?L = 12
(
k
c − θ2−tθL1
)
and θˆL.H2 (s) = t − s
(
θH1 +2σθ
L
1
1+2σ
)
=
t− sΘ, where for simplicity, we introduce Θ :=
(
θH1 +2σθ
L
1
1+2σ
)
. Then it follows that
θ2c(s− s?L)− tc(s− s?L)− cθL1 [s?L]2 + cΘs2 − k
(
sΘ− θL1 s?L
) ≥ 0
cΘs2 +
(
c(θ2 − t)− kΘ
)
s− (c(θ2 − t)− kθL) s?L − cθL1 [s?L]2 ≥ 0
After substitution we have
(
c(θ2 − t)− kθL
)
s?L − cθL1 [s?L]2 =
cθL1
4
(
k
c
− θ2 − t
θL1
)2
“C”
Θ2c2
(
k
c
− θ2 − t
Θ
)2
“B2”
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So the expression B
2−4AC
4A2
takes a particularly simple form:
1
4
((
k
c
)2 [Θ− θL1
Θ
]
+
(
θ2 − t
)2 [ 1
Θ2
− 1
ΘθL1
])
Putting together the formula for solving a quadratic equation and substituting the
expression for Θ we get
scriL.2 =
1
2
(
k
c
− (1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
2σθL1 + θ
H
1
)
+
1
2
√
∆θ1(
2σθL1 + θ
H
1
)
√√√√(k2
c2
− (1 + 2σ)(
2σθL1 + θ
H
1
) (θ2 − t)2
θL1
)
With similar algebra it is possible to derive the solution of ICH
scriH.2 =
1
2
(
k
c
− θ2 − t
θH1
)
+
1
2
√
∆θ1
(
k2
c2
1
(1 + 2σ)θH1
− (θ2 − t)
2
θH1
1
θL1 + 2σθ
H
1
)
Both thresholds are decreasing functions of the creditors’ noise σ.
Limit of large noise: We start with the limit of large noise where σ →∞.
lim
σ→∞ s
cri
L.2 =
1
2
(
k
c
− (1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
2σθL1 + θ
H
1
)
+ 0 = s?L
Explanation: all terms under the square-root trivially converge to 0. The second
term within the brackets — it is easy to calculate the limit of the inverse:
2σθL1 + θ
H
1
(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
=
(1 + 2σ)θL1 + θ
H
1 − θL1
(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
=
θL1
θ2 − t
+
∆θ1
(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
→ θ
L
1
θ2 − t
This implies the result. The limit for the high-threshold is trivial to calculate:
lim
σ→∞ s
cri
H.2 =
1
2
(
k
c
− θ2 − t
θH1
)
= s?H
Since scriL.2 continuously and monotonically approaches s
?
L as σ →∞, and s?L < s?H ,
by the intermediate value theorem there exists a unique value of σ, denoted by σ,
such that
scriL.2(σ) = s
?
H
Whenever σ > σ, the pair {s?L; s?H} is incentive-compatible for the low (L) and high
(H) types as well, and the first-best can be maintained as a separating equilibrium.
48
Limit of small noise: Now we turn to the analysis of the case of small noise, as
σ → 0. First, calculate the limit of critical signals as σ → 0. After some algebraic
manipulations it is possible to show that the critical incentive-compatible signals
converge to the same expression:
lim
σ→0
scriL.2 = lim
σ→0
scriH.2 =
1
2
(
k
c
− θ2 − t
θH1
)
+
1
2
√
∆θ1
θH1
(
k2
c2
− (θ2 − t)
2
θL1 θ
H
1
)
Conditions for existence of the equilibrium
A ‘constructive’ approach to prove the statement of the theorem by solving
the equation scrii = s
cri
j is not possible due to the analytical complexity of the
non/limiting case. Instead, we prove the theorem using the following steps, which
are analytically easier to calculate:
1. Calculate the partial derivatives
∂scriL
∂σ and
∂scriH
∂σ
2. Consider the value of the derivatives at σ = 0. If (scriL )
′
(0) < (scriH )
′
(0) then
scriH approaches the limit faster, meaning that for sufficiently small σ, we must
have scriL > s
cri
H . Note that from the limiting cases at σ →∞ it is obvious that
for large enough σ, scriL < s
cri
H .
3. Analytically, we solve the equation (scriL )
′
(0) = (scriH )
′
(0) for c. This gives a
critical cost level cˆ such that scriL > s
cri
H for sufficiently small σ
We omit the detailed calculations to save space. The solution for cˆ is
cˆ =
√
∆θ1(kθL1 )
2(
3θL1 + θ
H
1
) (
θ2 − t
) (2.14)
2.A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
We prove a more general version of Lemma 3, with an arbitrary N banks, from
which the version in the main text will be trivial. Suppose the number of banks
is N ≥ 2, each with types θn1 . Without loss of generality we can determine the
indexing of banks such that ni < nj ⇔ θni1 < θnji . Let the prior distribution of types
be Pr[θ1 = θ
n
1 ] = pn. It is useful to interpret N = 1, 2... as quality classes and the
probability pn representing the mass of institutions belonging to this quality class.
Suppose that a closed subset of institutions N := n < n < n are pooling on the
same risk-management signal sp. Let us define the conditional distribution of banks
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belonging to N as P˜ := {p˜n}nn, it is straightforward that
p˜n =
pn∑
n∈N pn
Conditional on observing sp, p˜n represents creditors’ posterior probability of the
event that the bank is of type n. We define the (conditional) average type as
θ
n
1 :=
∑
n∈N
p˜nθ
n
1
Equation 1: we start with the creditors’ indifference condition. A creditor is
indifferent between actions WAIT and RUN if
Pr[Failure] · (0− t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p/o wait-run
+Pr[Survive] · (1− t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p/o wait-run
= 0
Because Pr(Failure) = 1− Pr(Survive), we can rewrite this equation as
Pr[Survive] = t
Using creditors’ posterior probability, we can write
Pr[Survive] =
n∑
n
p˜nΦ
(
xˆ− θˆn1
σ
)
After substitution
n∑
n
p˜n
xˆ− θˆn1 + σ
2σ
= t
this can be rewritten as∑
p˜nxˆ−
∑
p˜nθˆ
n
1 +
∑
p˜nσ = 2σt
xˆ− θˆn1 + σ = 2σt
xˆ = 2σt− σ + θˆn1
Equation 2: Given strategic threshold xˆ, the fundamental threshold solves
R = θ1s+ θ2 − α = 0. After substituting α and rearranging the equation, we have
for each n ∈ N
θˆn2 =
xˆ+ σ − 2σθn1 s
1 + 2σ
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We can calculate θˆ2 as
θˆ2 =
xˆ+ σ − 2σsθ1
1 + 2σ
Substituting back to xˆ,
xˆ = 2σt− σ + xˆ+ σ − 2σsθ1
1 + 2σ
xˆ =
1 + 2σ
2σ
(
2σt− σ + σ
1 + 2σ
− 2σ
1 + 2σ
sθ1
)
then back to θˆn2 :
θˆn2 = t−
1
2
+
1
2(1 + 2σ)
− sθ1
1 + 2σ
+
σ
1 + 2σ
− 2σθ
n
1 s
1 + 2σ
= t− s
(
1
1 + 2σ
θ1 − 2σ
1 + 2σ
θn1
)
The formulas for N = 2 trivially follows. We note that Corollary 1 also follows in
the N ≥ 2 general case, this can be seen with trivial algebra.
—
For the N=2 case which we discuss in the main text, the incentive-compatibility
constraints can be solved analytically. The binding constraint will give the following
upper boundary for the set of pooling equilibria which can be maintained:
sp :=
1
2
(
k
c
− (1− 2σ)(θ2 − t)
θ1 + 2σθL1
+
√
pH∆θ1
θ1 + 2σθL1
(
k2
c2
− (1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
2
θL1 (θ1 + 2σθ
L
1 )
))
2.A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
As explained in the main text, critical regulation level is described by equation 2.14:
scriL = s
cri
H (2.14 revisited)
The analytical solution to this equation is
scriP =
2c(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t) + k∆θ1 −
√(
2c(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t) + k∆θ1
)2 − 4kc(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)∆θ1
2c∆θ1
=
2c(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t) + k∆θ1 −
√(
2c(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
)2
+ (k∆θ1)
2
2c∆θ2
=
(
(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
∆θ1
+
k
2c
)
−
√[
(1 + 2σ)(θ2 − t)
∆θ1
]2
+
[
k
2c
]2
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2.A.6 Proofs for Section 2.4
2.A.6.1 Bank-optimal pooling
Substituting to the ex-ante formula shows that total ex ante payoff is a decreasing
function of the average of thresholds in any given equilibrium. We denote this by
θˆAV2 (s). The threshold θˆ2(s) is always a decreasing function of s (ceteris paribus a
bank’s survival is more likely with higher s). The derivative of the expected profit:
∂Epi
∂s
= −k∂θˆ
AV
2
∂s
− cθ2 + cs∂θˆ
AV
2
∂s
+ cθˆAV2 =
∂θˆAV2
∂s
(−k + cs)− c(θ2 − θˆAV2 ) (2.15)
In any pooling equilibrium, from Corollary 2 we have θˆAV2 = t− sθAV1 so the partial
derivative (2.15) is −θAV1 and the total expected payoff as a function of s is
∂Epi
∂s
= θAV1 (k − cs)− c(θ2 − t+ sθAV1 )
This allows us to calculate the pooling equilibrium which maximizes total bank
welfare: this is pooling on the value of s which solves
θAV1 (k − cs) = c(θ2 − t+ sθAV1 )
so the optimal pooling level is
s?pool = −
c(θ2 − t)− θAV1 k
2cθAV1
=
1
2
(
k
c
− θ2 − t
θAV1
)
It is obvious that s?i < s
?
pool < s
?
j , that is, the best pooling equilibrium is between
the symmetric information benchmark intervention levels.
2.A.6.2 Creditors in separating equilibrium
The mass of creditors who run at θ2 is α(θ2). We denote by θ
?
2 the value of θ2 where
α(θ2) = 0 and by θ2? where α(θ2) = 1. The total payoff to creditors is
Eu =
∫ θ2?
θ2
tν(·)dθ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
All withdraw
+
∫ θ?2
θ2?
tα(θ2)ν(·)dθ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
α withdraw
+
∫ θ2?
θˆ2
1− α(θ2)ν(·)dθ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−α stay and survive
+
∫ θ2
θ?2
1ν(·)dθ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
all stay and survive
where for example in the benchmark case
θ?2 = t(1 + 2σ)− θ1s
θ2? = xˆ− σ = t(1 + 2σ)− θ1s− 2σ
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With straightforward algebra it is possible to calculate the followings:
θˆ2 = t− θ1s
θˆ2 − θ2? = 2σ(1− t)
θ2? − θˆ2 = 2σt
α(θˆ2) = t
The value of integrals follows:
∫ θˆ2
θ2?
α(θ2)dθ2 = (1− t2)σ∫ θ?2
θˆ2
α(θ2)dθ2 = t
2σ∫ θ?2
θ2?
α(θ2)dθ2 = σ
so putting together we obtain:
Eu =
1
2η
(
t(θ2? − θ2) + σt− t2σ + (θ − θˆ2)
)
We can calculate the derivative with respect to the risk-management action:
∂Eu
∂s
=
1
2η
((1− t)θ1) > 0
this means creditors always prefers a higher action. After rewriting:
Eu =
1
2η
(
(θ2 − tθ2)− σt(1− t)− (t− θ1s)(1− t)
)
All payoff difference is captured by the second term, the first term depends on ex-
ogenous parameters only. We can define the following measure of creditors’ welfare,
keeping only the endogenous variable (s) and the interesting parameters (σ, θ1)
WR = (θ1s− σt) (1− t)
Creditors’ payoff in the least-costly separating and in pooling equilibrium is
WRSE =
(
pθi1s
FB
i + (1− p)θj1scri − σt
)
(1− t)
WRPE = θ1s
P (1− t)
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2.A.6.3 Banks in a Pooling equilibrium
Payoffs under pooling equilibrium. Given the fundamental thresholds we can
characterize the bank’s payoff. For any i ∈ {L,H}:
ΠPi =
∫ θ2
θˆPi
k − csiµ(·)dθ2 = (k − csi)
(
θ2 − θˆPi
)
Given the formula for the threshold, this can be written as
ΠPL (s) = Π
FI
L (s) + (k − c · s)
(
spH∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)
ΠPH(s) = Π
FI
H (s)− (k − c · s)
(
spL∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)
The difference between the two types’ profit is
∆Π =
2σ
1 + 2σ
(
θH1 − θL1
)
(k − c · s)s
∂∆Π
∂s
=
2σ
1 + 2σ
(
θH1 − θL1
)
(k − 2c · s)
The profit difference is increasing in s as long as k2c > s and decreasing thereafter.
The total payoff given the prior type distribution is∑
Π = (k − c · s)
(
θ2 − (pLθˆL2 + pH θˆH2 )
)
we can rewrite the second term
(pLθˆ
L
2 +pH θˆ
H
2 ) = t−
s(pLθ
L
1 ) + pHθ
H
1 )
1 + 2σ
− 2σs
1 + 2σ
(
pLθ
L
1 + pHθ
H
1
)
= t−(pLθL1 + pHθH1 ) s
Implication: the total payoff to the bank in a pooling equilibrium equals the total
profit which would occur with full information, for the given unique intervention
level. That is, although agents are unable to distinguish the two types, the bank’s
ex-ante expected profit is exactly as if they were distinguishable. The only welfare
loss (on the bank’s side) stems from the fact that in a pooling equilibrium they are
unable to set their first-best. This difference can be quantified
∆Π = Π(s?)−Πs = (k − c · s?)(θ2 + s?θ1 − t)− (k − c · s)(θ2 + sθ1 − t)
= kθ1∆s− c(θ2 − t)∆s− cθ1(∆s)2
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2.A.6.4 Creditors in a Pooling equilibrium
Substituting pooling thresholds we obtain:
α(θ2) =
xˆ− θ2 + σ
2σ
=
t(1 + 2σ)− θ1s− θ2
2σ
θ?2 = t(1 + 2σ)− θ1s
θ2? = xˆ− σ = t(1 + 2σ)− θ1s− 2σ
θˆi2 = t− θi1s−
spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
; θˆj2 = t− θj1s+
spi∆θ1
1 + 2σ
θˆi2 − θ2? = 2σ(1− t) + s(θ1 − θi1)−
spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
= 2σ(1− t) + spj∆θ1 2σ
1 + 2σ
θˆj2 − θ2? = 2σ(1− t) + s(θ1 − θj1) +
spi∆θ1
1 + 2σ
= 2σ(1− t)− spi∆θ1 2σ
1 + 2σ
θ?2 − θˆi2 = 2σt+ s(θi1 − θ1) +
spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
= 2σt− spj∆θ1 2σ
1 + 2σ
θ?2 − θˆj2 = 2σt+ s(θj1 − θ1)−
spi∆θ1
1 + 2σ
= 2σt+ spi∆θ1
2σ
1 + 2σ
α(θˆi2) = t−
spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
α(θˆj2) = t+
spi∆θ1
1 + 2σ
∫ θ?2
θˆi2
α(θ2)dθ2 = σ
(
t− spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2
∫ θˆi2
θ2?
α(θ2)dθ2 = σ − σ
(
t− spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2
∫ θ?2
θˆj2
α(θ2)dθ2 = σ
(
t+
spi∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2
∫ θˆj2
θ2?
α(θ2)dθ2 = σ − σ
(
t+
spi∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2
Substituting to the welfare function:
Eui =
1
2η
(
t(θ2? − θ2) + tσ + (θ?2 − θˆ2)− σ(t−
spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2 + (θ2 − θ?2)
)
=
1
2η
(
(θ2 − tθ2) + (t2(1 + 2σ)− tθ1s− 2σt) + tσ − σ(t−
spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2 − θˆ2
)
Euj =
1
2η
(
t(θ2? − θ) + tσ + (θ?2 − θˆ2)− σ(t−
spj∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2 + (θ2 − θ?2)
)
=
1
2η
(
(θ2 − tθ2) + (t2(1 + 2σ)− tθ2s− 2σt) + tσ − σ(t+
spi∆θ1
1 + 2σ
)2 − θˆ2
)
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2.B Appendix B - Generalizations
2.B.1 Generalized functional forms
We leave the payoffs to the creditors and the bank unchanged, and generalize two
components of the model: (1) The cost of action is a generic function c(s) with the
assumptions ∂c(s)∂s > 0 and
∂2c(s)
∂s2
> 0 that is the cost function is increasing and
strictly concave in the signal s. This implies the net payoff for the bank is
U(θ, α) =
k − c(s) if R(θ1, θ2, s, α) ≥ 00 if R(θ1, θ2, s, α) < 0
(2) The regime change function is a generic function R(θ1, θ2, s, α) with assumptions
∂R
∂θ1
> 0;
∂R
∂θ2
> 0;
∂R
∂s
> 0;
∂R
∂α
< 0;
∂2R
∂θ1∂θ2
= 0;
∂2R
∂s∂θ1
> 0;
where the last condition plays the role of a single crossing condition. All other
components of the model remain unchanged.
Symmetric information benchmark: The indifference condition remain
unchanged since the generalization does not alter the creditors’ problem. The mass
of agents who attack is:
α =
xˆ− θˆ2 + 
2
= t
The failure condition solves - after substituting α = t -
R(θ1, θ2, s, t) = 0
from which
θˆ2 = f(t, θ1, s)
xˆ = f(t, θ1, s) + 2σt− σ
We want to establish that the thresholds are decreasing in both θ1 and s. This can
be shown using implifit function theorem (IFT)
∂θˆ2
∂s
= − ∂R/∂s
∂R/∂θ2 = −
[+]
[+]
< 0
∂θˆ2
∂θ1
= − ∂R/∂s
∂R/∂θ2 = −
[+]
[+]
< 0
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This generalizes the result that higher signal as well as higher type decreases thresh-
old, therefore improves stability and increases probability of survival of the regime.
Optimal action: The expected profit for any risk-management choice s is:
pi(θ1, s) = ρ (k − c(s))
Optimum risk management is determined by the FOC
∂pi(θ1, s)
∂s
= (k − c(s)) ∂ρ
∂s
− ρ∂c(s)
∂s
= 0
from the formula for ρ = 12η (θ2 − θˆ2)
∂ρ
∂s
= − 1
2η
∂θˆ2
∂s
> 0
so the FOC of optimality using IFT is (to simplify notation: ∂xR = ∂R∂x )
− k
2η
∂θˆ2
∂s
=
∂c(s)
∂s
k
2η
∂sR
∂θ2R
=
∂c(s)
∂s
The question is how s? changes with θ1. For that we use IFT on the FOC. The
second term doesn’t change with θ1. The first term
∂
∂sR
∂θ2R
/∂θ1 =
∂sθ1R∂θ2R− ∂θ2θ1R∂sR
∂2θ2R
∂
∂sR
∂θ2R
/∂s =
∂ssR∂θ2R− ∂θ2sR∂sR
∂2θ2R
using the assumptions ∂θ2θ1R = 0 and ∂ssR ≥ 0 and ∂θ2R > 0 and ∂θ2sR = 0 this
implies
sign[∂[RHS]/∂θ1] = sign[∂sθ1R] = [+]
sign[∂[RHS]/∂s] =
[+]
[+]
∂c(s)/∂(s) ≥ 0
Another application of IFT implies for the case sign[∂θ2s] > 0
∂s?
∂θ1
= −∂θ1FOC
∂sFOC
= − +
[+]− [+] > 0
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as long as R is not too convex in s compared to the cost function. Precisely, it must
be the case that
∂ssR∂θ2R− ∂θ2sR∂sR
∂2θ2R
=
∂ssR
∂θ2
<
∂c′(s)
∂s
2.B.2 Separating equilibrium
Summary: For any arbitrary function R(θ, s, α) we derive a first-order approxi-
mation of failure thresholds off-the-equilibrium path, i.e. when agents act as if the
type is j while the actual type is i. Alternatively, this threshold can also be seen
as a decomposition of the difference between equilibrium thresholds for type i and
j into two components - a direct effect through regime change function, and an
indirect effect which is purely belief-based. The main result is that as the noise be-
comes more precise (σ → 0), the indirect effect dominates the direct effect, pushing
the off-equilibrium threshold towards the other type’s threshold. Intuitively, this
increases the potential gains for the low type from mimicking the high type.
We know that
α(xˆ, θ2) =
xˆ− θ2 + σ
2σ
xˆ = θˆ2 + 2σt− σ
The relevant thresholds on- and off-equilibrium path respectively solve
R(θi1, θ2, si, α(xˆi, θ2)) = 0 [θˆi2]
R(θi1, θ2, sj , α(xˆj , θ2)) = 0 [θˆi.j2 ]
R(θj1, θ2, sj , α(xˆj , θ2)) = 0 [θˆj2]
R(θj1, θ2, si, α(xˆi, θ2)) = 0 [θˆj.i2 ]
Using implicit function theorem (IFT) we can calculate the derivative of the full-
information fundamental threshold with respect to θ1
∂θˆ2
∂θ1
= −∂θ1R
∂θ2R
=
∂R
∂θ1
+ ∂R∂α
∂α
∂xˆ
∂xˆ
∂θˆ2
∂θˆ2
∂θ1
∂R
∂θ2
+ ∂R∂α
∂α
∂θ2
This derivative can be used to approximate the change when type changes from
θi1 to θ
j
1 in ‘full information’ model, keeping signal s fixed. This defines a natural
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decomposition
∂θˆ2
∂θ1
=
∂R
∂θ1
∂R
∂θ2
+ ∂R∂α
∂α
∂θ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
+
∂R
∂α
∂α
∂xˆ
∂xˆ
∂θˆ2
∂θˆ2
∂θ1
∂R
∂θ2
+ ∂R∂α
∂α
∂θ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect
The difference between θˆi2 and θˆ
i.j
2 is only through the second term, while the dif-
ference between θˆi.j2 and θˆ
j
2 is only through the first term, which allows us to write
θˆi.j2 = θˆ
j
2 +
∂R
∂θ1
∂R
∂θ2
+ ∂R∂α
∂α
∂θ2
∆θ1 = θˆ
j
2 +
∂R
∂θ1
∂R
∂θ2
− 12σ ∂R∂α
∆θ1
θˆi.j2 = θˆ
i
2 −
∂R
∂α
∂α
∂xˆ
∂xˆ
∂θˆ2
∂θˆ2
∂θ1
∂R
∂θ2
+ ∂R∂α
∂α
∂θ2
∆θ1 = θˆ
i
2 −
1
2σ
∂R
∂α
∂xˆ
∂θˆ2
∂θˆ2
∂θ1
∂R
∂θ2
− 12σ ∂R∂α
∆θ1
From here we can immediately generalize two results of the main text
1. As σ → 0 the direct effect goes to zero, thereby θˆi.j2 → θˆj2
2. Due to assumptions on the derivatives, both effect terms are always positive,
guaranteeing θˆi2 ≤ θˆi.j2 ≤ θˆj2 (i and j interchangeable, = only in limiting cases).
Example: Apply to exampleR the derivatives give precise solutions because
of linearity.
θˆ2
θˆ1
=
s+ 12σ (s)
1 + 12σ
= s
which implies
θˆj2 − θˆi2 = s∆θ1
which is correct because from the formula t − θj1s − t + θi1s = s∆θ1. From the
decomposition
θˆi.j2 − θˆj2 =
s
1 + 12σ
∆θ1 =
2σs
1 + 2σ
∆θ1
θˆi2 − θˆi.j2 =
1
2σs
1 + 12σ
∆θ1 =
s
1 + 2σ
∆θ1
which is exactly what we have in the main text.
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2.B.3 Pooling equilibrium
Equation 1 is unchanged:
xˆP = 2σt− σ + piθˆi2 + pj θˆj2
Equation 2 can only be expressed implicitly:
R(θ1, θ2, s, α(xˆ, θ2)) = 0
Write the Taylor-approximation of the difference between θˆi2 (full-information thresh-
old) and θˆiP2 (pooling threshold).
∂θˆ2
∂xˆ
= −
∂R
∂xˆ
∂R
∂θ2
= −
∂R
∂α
∂α
∂xˆ
∂R
∂θ2
+ ∂R∂α
∂α
∂θ2
= −
1
2σ
∂R
∂α
∂R
∂θ2
− 12σ ∂R∂α
> 0
θˆiP2 = θˆ2
i
+
∂θˆ2
∂xˆ
∆xˆ
where
∆xˆ = xˆP − xˆi = (1− p)∆θˆ2 = −pjs∆θ1 = −s(θ1 − θi1)
The derivative goes to zero as 1σ → 0. That implies, low precision pushes pooling
thresholds (respectively, profits) towards the full-information thresholds. This is
consistent with the ’smoothing out differences’ intuition. The results are symmetric
for type j. First define
∆xˆj = xˆjP − xˆj = piθˆi2 − piθˆj2 = −p∆θˆ2 = ps∆θ1 = −s(θ1 − θj1)
then approximate the average thresholds
θ
P
2 = piθ
iP
2 + pjθ
jP
2
∼= θˆ2 + ∂θˆ2
∂xˆ
∆xˆ = t− sθ1 + ∂θˆ2
∂xˆ
(−s)(θ1 − θ1) = t− sθ1
This is again the same result as for the specific case, but now proven generally!
Example: Using this result on the example R = θ2 + θ1s− α = 0 we have
∂θˆ2
∂xˆ
=
1
2σ + 1
θˆiP2 = t−
sθ1
1 + 2σ
− 2σ
1 + 2σ
sθi1
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2.B.4 Regulation
The incentive compatibility constraints for an arbitrary level of (minimum) pooling
pii.j(s) ≤ pii(sp) [ICi]
pij(s) ≥ pij.i(sp) [ICj ]
These inequalities say that s must not be profitable for the low-type even if it
is believed to be of high type, but must be profitable for the high-type, if otherwise
is believed to be of low-type.
All 4 functions in the IC’s reach zero at slim = c−1(k). Suppose our conjec-
ture is correct. This is equivalent with the existence of some sp < s such that both
inequalities are satisfied with equality at the same critical s, which just solves ICi
and just fail to solve ICj . This critical situation, if exist, therefore characterized
equivalently by a pair {sp; s} where sp < s which solves both inequality with equal-
ity. Consider all possible pairs of {sp; s}, not just those which solves the IC’s, and
define the following profit-differences
∆pii(s) = pij(s)− pii.j(s) := ϕ(s)
∆pij(s) = pij.i(s)− pii(s) := ϕ(s)
Viewed as a function of an arbitrary s, these are both the same concave functions
with zeroes at {0, slim}, which we denoted by ϕ(s). If a critical pair {sp; s} exists,
it must satisfy ϕ(sp) = ϕ(s), call this the ‘critical condition’. In addition, if a
candidate critical pair {sp, s} satisfies the critical condition and at least one IC, say
[ICi], then automatically satisfies the other one. This follows from the definition of
‘critical condition’.
We know that both scrii (sp) → slim from below, and scrii (sp) increases in sp
and its image is a compact interval [scrii.2 , s
lim]. It is obvious to see that the solution
of the critical condition (that is an explicit expression of pairs sp, s viewed as a
function), s(sp) is continuously decreasing in sp with the image [s
max, slim] where
smax is a value which maximizes ϕ(s), the difference between profits. A sufficient
condition for the existence of a critical sp, s is that s
max < scrii.2 , for which, we only
have to prove that s?j < s
max. This is tivial (although some more formality would
be nice here) as long as pi(s = 0) > pi(s = slim) = 0
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Chapter 3
Current Account and Overdraft
Pricing in Retail Banking
3.1 Introduction
In this research we investigate equilibrium pricing of personal current accounts
(checking accounts) and overdrafts in retail banking. In some markets, especially
in the US and the UK, the predominant personal current account (PCA) scheme is
the so-called ‘free-if-in-credit’ (FIIC) pricing, sometimes loosely referred to as ‘free
banking’. Under this price schedule, banks charge zero monthly or regular fee for
the access to the account and for basic services. However, accounts are usually
bundled together with an overdraft-service — essentially a short-term borrowing
facility — which allows the customer to go into debit in her account, incurring ex-
tensive charges in the form of service fees or interest payments. These charges are
sizeable enough to make overdrafts one of the most expensive forms of short-term
customer credit. The purpose of this research is to better understand the equilib-
rium consequences of some underlying market frictions, such as customer naivete´
and information asymmetry, on prices, profits, and on the market structure.
Many observers point out that FIIC-pricing is consistent with a cross-subsidy
across business lines as well as across various groups of customers, with significant
potential welfare consequences. According to the common narrative, hidden and
expensive overdraft fees exploit poorer households — more likely in need of extra
liquidity — to support more sophisticated, wealthier clients, and to generate indus-
try rents. This view has generated a massive policy debate on the potential role and
shape of regulatory intervention.
Two structural characteristics of retail banking have been identified as the
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root cause of this exploitative innovation1: first, the overdraft facility, being closely
linked to payment services which is the primary use of a current account, can be
seen as an add-on product, and — at least to the extent as the aftermarket is tech-
nologically or otherwise linked to the base product — banks have market power
and can exert monopoly pricing on the market for overdrafts. Second, this market
power is exacerbated by customers’ behavioural biases, such as their limited abil-
ity to comprehend contractual terms ex ante (Gabaix and Laibson [2006]), limited
attention to track their own account usage (Grubb [2014]), or the lack of switching
behaviour due to perceived or genuine switching costs.
In turn, FIIC pricing leads to two main policy concerns. First, although
on the surface ‘free-banking’ appears to be the result of strong competition, it may
mask non-competitive distortions and market power, leading to inefficient outcomes.
Second, as FIIC pricing essentially amounts to below-marginal-cost base-good and
above-marginal-cost add-on prices, to the extent different groups of customers differ
in their use of the two services, it leads to potential distributional concerns and
welfare effects. To be specific, if overdraft users tend to be poorer households more
likely in financial trouble and in the need of short-term financing, FIIC-pricing
implies a wealth-transfer ‘from the poor to the rich’, leading to an overall reduction
in social welfare.
In this paper we describe a model of overdraft pricing which captures some
relevant characteristics of the retail banking sector to illustrate how FIIC-pricing
can emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon. We define FIIC equilibrium as a market
equilibrium in which a base product (current account) is priced at its lower bound
at least by some players, while connected services — specifically, overdrafts — are
sold to customers at a mark-up (above marginal cost). In our benchmark model we
consider a two-stage duopoly model, where two banks compete for a continuum of
customers by selling two products, a ‘personal current account’ (PCA) in the first,
and a connected overdraft-facility in the second stage.
Deviating from much of the theoretical literature, we assume that competi-
tion for customers is possible even in the second stage. This captures the idea that
customers’ lock-in is not perfect in a financial services context. Indeed, the nature of
an existing relationship to one’s bank is distinctively different from a typical indus-
trial aftermarket situation - the most cited example being the market for printers
and cartridges - where technological linkages tie customers strongly to the primary
supplier, while high initial investment costs prevent switching to another provider.
Strictly speaking there is no such technological reason to link payment services (the
1The term ‘exploitative innovation’ is based on Heidhues et al. [2016a]
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primary market) to the provision of short-term customer credit (the aftermarket),
yet the market shows similar characteristics: lack of switching behaviour, and ‘ex-
ploitative’ aftermarket prices.
Traditionally, there has been two oft-cited sources of banks’ market power
over existing customers. First, naive customers’ lack of attention to other deals after
establishing the first relationship may lead to banks’ exploitation of those customers.
Second, relationship banks obtain relevant information regarding their customers’
creditworthiness, which may lead to adverse selection on the market for customer
credit. Both issues are at the centre of recent regulatory innovations: requiring
insider banks to disclose information on request may moderate the adverse selec-
tion problem, while automatized switching services and price-comparison websites
potentially decrease psychological and material costs associated with low switching
behaviour, which is closely related to the concept of customer naivete´. Regulatory
interventions also induced changes in banks’ behaviour: instead of ‘shrouding’ the
information on fees and other contractual terms which potentially impose additional
costs, they tend to heavily advertise up-front, thereby compete much more strongly
on overdraft terms as well.
We begin our analysis with a model of banking competition featuring cus-
tomer naivete´. In the first stage, banks compete for a group of naive and sophisti-
cated customers. In the second stage, they charge different overdraft prices for own
customers and for customers of the other bank. Banks have some market power
over customers (this is captured by a Hotelling-model) in the first stage, but the
lock-in is imperfect in the second-stage, so overdraft fees emerge endogenously in a
Bertrand-competition. Naive customers are sticky after their initial choice of bank,
and won’t consider the possibility of switching when an overdraft facility is required.
This creates market power, which distorts standard competitive pricing outcome.
Our results demonstrate that, despite the possibility of competition in the
second-stage, the presence of naive customers turns to be an important source of
market power and economic profit. Specifically, we show that for an arbitrary low
number of naive customers, prices deviate from marginal-costs, and the unique Nash-
equilibrium of the Bertrand-game on the overdraft market is a mixed-strategy Nash-
equilibrium, where both insider and outsider banks earn positive profit. This makes
overdraft a profitable business, and induces competition in the first stage (on the
market for PCA) to expand market share. When primary markets are sufficiently
competitive, there exist a symmetric ‘FIIC-equilibrium’ for a significant subset of the
parameter space - specifically, FIIC-pricing can prevail even with relatively modest
number of naive customers, and on highly competitive markets.
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In the rest of the paper we extend the baseline setup with adverse selection,
and show how the combination of adverse selection and customer naivete´, being the
two most important frictions on banking markets, affect equilibrium pricing, profits,
and customer behaviour. The presence of adverse selection makes it more difficult for
the outsider to enjoy the benefits on the aftermarket. As a consequence, the profits
will be tilted towards the bank’s role as an insider. This increases the incentives
to obtain more customers on the primary market, so it decreases first-period PCA
prices even further — making it even more likely that an FIIC-pricing prevails as
an equilibrium. In our model differences in the mass of myopic customers is not the
only possible explanation anymore for the observed differences across countries: ‘free
banking’ may or may not develop depending on the severity of adverse selection, or
the extent of primary market competition as well.
Our approach is a novelty in the theoretical banking literature from a crucial
aspect, which we emphasize here again. Although various models of add-on pric-
ing have been proposed recently to explain exploitative overdraft pricing practices
(Gabaix and Laibson [2006], Armstrong and Vickers [2012], Heidhues et al. [2016a]),
these models usually stipulate ex-post monopoly power on the aftermarket, in our
case, on the market for overdrafts. Although that assumption is a good approxi-
mation of the short-term behaviour and first-time overdrafting — in which case the
main behavioural bias to consider is that inattentive customers, being unaware of
their potential overdraft usage2, indeed face a de-facto monopolist seller — it cannot
provide an explanation for the long-term lack of switching behaviour and the persis-
tence of exploitation of a certain group of customers. Furthermore, recent observed
pricing schemes by major UK banks seem to be consistent with the presence of a
(limited) aftermarket competition.
We believe that the new modelling approach is useful to properly address
these recent changes in retail banking. Due to increased pressure from customer
protection groups and policy makers, it is hard to argue anymore that overdraft fees
are ‘shrouded’, as the literature usually assumes, and not transparent at the time of
contracting — in contrast, in the UK, overdraft conditions seem to be one of the most
heavily advertised selling points of PCA’s offered to new customers. Comparison
websites, easy switching services make the implicit assumption of full monopoly
power on the aftermarket less-and-less tenable. At the same time, this seem to have
little effect (for now) on the exploitative charges on those who are permanently in
overdraft. Our model takes a first step towards a more robust explanation of the
large-scale existence of these schemes even with competitive aftermarkets.
2Models of bill-shock regulation: Grubb [2014]
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The dominant theoretical explanation usually invoked to explain FIIC-style
pricing is the framework by Gabaix and Laibson [2006], which combines aftermar-
ket pricing of an add-on product with a homogeneous base-good, in the presence
of naive customers3. In a typical equilibrium of this modelling tradition a bank is
facing a perfectly inelastic demand function on the overdraft market, whenever a
specific group of customers decides to participate and consume the overdraft facility.
Naive customers always ‘decide to use’ the add-on, while sophisticated customers
substitute away if they find it too expensive. The bank must decide whether it
wants to serve only naive, or all types of customers, and then set the appropri-
ate monopoly price which just preserves the applicable participation constraints of
the customers. Aftermarket monopoly profits are then competed away in the base-
good market, if possible4. If there is a sufficiently large number of sophisticated
customers, the bank’s optimal decision is to serve all customers, and the add-on
price will be relatively modest (bounded by the participation constraint of sophisti-
cated customers). In this equilibrium, there is no cross-subsidy across the groups of
customers, and there is no FIIC-pricing5. With relatively large number of myopes,
however, a bank decides to serve only myopic customers, leading to excessive add-on
price, low base-price, and possibly severe cross-subsidy. As sophisticated customers
must exert effort which is more costly than producing the overdraft service to sub-
stitute away, the equilibrium is inefficient. If the base-price hits the lower bound,
aftermarket profits cannot be eliminated by competition on the base-good market,
and this will be the source of monopoly profit for banks. This equilibrium, referred
to as ‘shrouding equilibrium’ in Gabaix and Laibson [2006]6 is loosely identified with
FIIC-banking in the relevant banking literature.
We believe there are two shortcomings of this theory which makes it prob-
lematic to apply directly to the retail banking sector, and which calls for additional
research work. First, the theory would predict FIIC-pricing whenever the mass of
naive customers (which is routinely identified with financial illiteracy) is sufficiently
large. However, there is no evidence that UK and US customers are significantly dif-
ferent in this respect from their European peers. While FIIC with overdraft is com-
mon and standard package in the UK, it is not particularly widespread in countries
3The GL2006 framework is directly applied to the UK retail banking sector by Armstrong and
Vickers [2012], and extended among others in Heidhues et al. [2016a], Heidhues et al. [2016b].
4The early literature on aftermarket pricing (Shapiro [1994]) recognizes that monopoly profits are
distributed back to the customers if prices can be decreased sufficiently on a competitive base-good
market. However, a lower bound on the price can prevent competing away these profits (Heidhues
et al. [2016a]). This lower bound can arise endogenously in certain markets (Miao [2010]).
5However, above-marginal-cost add-on and below-marginal-cost base good price still prevails.
6In this equilibrium firms are incentivized to hide information regarding the add-on prices and
conditions in the first stage, to make the myopic population as large as possible
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like France or Italy. Second, identifying shrouding equilibrium with FIIC-banking is
not straightforward. It is true, that the shrouding equilibrium is disproportionally
costly for naive customers and might lead to positive profits. However, these two
frictions do not typically occur within the same parameter range. The base-good
price decreases continuously and linearly with the mass of naive customers, so ‘FIIC’
and the associated positive profits would be observed only with very large number
of myopes. The relative ‘exploitation’, however, is particularly concerning when the
number of naive customers is moderate (close to the critical threshold), because
redistributing profits in the form of lowered base-good price does not ease yet the
extra burden caused by the excessive add-on price.
3.1.1 Related literature
Behavioural theories for overdrafts: The concept of shrouding equilibrium with naive
customers put forward in Gabaix and Laibson [2006] has formed the basis of sev-
eral theoretical and empirical contributions. In two strongly related recent papers,
Heidhues et al. [2016a] and Heidhues et al. [2016b] develop new insights which are
directly applicable to financial markets. First, they show that a binding price floor
in the market for the base-product leads to positive economic profit in a shroud-
ing equilibrium. Then, they demonstrate how these profits, emerging in a shrouding
equilibrium, can lead to various welfare-reducing market practices: in Heidhues et al.
[2016a], firms choose between investing into value-enhancing or ‘exploitative’ inno-
vations, and the paper shows that the incentives for the latter are stronger, as — in
contrast to the former one — it raises other participants’ incentives to maintain the
shrouding equilibrium. The authors note that binding price floor leading to positive
profits is likely to hold for consumer financial products. In a similar vein, Heidhues
et al. [2016b] argues that socially wasteful products are more likely to survive on the
market, as in this case it is more likely that shrouding prevails as a unique equilib-
rium and guarantees the positivity of profits, which then cannot be competed away
due to binding price floors. They interpret these findings in the context of financial
markets as an explanation for (i) why banks invest effort to develop complex pricing
practices (like overdraft) which can maintain exploitation, and (ii) why seemingly
inferior (expensive, active) mutual funds can survive. Our research loosely links to
these papers by showing that the additional profit which can be obtained on the
overdraft market is limited by the presence of adverse selection.
Grubb [2014] follows a distinct, but related modelling approach and empha-
sizes another behavioural bias, customers’ inability to closely track their ‘usage’ of
the base product (i.e. spending from your account), which leads to a surprise (‘bill-
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shock’) overdraft usage. Instead of this surprise-effect, our naive customers proxy
rather customers’ sticky behaviour on the long term, despite potentially significant
benefits from switching7.
The paper is also related to recent research on the possibility of price discrim-
ination based on customer naivete´, in the context of financial services (Kosfeld and
Schu¨wer [2017]), or more generally (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi [2017]). The first of these,
Kosfeld and Schu¨wer [2017] shows that educating customers may have unintended
welfare consequences if naivete-based discrimination is possible on the aftermarket.
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi [2017] also focuses on the welfare aspects in a more general
settings, and provide conditions where naivete´-based discrimination negatively af-
fects welfare. In our model we exclude naivete´-based price discrimination, but allow
for price discrimination based on other payoff-relevant and observable qualities.
There are other approaches to explain exploitation of customers’ bounded
rationality. Carlin [2009] describes a model of oligopoly banking where complexity
arises as part of an equilibrium pricing structure, as it can be a source of market
power. The endogenous complexity choices of banks determine the mass of unin-
formed players on the market, and all banks share the demand of uninformed players,
independently of the price. The unique equilibrium is in mixed strategies, so the
model also predicts price dispersion. However, the model is static and does not
capture either the relationship-banking nature or the cross-subsidy characteristics
of FIIC accounts, which is at the center of our research agenda.
To my knowledge, the only theoretical model which specifically addresses the
overdraft fees (or more generally, contingent charges) in the retail banking sector
is Armstrong and Vickers [2012], building on a simplified version of Gabaix and
Laibson [2006]. This version allows the authors to transparently focus on possible
regulatory interventions, such as price caps, overdraft warnings or restrictions of
negative balances altogether. We focus rather on a different type of equilibrium,
where fundamental assumptions of the model are altered.
Empirically, Alan et al. [2018] provides direct evidence of the exploitation of
naive customers from Turkey using an overdraft market experiment: by randomiz-
ing messages which affect consumers’ attention in various ways they demonstrate
unawareness of prices and underestimation of future usage, and that firms indeed
respond to this behaviour with shrouding. Adams [2017] confirms on US data that
overdraft prices consist a significant part of banks’ revenue, which tend to be larger
in low-income regions. He finds total expenditure to be higher for “poorer, younger
7The Competition and Market Authority in the UK estimates (‘Retail banking market investi-
gation’, Final report, 9 August 2016) the potential annual gains from switching in the UK retail
banking sector to be more than £4bn.
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or less educated” populations — a finding which seems to be consistent with the
theory, if those groups can be characterized as relatively more naive.8
Adverse selection in Banking: The adverse selection component of our model
largely follows the ideas presented in the seminal paper by Sharpe [1990] which in-
troduces the concept of relationship banking. This paper illustrates how information
which is created during customer-bank relationship can generate ex-post monopoly
power and lead to an endogenous emergence of switching barriers. Von Thadden
[2004] points out a mistake in the original paper and proves the existence of a unique
mixed-strategy equilibrium with partial informational lock-in where switching oc-
curs with positive probability. Rajan [1992] makes a similar point regarding the
importance of relationships, but his work is based on moral hazard instead of ad-
verse selection, and also emphasizes possible benefits of control by insider bank. Our
benchmark adverse selection model in Section 4 can be considered as a much sim-
plified, backbone version of Sharpe’s model which still delivers the same equilibrium
structure and characteristics.
Price dispersion: Our work predicts price dispersion both as a result of
adverse selection and customer naivete´. As mentioned before, the former is a well-
known result in the literature. The latter, to my knowledge, has not been explicitly
addressed in a theoretical contribution before. However, the common behavioural
notion of customer naivete´ / myopia is a close cousin of some earlier research ideas
with boundedly rational customers. To start with, customers who do not switch
despite a cheaper price available on the market are reminiscent to the ‘uninformed’
customers who do not search in Varian [1980], which also initiates price dispersion.
Burdett and Judd [1983] shows that this can happen even with identical and ratio-
nal agents and homogeneous search costs, with nonsequential search or with noisy
sequential search. Narasimhan [1988] studies brand-loyalty in a duopoly framework
and shows that the presence of loyal customers initiates price dispersion, due to
similar reasons, as loyal customers won’t consider buying a competitor’s product.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
our model in its most complete form. Section 3 derives equilibrium for a reduced
setup where customer naivete´ without adverse selection is addressed. Section 4
describes benchmark results for the model version with adverse selection but without
customer naivete´, while Section 5 derives equilibrium of the full model. Section 6 is a
discussion of the results and possible policy consequences, while Section 7 concludes.
8Other notable empirical studies on overdraft fees and customer naivete´ are Stango and Zinman
[2009], Stango and Zinman [2014], Morgan et al. [2012], Melzer and Morgan [2015],Williams [2016].
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3.2 Model setup
Consider the following two-stage competition game representing a retail banking
market. Two banks (j ∈ {1, 2}) are offering a uniform personal current account
(PCA) in stage one, and a liquidity facility (overdraft) in stage two. A unit measure
of customers with a fixed demand for one product in each stage are located uniformly
over the interval [0, 1], while the two banks are located at the two opposite ends of
the interval. Let `j denote the location of Bank j, that is, `1 = 0 and `2 = 1.
In the first stage only, a customer i located at γi ∈ [0, 1] incurs a transportation
cost τ × dij where τ is exogenous constant, while dij = |lj − γi| is customer i’s
distance from Bank j. In the second stage, products are homogeneous, and there is
no transportation cost.
At t = 1 each bank j simultaneously announces a fee pj ≥ 0 for the current
account, which is observable for all customers. Following the price announcement,
customers choose exactly one bank, which we then refer to as their insider bank.
In period t = 2 all customers are hit by a liquidity shock, and want to consume
the overdraft service. In this period they can decide whether to switch to the other
bank, so their action space is {“stay”, “switch”}. As noted at t=2 the consumers
do not incur a transport cost in selecting their bank. This assumption implies that
the overdraft service provided – the lending of money to cover a liquidity need – is
homogeneous across the banks.
Customers ex-ante differ in two aspects: (i) sophistication and (ii) profitabil-
ity (riskiness). Sophisticated customers (type S, fraction 1 − α) are fully rational,
and in both stages choose the bank with lower expected total outlay, including trans-
portation costs. If the expected payment is equal, they choose randomly in the first
stage, or remain with the insider in the second stage. Naive customers (type N ,
fraction α) fail to predict their future demand for the overdraft facility, therefore
they base their decision only on the observable first-period prices. Furthermore, in
the second stage, they do not consider the possibility of switching and always stay
with their insider bank.9
A proportion of β of customers yields low-profit to the bank (type L), while
a fraction (1 − β) is highly profitable (type H). The information on profitability
(but not on naivete´) is observed by the insider bank during the first stage of the
customer-banking relationship, and is contractable in the second period. Profitabil-
ity is captured concisely by parameters rL < rH , representing exogenous revenues
generated from the relationship in the overdraft-stage. Formally, let the customers’
9One possible justification is that without planning they become involuntary overdraft users.
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type space be Θ := {S,N} × {L,H}. The joint probability mass function of a
customer type θ ∈ Θ is completely characterized by parameters α and β, which
are treated as exogenous throughout the analysis. We assume that the two types
(naivete´ and profitability) are independently distributed.
Customers’ valuation of the account is ν, while on the overdraft service is
ν ′. We will assume that these valuations are sufficiently high so that all customers
decide to consume in all equilibria which we focus on in the main text.
Bank j can condition the price of the overdraft service for its insider cus-
tomers on profitability, but not on sophistication. Therefore, overdraft is offered at a
price φ
L,(j)
in and φ
H,(j)
in for type L (type H) insider customers of Bank j respectively.
Furthermore, Bank j offers the service for customers of the other bank (outsider
customers) at an on-demand price φ
(j)
out. Other than that, it is not possible to price-
discriminate based on the location of the customer. Overdraft fees are exogenously
capped at φ. Marginal cost of opening and maintaining a PCA is normalized to 0,
while overdraft is offered at a marginal cost cod.
We solve the game for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Let p ∈ R2+ denote
the PCA price vector, φ ∈ R6+ the overdraft fee vector, while a1 ∈ {1, 2} and
a2 ∈ {“stay”, “switch”} denote customers’ decisions in the first and the second
stage respectively. Then
Definition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the overdraft-pricing game consists
of
1. A first-period PCA price offer by the two banks: p? := {p?1; p?2};
2. Customers’ decision over which bank to choose in the first stage: a?1(θ, γ,p) :
Θ× [0, 1]× R2+ → {1, 2};
3. A second-period overdraft fee by the two banks: {φL,j?in ;φH,j?in , φj?out} for all j ∈
{1, 2}
4. Customers’ decision whether to switch: a?2(θ, a1(θ, γ,p),φ) : Θ×{1, 2}×R6 →
{“stay”, “switch”}.
where decisions are sequentially rational:
(i) each bank maximizes profit at each stage, and
(ii) customers’ decisions a1 and a2 are optimal given their appropriate subjective
beliefs regarding equilibrium prices.
Notice that the full model is a 4-stage strategic-form game, but it is useful
to interpret it as a game which unfolds in two periods: in period 1 banks offer
current accounts and customers engage with exactly one of them, while in period 2
banks offer an add-on liquidity service and customers decide whether to switch. This
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game is solvable by backward induction: first, we determine 2nd-period equilibrium
taking the prices and customer-bank relationships from period 1 as given. Then,
we consider deviations in the first stage, and analyse customers’ reaction to such
deviations. We find PBE if no such profitable deviation exists.
It is useful to introduce some further notation to simplify algebra. First, let
us define net cost from serving a customer in the overdraft-stage as:
cL = cod − rL
cH = cod − rH
cLH = cod − βrL + (1− β)rH
The new variable c conveniently captures all exogenous components of the profit
from a unit mass of customers who are respectively low, high or both (reflecting
population probabilities) types in the second stage.
In the following, we first derive two special cases: (i) the case without adverse
selection (β = 0), and (ii) the case without customer myopia (α = 0).
3.3 Overdraft with customer naivete´
We start by deriving the equilibrium for the special case where β = 0. Clearly, in
this case there is no information asymmetry between insider and outsider, so there
is no adverse selection problem. This version illustrates how the presence of naive
customers with an add-on product distorts standard competitive pricing results.10
As with β = 0 we have only one (high) type of customers, we can drop profitability
indices and simplify notation: {φ(j)in , φ(j)out} denotes overdraft fees by Bank j for
insider and outsider respectively, and c denotes net costs.
3.3.1 Second-stage equilibrium
Suppose that Bank j starts with a mass γj of customers
11, and within these cus-
tomers, the percentage of naive types is αj . Notice first that the second-period
game is separable into two distinct components: banks compete for the insider cus-
tomers of Bank j through the choice of φ
(j)
in and φ
(−j)
out , for all j ∈ {1, 2}. Given this
observation, we can formulate the subgame from an arbitrary bank’s perspective
as follows: (i) two banks jointly announce an overdraft fee {φ(j)in , φ(−j)out }, and (ii) all
10Note that without naive customers the pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium of the pricing game is
trivially a competitive equilibrium.
11Note that these are not necessarily the customers ‘closest’ to Bank j.
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sophisticated customers of j, that is, γj(1−αj) mass of customers switch if and only
if φ
(−j)
out < φ
j
in. Since indices are clearly pinned down when looking at the problem
from the perspective of any of the two banks, we can omit for further analysis.
Charging the maximum value φ is always a feasible strategy for both insider
and outsider banks. Whenever the outsider charges φ, it loses the competition
for sophisticated customers with certainty, and makes zero profit on overdrafts.
Therefore, in any equilibrium, outsider must only be willing to offer a fee which
leads to a nonnegative profit from overdraft business, that is,
φout ≥ c
The insider bank is bounded by a similar incentive compatibility constraint. Charg-
ing φ is always a feasible strategy, and even if at this fee it loses the competition for
sophisticated customers with certainty, it obtains the following profit12:
pi0in := α(φ− c)γ
This quantity can be regarded as insider’s minimax payoff : in any proposed equi-
librium, its profit from overdrafts must be at least pi0in. Now suppose that the equi-
librium is such that for a sufficiently low offer φ insider wins the price competition
with probability 1. Even in this case, the offer φ must satisfy the inequality
(φ− c) γ ≥ α(φ− c)γ
Let φ′in denote the value of φ which solves the corresponding equation, and we refer
to this as the incentive-compatible overdraft fee13. By rearranging we obtain:
φ′in := αφ+ (1− α)c (3.1)
According to this expression, the incentive-compatible overdraft fee is a weighted
average of the maximum fee and the break-even fee where the weights are the mass
of naive (resp. sophisticated) customers. We proceed with a formal proof that there
is no pure-strategy Nash-Equilibrium.
Lemma 1 If α > 0, no Pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium exists.
Proof. At stage 2 we have Bertrand-competition. Insider’s offer must be such that
φin ∈ [φ′in, φ], while outsider’s offer is φout ∈ [c, φ]. Given α > 0, we have φ′in > c.
12We don’t know yet whether this is a binding constraint, but we will see that later.
13We don’t know yet whether it is played in equilibrium by any of the players.
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Then outsider’s best response to any offer φin is φin −  with some  > 0. Insider’s
best response to any offer φout ∈ [φ′in, φ] is φout, and to any offer φout < φ′in is φ.
The mapping has obviously no fixed point, so there is no PSNE.
Notice that the Lemma is true for every α > 0 but fails for α = 0. For
α = 0 we have φ′in = c and its easy to see that playing φ
′
in by both players is the
unique PSNE of the game, which is also the competitive (zero-profit) outcome. This
verifies our previous claim that without customer naivete´ the unique equilibrium is
the competitive outcome. It is the presence of customer naivete´ which initiates price
dispersion in the overdraft market.
As there is no pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium, we look for a mixed-strategy
equilibrium (‘MSNE’). Suppose both outsider and insider mix according to CDFs
Fout and Fin, with support [F out, F out] and [F in, F in] respectively. The following
lemma establishes boundaries for the distributions.
Lemma 2 The supports of the CDFs Fout and Fin must satisfy
1. F out = F in = φ
′
in
2. F in = φ
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1
The expected payoff from any action which is played in equilibrium must be
equal over the range of equilibrium actions (‘indifference condition’ ). The MSNE
is established in two steps: first, we apply the indifference condition to outsider’s
strategies to derive Fin, then, apply it to insider’s strategies to derive Fout.
Lemma 3 The insider bank is mixing according to a continuous distribution Fin(φ)
with support [φ′in, φ], and is placing a probability mass α on φ, where
Fin(φ) = 1− αφ− c
φ− c (3.2)
Proof. First, we establish that there is no probability mass by the insider on φ′in.
Suppose Pr[φin = φ
′
in] > 0. Then outsider can charge φout = φin −  for some  > 0
and win all sophisticated customers with probability 1. By continuity, he would
make strictly larger profit than by winning at φ′in with some probability strictly less
than 1. Contradiction to equilibrium.
Because of that, by playing the lower boundary φ′in the outsider wins, all
74
sophisticated customers switch with probability 1, and the bank’s profit is
pi0out = (1− α)
(
φ′in − c
)
γ
For any higher bid φ > φ′in it must be that
piout(φ) = Prob(φ < φin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O wins
∗ (1− α)pi(φ)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit|win
+Prob(φ ≥ φin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I wins
∗0 = pi0out
where the function pi(φ) := φ− c denotes the profit from serving a unit measure of
customers with overdraft. The indifference condition in equilibrium is therefore:
(1− Fin(φ)) (1− α) (φ− c) γ = (1− α)
(
φ′in − c
)
γ
After substituting the value of φ′in from Equation (3.1), we obtain insider’s CDF:
Fin(φ) =
φ− αφ+ (1− α)(−c)
φ− c = 1− α
φ− c
φ− c
This CDF satisfies Fin(φ
′
in) = 0 and Fin(φ) = 1 − α, which implies that insider is
mixing over [φ′in, φ] and is placing a probability mass of α on φ.
Lemma 4 uses insider’s indifference property to derive outsider’s fee dispersion:
Lemma 4 The outsider bank is mixing according to a continuous distribution Fout(φ)
with support [φ′in, φ] where
Fout(φ) =
1
1− α −
α
1− α
φ− c
φ− c (3.3)
Proof. We know from the proof of Lemma 2 that there is no probability mass on
φ by the outsider, implying
pi0in = α
(
φ− c) γ
The indifference property implies
Prob(φ ≤ φout)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I wins
∗ (φ− c) γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit from all
+Prob(φ > φout)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O wins
∗ α(φ− c)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit from myopes
= pi0in
Leading to the following equality:
(1− Fout(φ)) (φ− c) γ + Fout(φ)α (φ− c) γ = α
(
φ− c) γ
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Figure 3.1: Overdraft fee dispersion
Customer naivete´
ϕin ' ϕ
CDF insider
CDF outsider
ϕin ' ϕPDF insider
PDF outsider
This defines the CDF for outsider :
Fout(φ) =
1
1− α −
α
1− α
φ− c
φ− c
This CDF satisfies Fout(φ
′
in) = 0 and Fout(φ) = 1
From the two Lemmas, immediately follows the characterization of the unique
MSNE, which we summarize in Theorem 1 and illustrate in Figure 3.1.
Theorem 1 The unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the overdraft pricing
game with β = 0 is as follows: both insider and outsider mix between [φ′in, φ],
outsider according to Fout as defined in Equation 3.3, and insider according to Fin
as defined in equation 3.2. Insider is placing a positive mass of α on φ.
3.3.2 Equilibrium characterization
3.3.2.1 Overdraft fee dispersion
We can make probabilistic statements regarding expected fee and switching be-
haviour in equilibrium. For easy readability all proofs are in appendix. First, we
establish the probability that outsider wins.
Lemma 5 The probability that outsider wins is a linear function of the mass of
naive customers (α)
Prob[φout < φin] =
1 + α
2
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.2
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As α → 0, there is no ‘naive distortion’ effect, and competition guarantees
that outsider wins with probability 1/2. As the mass of naive customers increases,
the insider places more-and-more emphasis on ‘exploitation’ (i.e. φ = φ) which
increases the probability of winning by the outsider. As α→ 1 the probability mass
on φ goes to 1, and outsider wins with probability 1. It is useful to mention that the
total probability that outsider wins is the sum of two probabilities: when the banks
play mixture (1−α2 ) and when the insider plays the mass-point and outsider always
wins (α). The appendix also shows formally that conditional on both mixing, the
outsider wins with probability 1/2.
Next, we calculate expected overdraft fees conditional on switching or stay-
ing. This is an interesting characterization on its own, and also an important ingre-
dient for later calculations.
Lemma 6 Conditional on switching, the (sophisticated) customers are expected to
pay an overdraft fee of
E[φout|φout < φin] = c+ 2α
1 + α
(
φ− c)
Conditional on remaining with insider, the (sophisticated) customers are expected
to pay
E[φin|φin ≤ φout] = c+ 2α
1− α
(
1 +
α ln[α]
1− α
)(
φ− c)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.3
The lemma is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Blue (solid) line is expected overdraft
fee conditional on staying, as a function of α, while red (dashed) line is expected
fee conditional on switching. Sophisticated customers are facing with an actual
realization from the distribution, not this expected value. As α→ 0, overdraft fees
converge to the competitive outcome φout = φin = c
14 and both insider and outsider
obtain zero-profit from overdraft business. With α > 0, banks randomize, while
insider is placing more-and-more weight on larger fees, increasing the expected fee
conditional on winning. This allows the outsider bank also to (probabilistically)
raise its offers. It is straightforward to interpret the expressions for expected fees in
Lemma 6 as a mark-up pricing formula: in the presence of naive customers, banks
can increase overdraft fees in expectation relative to the break-even, competitive
fee (c). The mark-up is proportional to the difference between the maximum price
and the break-even price, is increasing in α, and is always higher for the outsider
14Both CDF’s converge to a mass-point on c
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Figure 3.2: Conditional expected overdraft fees
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3.3.2.2 Second period profit
From the indifference conditions, we know that bank j’s expected profit from its role
as an insider and as an outsider is
pi
(j)
in = γjαj
(
φ− c)
pi
(j)
out = γ−j(1− α−j)
(
φ
′−j
in − c
)
Notice that the ‘outsider’ profit comes entirely from sophisticated customers who
switch, while insider profit consists of two components: sophisticated customers who
stay in equilibrium, and naive customers who always stay by assumption. In the
Appendix we derive a decomposition of the two latter terms. The following Lemma
provides results for the overall bank profit, calculated as an appropriately weighted
sum of the components defined above.
Lemma 7 For arbitrary values of γj and αj, Bank j’s profit is
pi(j) =
[
α− (α− αjγj)
2
1− γj
] (
φ− c) (3.4)
In two specific cases we have simpler expressions. Whenever the naive customers
are evenly distributed among the two banks in the second stage, that is, α1 = α2 = α,
15This can be proven by showing that their difference is decreasing and is 0 as α→ 1.
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Figure 3.3: Expected profits as a function of α
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(a) Decomposition of bank’s profit
Total profit
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(b) % decomposition of bank’s profit
banks obtain the following overall profit in the second stage:
pi(j) = α(1− α) + γjα2
Whenever also the market share’s are equal, that is γ1 = γ2 = 1/2, the banks obtain
the following second-period profit
pi(j) =
1
2
α (2− α) (φ− c)
This symmetric equilibrium profit can be decomposed as
Epimyop = α2 (1− ln[α]) (φ− c)
Episoph,switch = (1− α)α (φ− c)
Episoph,stay = α (1− α+ α ln[α]) (φ− c)
Profits in the most general case are increasing in market share whenever 2αj >
γjα−j. When the naive customers are evenly distributed, profits always increase in
market share, in the maximum fee (φ), and decrease in net costs (c).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.4
Figure 3.3a illustrates sources of expected profits as a function of α from
myopic (blue,solid) and from sophisticated customers who switch (red,dashed) and
stay (pink, dotted), while Figure 3.3b shows the percentage distribution of those
profits.
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3.3.3 First-stage equilibrium
3.3.3.1 Equilibrium first-period prices
Naive customers: As naive customers only take into account the first-period
announced price vector p, they follow a threshold strategy: a naive customer chooses
Bank 1 if and only if she is located at γ < γN , where γN is determined by the
indifference condition:
p1 + τγ
N = p2 + τ(1− γN )
The value of the threshold is:
γˆN =
1
2
+
∆p
2τ
(3.5)
Sophisticated customers: Sophisticated customers predict second-period equi-
librium overdraft fees to calculate expected payment. As the equilibrium expected
fee conditional of choosing Bank j is the function of the mass of myopic customers
within Bank j, the following is always an equilibrium:
Lemma 8 For any PCA price vector p such that γˆN (p) ∈ (0, 1) there exist an
equilibrium of the induced 3-stage subgame where (i) both sophisticated and naive
customers follow a common threshold defined in Equation (3.5) — now denoted as
γˆ —, so that only customers with γi < γˆ choose Bank 1, and (ii) second-period
overdraft fees are determined according to Proposition 1, with α1 = α2 = α.
Proof. Whenever α1 = α2 = α, according to Lemma 6, the expected second-
period overdraft fee for sophisticated customers if choosing Bank 1 or Bank 2 is
exactly equal, as it only depends on the fraction of naive customers within the
bank. Therefore, if they predict that in equilibrium α1 = α2, they will base their
decision only on first-period prices. Consequently, their decision will be identical to
that of naive customers, following a threshold strategy with γˆ = γˆN , which justifies
the belief that α1 = α2.
As a consequence, in this equilibrium, decreasing price always increases mar-
ket share. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4, where blue (solid) line represents expected
payment for sophisticated customers when choosing Bank 1, while red (dashed) is
expected payment from choosing Bank 2.
Bank 1’s total (ex-ante expected) profit, using Lemma 7, is
Π1 = γˆp1 + pi
1
t=2 = γˆ(p1, p2)p1 +
(
α(1− α) + γˆ(p1, p2)α2
) (
φ− c) (3.6)
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium market share
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For any given p2, the optimal choice of p1 is given by the first-order condition:
∂Π1
∂p1
=
∂γˆ
∂p1
p1 + γˆ + α
2
(
φ− c) ∂γˆ
∂p1
= 0
Note that
∂γˆ
∂p1
= − 1
2τ
therefore:
−p1
2τ
+
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2τ
)
− α
2
(
φ− c)
2τ
= 0
p1 =
1
2
(
p2 + τ − α2
(
φ− c))
Solving for symmetric equilibrium:
p
t
=
1
2
+
p
2t
− α
2
(
φ− c)
2t
p = τ − α2 (φ− c)
Whenever τ < α2(φ − c) this is negative. In that case, within the feasible range
of parameters, decreasing first-period price would always be a profitable deviation,
therefore first-period prices hit the lower bound. Rearranging this expression for
α, we obtain that FIIC prevails whenever the mass of naive customers exceed a
threshold value, and this threshold converges to zero as the first-period competition
parameter (τ) converges to perfect competition. Theorem 2 formalizes the result,
which we analyse further in the next section.
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Theorem 2 Symmetric equilibrium in the first stage:
• Suppose τ ≤ α2 (φ− c). Then decreasing prices is always a profitable devia-
tion, so the only symmetric equilibrium is p1 = p2 = 0
• Suppose τ > α2 (φ− c). Then there exist a unique symmetric-price equilib-
rium, defined by
p? = τ − α2 (φ− c) (3.7)
3.3.3.2 Equilibrium profits
Equilibrium profits can be computed using Equation (3.6).
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium profit and PCA price
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Figure 3.6 illustrates that — in contrast to the Gabaix and Laibson [2006]-
tradition — strictly positive profits emerge for any mass of naive customers. The
distorted Bertrand-competition in the second stage of our game guarantees that
prices are jointly determined in equilibrium so that banks can enjoy the benefits of
their market power. In turn, the relative market power in first-stage (τ) and in the
second stage (α) then determines whether prices are positive, or hit the lower bound:
the more competitive are banks in the first-period, the more likely that a zero-price
equilibrium develops, as a result of their competition for market share. In particular,
as τ → 0, so does this threshold α — at the limit, there is zero-price for all possible
values of α. However, the equilibrium profits remain positive everywhere, not only
when the price bound is hit.
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3.4 Overdraft with adverse selection
In this section we switch off customer naivete´, set α = 0 (all customers are sophisti-
cated), and introduce the adverse selection problem β > 0. To simplify analysis, we
derive equilibrium by assuming that the insider bank follows a pure-strategy against
low-types by charging the maximum (supremum) fee which is offered to the other
type in equilibrium. Formally, let
φLin = sup{φ : FHin (φ) < 1}
where FHin (φ) denotes the CDF of the fees insider offers to high-type customers. This
assumption intuitively places a simple and plausible restriction on the equilibrium
structure, namely that any outcome must be such that low-types are being charged
a higher fee than high-types16. We introduce the notation piL(φ) := φ−cL, piH(φ) :=
φ − cH and piLH(φ) = φ − cLH for the 2nd-period profit of serving a unit measure
of customers of type Low/High/Mixed (according to population probabilities) at an
overdraft fee φ.
3.4.1 Second-stage equilibrium
The subgame has obviously no pure-strategy Nash-Equilibrium. The first Lemma
establishes boundaries for the distributions of the mixed strategies FHin and Fout:
Lemma 9 Both outsider and insider mix over the interval [cHL, cL]. Outsider’s
profit must be zero in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.1
Intuitively, the Lemma establishes that because all L-types switch whenever outsider
tries to undercut insider by offering a lower fee, outsider’s offer cannot be below cLH
(participation constraint). On the other hand, the fees cannot be above cL, because
outsider cannot make profit in equilibrium.
Outsider’s indifference condition: At any fee φ < φLin outsider obtains all low-
types, therefore the indifference condition is:
Pr
[
φ < φHin
] (
βpiL(φ) + (1− β)piH(φ))+ Pr [φ > φHin]βpiL(φ) = 0(
1− FHin (φ)
) (
βpiL(φ) + (1− β)piH(φ))+ FHin (φ)βpiL(φ) = 0
16The more general proof of the next section proves that the assumption of degenerate distribution
for the low-type is without loss of generality, as it arises as a limiting case. For this section, this is
assumed for simplicity.
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This can be solved for the CDF of insider-H’s price dispersion:
FHin (φ) =
1
1− β −
β
1− β
∆c
φ− cH
where ∆c = cL − cH . This expression satisfies
FHin (c
L) = 1 and FHin (c
LH) = 0
So the insider is mixing continuously between cLH and cL, without a mass-point.
Insider’s indifference condition: The insider can make a positive profit by charg-
ing cLH to the high-types, and winning the competition with probability 1:
pi0in = (1− β)
(
cLH − cH) = (1− β)β∆c
The indifference condition at any given offer φ
Pr [φ < φout] ·
(
(1− β)piH(φ))+ Pr [φ > φout] · 0 = pi0in
(1− Fout) ·
(
(1− β) (φ− cH))+ Fout · 0 = (1− β) (cLH − cH)
This implies the mixed strategies of the outsider in equilibrium:
Fout(φ) =
φ− cLH
φ− cH = 1−
cLH − cH
φ− cH = 1− β
∆c
φ− cH
This CDF trivially satisfies Fout(c
LH) = 0. We can also calculate that
Fout(c
L) = 1− β
which implies that the outsider’s mixed strategy is given by Fout(φ) over [c
LH , cL),
and a mass point of β on cL. It might be useful to rewrite Fout as
17
Fout(φ) = (1− β)Fin(φ)
The results are summarized in Theorem 3, which is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Theorem 3 The unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the overdraft-stage of
the game with α = 0 and β > 0 is as follows: both insider and outsider mix between
17piLH(cLH) = 0 by definition. The relationship between Fin and Fout is obvious from the
formulas as well. This simple relationship is reminiscent to von Thadden (2004).
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Figure 3.6: Overdraft fee dispersion
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, outsider according to Fout and insider according to Fin as defined below.
FHin (φ) =
1
1− β −
β
1− β
∆c
φ− cH (3.8)
Fout(φ) = 1− β ∆c
φ− cH (3.9)
Outsider is placing a strictly positive probability mass of β on cL (the upper boundary
of the distribution), while insider charges cL to the low-types with probability 1.
3.4.2 Equilibrium characterization
3.4.2.1 Fee dispersion
We calculate expected fees conditional on switching versus staying with the insider
bank. A careful examination of the CDF’s and the payoff structure reveals similari-
ties with the case of customer naivete´, which is reflected in the following expressions.
The probability of winning by insider is a linearly increasing function of the mass of
low-type customers. In the limits, the CDF’s become degenerate, and bank’s charge
the respective fees: as β → 0, and banks charge cL, while they charge cH as β → 1
(see Figure 3.7). The profit is zero in both extreme cases. The formulas below
already foreshadows an interesting but intuitive result which is formally established
in the next step: possible profit due to adverse selection is the highest when the
uncertainty regarding the underlying types is the highest - that is, when β = 1/2.
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Figure 3.7: Conditional expected overdraft fees
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Lemma 10 The probability that insider (outsider) wins is
Prob[φHin < φout] =
1 + β
2
and Prob[φout < φ
H
in] =
1− β
2
The expected fees conditional on winning are
E[φHin|φHin < φout] = cH +
2β
1 + β
∆c
E[φout|φout < φHin] = cH +
2β
1− β∆c+
2β2
(1− β)2 ln[β]∆c
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.2
3.4.2.2 Banks’ profits
The outsider makes zero profit: First, verify that in equilibrium the outsider
obtains zero profit. In any equilibrium profit comes from two parts which might also
be negative: (1) low-types who switch (with certainty) and pay φout, that is E[φout]
(the unconditional expected fee) in expectation (2) High-types who switch whenever
outsider wins the bid, and pay φout, that is Pr[φout < φin]E[φout|φout < φin] in
expectation. Denoting piLout and pi
H
out the profits from the bank’s role as an outsider
from low/high types respectively, we can write
piLout = β
(1− β)cH + βcL − β ln[β]∆c︸ ︷︷ ︸
overdraft fee
− cL︸︷︷︸
cost

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Figure 3.8: Expected profit
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piHout = (1− β)
(
1− β
2
)cH + 2β1− β∆c+ 2β2(1− β)2 ln[β]∆c︸ ︷︷ ︸
overdraft fee
− cH︸︷︷︸
cost

After straightforward algebra we obtain
piout := pi
L
out + pi
H
out = 0
Intuitively, the expected loss from low-type customers who switch regardless of pric-
ing conditions (formally because insider is charging a very high fee) is exactly offset
by the expected profit on high-type customers who switch because the outsider is
winning the price competition. The outsider makes zero profit, therefore all profit
in equilibrium comes from its ‘role’ as an insider bank.
The insider makes positive profit: We have proven that all positive
profit (if it exist) comes from the insider, and it therefore must come from high-
types when the bank wins the competition. This happens when they mix and the
insider wins, and also whenever the outsider plays the probability mass.
piHin = (1− β)Pr[φHin < φout]×
(
E[φHin|φHin < φout]− cH
)
= (1− β)
(
cH +
2β
1 + β
∆c− cH
)
This expression simplifies to the following:
piHin = β(1− β)∆c
Expected profits are illustrated in Figure 3.8. We can also verify that piHin = pi
0
in.
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3.5 Overdraft with naivete´ and adverse selection
Now we turn to the main model and analyse the interaction between customer
naivete´ and adverse selection. In this case we pursue an equilibrium in the following
generic form: insider sets a price for low-types and high-types according to distribu-
tions FLin and F
H
in , while outsider’s price dispersion is given by Fout.
18 The model is
solved backwards: we start with the equilibrium for the second-stage, then iterate
back to the first-stage.
3.5.1 Second-stage equilibrium
Recall that with adverse selection but without customer naivete´ in equilibrium in-
sider follows a pure-strategy against low-types by charging cL with probability 1.
As part of the proof for the main theorem of this section, we show first that this
simple equilibrium structure cannot survive when naive customers are also present
in the economy and α < β. Then, we demonstrate the existence of a specific type
of equilibrium where for α < β insider randomizes independently for high-types and
low-types over some non-overlapping intervals [φ
′′
in, φˆ] and [φˆ, φ], while outsider ran-
domizes according to a piecewise-defined, continuous distribution over the union of
those intervals. The analytical values of φ
′′
in and φˆ will be exactly determined. The
proof consists of two main steps: first we show that any equilibrium must satisfy this
structure; then, we derive overdraft fee dispersion taking the structure as given. In
the main text below we give an overview of steps and intuition, while rigorous proof
and analytical calculations are relegated to Appendix. The proposed equilibrium is
depicted in Figure 3.9.
For this section, let us introduce the following notation: pi(θ, φ, ρ) denotes
profit from serving customers of type θ ∈ {L,H,LH} with overdrafts, when over-
draft fee is φ, and the bank wins with probability ρ. Subscripts in and out refer
to profit for insider and outsider respectively. pi(θ) stands for a minimax payoff
according to an alternative strategy.
First, notice that insider bank can always revert to the strategy of serving
naive customers only, and charging the fee cap φ. This defines two candidate ‘min-
imax’ payoffs for insider, for low and for high types independently. It will be clear
later that as they are facing with the same outsider distribution Fout, only one of
these can be binding.
Suppose first that the minimax payoff from low-types, piin(L) is binding,
18The only assumption we make is that insider sets the prices indifferently for low-types and
high-types.
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Figure 3.9: Overdraft price dispersion
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which must be the case if insider places a positive probability mass at φ in FLin. This
pins down the upper piece of outsider’s piecewise-defined CDF (denoted FLout
19)
through insider’s indifference condition against the low-type customers, that is, in-
sider is willing to offer an arbitrary φ to low-types only if its expected profit by
charging φ equals to its minimax profit:
piin (L, φ, Pr[φ ≤ φout]) = piin (L)
Suppose now that we know the cutoff value of the distributions, φˆ. Then it is
possible to formulate the profit for insider from serving high-type customers. By
playing φˆ, insider wins with probability Pr[φout ≥ φˆ], which we denote by ρˆout for
simplicity:
ρˆout := 1− FLout(φˆ)
By playing φˆ, insider’s payoff from serving high-types is piin(H, φˆ, ρˆout). Due to
insider’s indifference property, this must be equal to its expected payoff at the lower
boundary F . As by playing F insider wins with probability 1, F is the value of φ
which solves
piin(H,F , 1) = piin(H, φˆ, ρˆout)
Notice that this equality defines the lower boundary of the support as a function of φˆ.
By charging F (φˆ) outsider wins the competition with probability 1 and obtains both
(sophisticated) types, leading to profit piout
(
LH,F (φˆ), 1
)
. Due to the indifference
19Note that although we use parallel notation, FLin and F
H
in denote two different distributions,
while FLout and F
H
out is one piecewise-defined CDF!
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condition for outsider, this must be equal to its profit when charging φ −  (with
→ 0). In the latter case outsider wins the low-type customers with the probability
that insider is placing on φ. Let this probability be ρin, which can also be written
as a function of φˆ, and the associated profit is piout(L, φ, ρin(φˆ)).
The next step is to determine the function ρin(φˆ). We know that for an arbi-
trary φˆ insider’s CDF against low-types must reach zero in equilibrium. Therefore,
outsider’s indifference condition at the two boundaries of the support of FLin is
piout(L, φˆ, 1) = piout(L, φ, ρin(φˆ))
This equation allows us to express insider’s probability mass at φ as a function of
φˆ, so we have an analytical expression for ρin(φˆ).
The final step of the proof combines the lower and upper-part of outsider’s
indifference condition to solve for the (unique) threshold value φˆ. At the equilibrium
value of φˆ outsider must be indifferent between charging F (φˆ) and win the low-types
with probability 1, or charging φ−  and win the low-types with probability ρin(φˆ).
That is
piout(LH,F (φˆ), 1) = piout(L, φ, ρin(φˆ))
The Appendix derives the analytical value of φˆ:
φˆ? = cL +
α
β
(
φ− cL)
The result is very intuitive, and shows immediately that the equilibrium described
here emerges for α ∈ (0, β) only. As α → 0, φˆ? → cL and we get back the solution
for the ‘adverse selection only’ benchmark case. Whenever α = β, φˆ? = φ and the
insider’s mixture over low-types becomes degenerate. For every value of α > β the
fee cap is binding for the low-types, leading to a different type of equilibrium, which
is more straightforward to derive (see Appendix for details).
The rest of the proof is straightforward. First, we can use the equilibrium
threshold value φˆ? to pin down insider’s equilibrium profit: at φˆ? insider wins the
high-types with probability
(
1− Fout(φˆ?)
)
, and this defines its new, modified equi-
librium payoff piH,?in . We show in Appendix formally that pi
H,?
in > pi
H
in whenever α < β,
verifying the claim that only the minimax payoff for the low-type is binding (which
is indeed binding by construction of the equilibrium). As the equilibrium payoff is
pinned down, we can write insider’s indifference condition against high-types:
piin(H,φ, Pr[φ < φout]) = pi
H,?
in
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This equation defines the functional form for Fout(φ) on the interval [F , φˆ
?].
Insider’s distributions are derived using outsider’s indifference condition: at
every φ, outsider must be indifferent between playing φ or its alternative payoff,
which is pinned down by the mass-point by insider on φ. That leads to the two
independent indifference conditions in a straightforward way. Theorem 4 fully char-
acterizes second-stage equilibrium.
Theorem 4 The equilibrium of the second-stage overdraft pricing game is as fol-
lows:
• If α > β, insider charges a fee for low-types according to a degenerate dis-
tribution and places all probability mass at φ. For high-types, insider mixes
over [φ′in, φ] according to F
H
in (φ), while outsider mixes over the same interval
according to Fout(φ). Insider places a positive probability mass ρ
H
in :=
α−β
1−β on
φ, where
FHin =
1
1− β −
α
1− β
φ− cH
φ− cH
Fout =
1
1− α −
α
1− α
φ− cH
φ− cH
• If α ≤ β, insider mixes over [φ′′in, φˆ] according to FHin (φ) for high-types, and
over [φˆ, φ] according to FLin(φ) for low-types. Outsider mixes over [φ
′′
in, φ] ac-
cording to Fout, without mass-point. Insider places a positive mass ρin on φ,
where
FHin (φ) =
1
1− β −
α(φ− cL) + β∆c
(1− β)(φ− cH)
FLin(φ) = 1−
α
β
φ− cL
φ− cL
Fout is piecewise defined as
Fout(φ) =
 11−α −
α(φ−cH)+(β−α)∆c
(1−α)(φ−cH) if φ ≤ φˆ
1
1−α − α1−α φ−c
L
φ−cL if φ > φˆ
Proof. Appendix, which also defines analytically the boundaries φ′′in and φˆ.
The following figure illustrates how the proposed equilibrium approaches
simpler models as limiting cases. The left figure in 3.10 depicts the limit as α → 0
(adverse selection only). The lower-bound of the distributions approaches cLH , while
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Figure 3.10: Overdraft price dispersion - limits
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(b) α→ β
the upper bound of FHin approaches c
L. At the same time, the distributions on the
upper range (for φ ∈ (cL, φ) converge to a mass-point on cL for both insider and
outsider. This is exactly the distribution we derived in Section 3.
The right figure illustrates that as α→ β, the upper part of the distributions
‘disappear’ and FLin becomes degenerate. The lower part of the distributions then
will be similar to Section 2, where β = 0 and α > 0, which is clearly a specific case
of β < α.
3.5.2 Equilibrium characterization
Switching probabilities and expected equilibrium overdraft fees are characterized 20
in Appendix. Here in the main text we only focus on bank’s profits from their role
as insider and outsider, as this is sufficient to characterize the symmetric first-stage
equilibrium what we introduce below.
Banks’ second-period equilibrium profits can be decomposed into a sum of
the profit from their role as outsider and insider bank. The insider profit is further
decomposed into profits from high-types and from low-types. That is if Bank j have
market share γ(j), its profit is
pij = γ(j)pi
L(j)
in + γ
(j)pi
H(j)
in + γ
(−j)pijout (3.10)
Notice that the superscript of the market share for bank’s outsider role is (−j), as
it obtains the other bank’s customers as outsider. The components can be obtained
20We provide for this section only a partial characterization, as in some cases the analytical
solutions are difficult.
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directly from the respective indifference conditions. From Appendix, we have for
the case of α ≤ β
piL,jin = α
(j)β(j)
(
φ− cL)
piH,jin = (1− β(j))
(
β(j)
(
cL − cH)+ α(j) (φ− cL))
pijout = α
(−j)
(
1− α(−j)
) (
φ− cL)
Whenever αj = α−j = α and β(j) = β(−j) for an arbitrary γj (and noting that
∀j γj = 1− γ−j ), this simplifies to
pi = γ(1− β)β∆c− α2(1− γ)(φ− cL) + α(φ− cL)
With symmetric γ = 12 and α we obtain
pi
(2)
α≤β =
1
2
(
α(2− α)(φ− cL) + β(1− β)∆c) (3.11)
which in the special case of α = 0 equals the parallel expression in Section 3.
For the case of α > β, the appropriate profits are:
piL,jin = α
(j)β(j)
(
φ− cL)
piH,jin = α
(j)(1− β(j)) (φ− cH)
pijout = (1− α−j)
(
φ′in − cLH
)
= (1− α−j)
(
α−jφ+ (1− α−j)cH − cLH
)
Whenever αj = α−j = α for an arbibrary γj (and noting that ∀j γj = 1 − γ−j ),
this simplifies to
pi = αγj
(
φ− cH − β∆c)+ (1− α)(1− γj) (α(φ− cH)− β∆c)
With symmetric γ = 12 and α we obtain
pi
(2)
β<α =
1
2
(
α(2− α) (φ− cH)− β∆c) (3.12)
which in case of β = 0 equals the parallel expression in Section 2.
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3.5.3 First-stage equilibrium
Naive customers’ decision is simply the threshold value calculated from first-period
prices:
γˆN =
1
2
+
∆p
2τ
Sophisticated customers first correctly predict the equilibrium value of their thresh-
old strategy, that’s γˆS . In turn, this will pin down the parameters required to
calculate equilibrium overdraft fees, that is (potentially), αj and βj , and γj . This
allows to calculate customers’ expected payment conditional on that everyone fol-
lows the equilibrium strategy. Every candidate γˆS generates some expected payment
— equilibrium is found where the sophisticated customer located at γˆS is indeed
indifferent between choosing Bank 1 and Bank 2. This raises the possibility of mul-
tiple equilibria as well. In the rest of the chapter we focus on a relatively simple
symmetric equilibrium, which circumvents the need for calculating overdraft fees.
More detailed analysis of the first-stage, including the case of multiple equilibria, is
left for future work.
3.5.3.1 Symmetric equilibrium
Establishing the equilibrium consists of two steps. First, we will show that for any,
not necessarily equal21 values of p1 and p2, following the exact same behaviour by
sophisticated and naive customers in the first stage is still an equilibrium. The ar-
gument is similar to the one in the previous section with naivete´. By assumption,
low-types and high-types make the same first-period choice22, therefore, for any
strategy of sophisticated customers, the fraction of low and high types will be the
same within the two banks. In addition, if sophisticated customers follow the same
strategy as naive customers, the mass of naive customers will also be the same. As
the two bank has the same ‘structural’ parameters, and (overdraft-) pricing is scale-
free in the sense that it is independent of the market share, given this predicted
equilibrium, sophisticated customers predict the same equilibrium expected over-
draft fee payment. Therefore, they will base their decision solely on the first-period
payout, and would follow the same strategy as naive customers, justifying this as
an equilibrium action.
Next, taking this behaviour as given, we look at the banks’ total profit func-
tion, and calculate the first-order condition for optimum PCA-price. The first-order
21such that γˆN ∈ (0, 1) is maintained
22customers do not know ex-ante whether they will be perceived low or high-types by the bank,
that would require them to know the bank’s behavioural scoring system, which is unlikely
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condition captures an intuitive trade-off: as first-period prices decrease, a bank can
increase its market share, but obtains lower profit from each individual customers.
This leads to a first-period price which is unique in this symmetric equilibrium.
We restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium with p1 = p2. The Bank’s
profit is given by Equation (3.10), and below we derive the fixed point of the best-
response mapping to the two cases, α ≤ β and α > β. The overall profit-functions
for both period - as a sum of first-period profit from PCA-deals and second period
profit on overdrafts - in the case of a symmetric equilibrium can be constructed
using (3.11) and (3.12) for example from Bank 1’s point of view as follows:
piα≤β = γ1 (p1, p2) p1 + pi
(2)
α≤β
piα>β = γ1 (p1, p2) p1 + pi
(2)
α>β
We substitute γ1 = γ
N and calculate the best response by Bank 1 to any p2 as a
solution of the following first-order conditions:
∂piα≤β
∂p1
=
1
2τ
(
β2∆c− β∆c− 2p1 + p2 − α2(φ− cL) + τ
)
= 0
∂piα>β
∂p1
=
1
2τ
(
2αβ∆c− β∆c− 2p1 + p2 − α2(φ− cH) + τ
)
= 0
this gives us the best-response function:
p˜1,α≤β(p2, ·) = 1
2
(−β∆c+ β2∆c+ p2 − α2 (φ− cL)+ τ)
p˜1,α>β(p2, ·) = 1
2
(−β∆c+ 2αβ∆c+ p2 − α2 (φ− cH)+ τ)
The symmetric equilibrium we are after here is given by the fixed-point equations:
p =
1
2
(−β∆c+ 2αβ∆c+ p− α2 (φ− cL)+ τ)
p =
1
2
(−β∆c+ β2∆c+ p− α2 (φ− cH)+ τ)
which gives the symmetric equilibrium solution:
p?α≤β = β
2∆c− β∆c+ τ − α2 (φ− cL) (3.13)
p?α>β = 2αβ∆c− β∆c+ τ − α2
(
φ− cH) (3.14)
Whenever α = β the two predicted PCA prices coincide, so p? is continuous at this
point of the parameter space.
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Theorem 5 There exist a symmetric equilibrium in the first stage, characterized
as follows:
• Whenever α ≤ β, the symmetric equilibrium is ‘FIIC’ with p? = 0 whenever
τ ≤ α2(φ− cL)− β(1− β)∆c. Otherwise there exist a positive price given by
Equation (3.13).
• Whenever α > β, the symmetric equilibrium is ‘FIIC’ with p? = 0 whenever
τ ≤ α2(φ− cH)− β(1− 2α)∆c. Otherwise there exist a positive price given by
Equation (3.14).
The difference between the equilibrium fee in (3.14) and the case of customer naivete´
only is exactly β∆c(2α− 1), which is zero if β = 0 or if ∆c = 0 — that is, if there is
no adverse selection. Furthermore, the difference is negative whenever α < 12 . On
the other hand, the difference between ‘naivete´ only’ PCA-price and Equation (3.13)
is always negative. Recall that relatively low α values are typically the parameter
regions where PCA prices may turn positive as a result of first-stage market power
(relatively high value of τ), as the potential to exploit naive customers is extremely
limited. This is inherent in all Gabaix-Laibson-style models, but also verified by our
approach. The comparison above implies the following corollary:
Corollary 3 The presence of adverse selection typically decreases first-period prices
and makes FIIC-pricing more likely. Specifically, whenever τ > 0, any adverse
selection (which requires β > 0 and ∆c > 0) decreases any positive PCA prices
whenever α < β, and also if β < α < 12 .
Figure 3.11 provides an illustration of how the presence of information asym-
metry and adverse selection affects equilibrium outcome. We choose the parameters
so that the expected (net) cost of the overdraft business is exactly equal (that is,
βcL+(1−β)cH is constant). The left-side figure depicts an already known situation
with customer naivete´ only (β = 0). The presence of naivete´ raises profits over
the whole interval α ∈ (0, 1), imposing FIIC for a significant part of the parameter
space, except for lower values of α. In contrast, the right-hand figure depicts a sit-
uation where β = 0.5. Despite the expected cost of overdraft business being equal,
information asymmetry tilts the sources of profits towards insider role, leading to
further increase of PCA prices even for low values of α.
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Figure 3.11: Bank profit and PCA price
Without / with adverse selection
Profit
p
Profit,no overdraft
α=β α
profit/price
Profit
p
Profit,no overdraft
α=β α
profit/price
Positive PCA prices without information asymmetry (left-hand figure) are
competed away as adverse selection makes insider role of a bank more
prominent compared to its outsider role.
3.6 Discussion
In this section we revisit the most important results of the preceding analysis and
emphasize the contribution from economic theory point of view, as well as our
message to banking research in the context of overdraft markets.
We started the research by changing an important component of the eco-
nomic literature on aftermarket-pricing, namely that the seller of the primary good
has monopoly power on the aftermarket. Instead, we take an almost opposite view
by modelling a homogeneous add-on good with Bertrand-competition on the after-
market. We argued that this is a more accurate description of retail banking, as
there are no conventional technological constraints linking the aftermarket-good to
the base-market good, like for example in the case of a printer and its cartridges.
In the meantime, we certainly acknowledge that there is market power in retail
banking: however, its source is rather attributable to behavioural biases (customer
naivete´), or informational frictions (adverse selection). We therefore constructed a
stylized model which is able to capture the interaction of these two effects in an
otherwise competitive aftermarket environment.
We believe that this approach is more suitable to address the potential im-
pact of recent policy developments in the Banking sector. Due to an increasing
pressure from customer protection groups, policy makers recently started to look
more seriously at some prevalent retail banking practices, such as FIIC-pricing. As
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a result of this scrutiny, new measures - such as the 2nd Payment Services Directive
in the EU, or the Open Banking Programme in the UK - have been implemented
to address the potentially welfare-reducing consequences. The most important el-
ements of these changes seem to target customers’ behavioural biases, like naivete´
— possibly exacerbated by exploitative practices such as shrouding —, and banks’
information monopoly over customers, which gives rise to adverse selection and pre-
vents potential competitors to enter the market and improve efficiency. Professor
Alasdair Smith from the UK’s Competition and Market Authority summarizes this
point neatly as23
The Open Banking programme (...) tackle the central problem in retail
banking competition. That central problem is not “free banking”; it’s the
fact that bank customers don’t have the information or tools they need
to get the best deal from their banks.
The implemented measures among others make it easier for customers to shop
around using price comparison websites, switch to a competitor bank using switch-
ing services, and force banks to share customer account information on request to
alleviate the potential adverse selection problem. As a result, banks’ seem to have
started to advertise heavily their overdraft conditions (instead of shrouding this in-
formation in advance), and introduced temporarily discounted overdraft fees as a
selling-point.24
We started the analysis with a simple duopoly model where in the sec-
ond stage naive customers can be exploited, while there is Bertrand-competition
for sophisticated customers. We showed that there exist no pure-strategy Nash-
equilibrium of the overdraft-pricing stage, and in the mixed-strategy equilibrium
both insider and outsider bank randomizes its overdraft fees. We have demon-
strated that the mixed-strategy equilibrium has intuitive limits: as α → 0 the
equilibrium converges to a competitive (zero-profit) equilibrium, while with α → 1
it converges to a maximum-exploitation monopoly pricing. An interesting property
of the mixed-strategy equilibrium is that insider’s price dispersion allows the out-
sider bank as well to increase their prices, and obtain positive profit. When a bank
decides whether to decrease prices it faces the following trade-off: it increases its
market-share, therefore it obtains more profit in the first-period and from its role
as insider, but it will obtain less profit from its outsider role. The equilibrium PCA
23Financial Times, FEBRUARY 21, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/
72de5dc0-f79c-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71
24Recall that the first, ‘authentic’ interpretation of price dispersion of homogeneous goods in
economics was ’the model of sales’, by Varian (1980).
98
price trades off these two forces. As the insider role is profitable, the equilibrium
price will always be below the price which would arise on the market for PCA with-
out the aftermarket (the latter is positive as banks have some market power derived
from product differentiation in the first-stage), but it is limited by the presence of
outsider profits, and therefore positive second-period profits are not competed away
in the first-stage, even with positive prices. Therefore, in contrast to the literature,
in this model the source of the positivity of bank’s profits is not the binding lower
boundary constraint, but a direct consequence of endogenous price determination
with customer naivete´.
The presence of adverse selection changes this picture in an important way.
As our analysis with adverse selection only (Section 4) points out, the information
monopoly gives rise to an equilibrium with similar price dispersion, but this price
dispersion only lets the insider to profit from its information advantage - outsider
would get zero profit in equilibrium. This is a restatement of known results from the
domain of relationship-banking literature (see for example, von Thadden (2004)).
25
This intuition carries through to the full model where we combine customer
naivete´ and adverse selection. The appearance of adverse selection prevents the
outsider to enjoy the extra profits from naivete´. As a result, the source of profit will
be tilted towards insider customers, so the bank would compete more strongly for
them in the first stage. This effect pushes the PCA prices downward, making FIIC-
equilibrium even more likely. In particular, with the same mass of naive customers,
low adverse-selection might lead to positive prices, while high adverse selection to
zero-bound pricing and FIIC equilibrium. Adverse selection influences exploitation-
ability in a nontrivial way.
Another aspect of this interaction links to the question of why overdraft
markets develop in the first place.26 The following high-level argument is motivated
by Heidhues et al. [2016a], who study the incentives to ‘innovate’ pricing practices
designed to exploit naive customers on the market — the overdraft segment itself
being a prime example. Without much formality, and admitting that this argument
may be subject to criticism, we say that there is ‘incentive to innovate’ and enter
into a new market, if the new equilibrium (after sufficient convergence including
follow-up entries) promises a higher equilibrium payoff, than the current status
quo. Let this status quo be a banking market where overdrafts do not exist. Does
25Our version of the relationship-banking model presented here is essentially an extremely parsi-
monious version of the classic relationship-banking problem with adverse selection.
26This is not addressed formally in the model, but the discussion here can be a basis of a poten-
tially important extension.
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Figure 3.12: Bank profit and PCA price
Without / with adverse selection (2)
Profit
p
Profit,no overdraft
α=β α
profit/price
Profit
p
Profit,no overdraft
α=β α
profit/price
Market power (larger τ) in the first period makes overdrafts less profitable
compared to an equilibrium where only PCA’s are offered, without overdrafts.
the banking sector has incentives to make an investment to introduce this new
product and move to a new equilibrium?27 Figure 3.12 illustrates the effect of first-
period PCA-price competition. Without adverse selection (left figure) — for an
arbitrary level of α — overdrafts generate additional profits, therefore the answer is
positive: there is always ‘incentive to innovate’ and introduce the overdraft business
segment into the market. The presence of adverse selection (right figure) makes
profits much less responsive to the presence of naive customers, especially for low α
values. Although the profits obtained in the new equilibrium are still positive, the
extra profit compared to the case where banks only sell PCA’s and exploit product
differentiation shrinks, and for sufficiently high τ , it even converges to zero. This
means there is less incentives to innovate. Whenever the banks have large first-
period market power (a more concentrated, oligopolistic retail banking market),
equilibrium PCA prices tend to be larger, so it is less likely that the equilibrium is
FIIC. The presence of adverse selection can bring this to the extreme, when banks
have no incentives to innovate and introduce overdrafts at the first place.
To conclude, more concentrated, less competitive markets with higher prod-
uct differentiation in Europe compared to the large and competitive banking sector
in the US and the UK might be the the reason why FIIC is much more prevalent
in the latter countries. In addition, higher adverse selection (more uncertainty re-
27Even if there is a generic demand for a certain type of product - like an overdraft-style liquidity
facility -, it is not immediate, and not costless to introduce a new banking product unknown to
customers, and start fulfilling the potential demand.
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garding the borrowers’ creditworthiness) makes FIIC more-likely, which suggest that
FIIC might be more prevalent in countries with relatively higher income inequality
and lower social safety net. These potential explanations which are suggested by
our model are invariant to the level of customer naivete´, so FIIC can prevail or not
even with the exact same number of naive customers - a puzzle which motivated
our research at the beginning.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a novel way of thinking about bank’s overdraft prices and
aftermarket pricing in general. Even with competitive aftermarkets, behavioural
frictions such as customer naivete´ - the presence of customers who do not switch,
despite a cheaper product is available on the market, and there are no other bar-
riers to switch -, or informational frictions such as adverse selection can generate
an equilibrium which is reminiscent to pricing schemes observed in retail banking.
Specifically, the model predicts free-if-in-credit pricing (‘free banking’) for a large
subset of parameters. In contrast to alternative models, FIIC arises with moderate
number of naive customers, and as long as the market is subject to more severe
adverse selection, even with small number of naive customers. Higher competition
on the primary market also raises the possibility of the emergence of FIIC-pricing.
These are novel findings in the theoretical literature, and help to explain better the
observed differences in retail banking markets around the world. Our modelling
framework is also better suited to analyse the potential impact of certain regula-
tory interactions, such as price-comparison websites, ‘open banking’, or switching
services. Most of this analysis, and further comparative exercise on cross-country
differences is left for future research work.
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3.A Appendix A - Proofs, Customer myopia
3.A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The Lemma is established through a series of claims.
Claim 1 Insider will never bid any φin < φ
′
in, so F in ≥ φ′in. Furthermore, Pr[φin =
φ′in] = 0.
Proof. (i) Charging φ is always a feasible action for insider, and even if she wins
at some φin < φ
′
in with probability 1 and loses at φ with probability 1, the latter
still gives higher profit by the definition of φ′in. (ii) Suppose there is a mass point
at φ′in by the insider, that is, Pr[φin = φ
′
in] > 0. This can only be equilibrium
if F out ≤ φ′in, otherwise insider would have incentives to increase the price. In
addition, insider must win at φ′in with certainty (otherwise would find it better to
charge φ by the definition of φ′in). This implies outsider loses at φout = φ
′
in with a
strictly positive probability. In that case, outsider is better off by charging φ′in − 
with probability 1, winning with certainty, and obtaining a profit of α (φ′in − c) γ−.
Insider would lose at φ′in. Contradiction to equilibrium.
Claim 2 Outsider will never bid below φ′in, so F out ≥ φ′in
Proof. Suppose the bid is φ < φ′in. Because of claim 1, he wins with certainty, but
than he would be better off by bidding
φ′in+φ
2 . Contradiction.
Claim 3 Whenever φ′in > c outsider makes positive profit in equilibrium.
Proof. For any bid φout ∈ (c, φ′in) outsider would win with certainty and make
positive profit. As this is a feasible deviation, there must be positive profit in
equilibrium.
Claim 4 Outsider never places positive mass on any φ ≥ F in. In particular,
Pr[φout = F in] = 0.
Proof. In this region he would lose with certainty, implying zero profit and contra-
dicting Claim 3.
Claim 5 F in = φ and insider’s profit is α
(
φ− c) γ
Proof. Claim 4 implies that insider loses the bid with probability 1 at F in. There-
fore, her profit when playing F in can be at most α
(
F in − c
)
γ. Because the minimax
payoff is α
(
φ− c) γ, and the profit is increasing in φ, it follows immediately that
F in = φ and the profit throughout the mixture is α
(
φ− c) γ.
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Claim 6 Outsider’s lower boundary must be exactly Fout = φ
′
in
Proof. Suppose F out > φ
′
in. Then there exist a strategy for insider to bid F out,
win the competition with probability 1, and make profit (F out − c) γ > pi0in. This
contradicts to Claim 5.
Claim 7 Insider’s lower boundary must be exactly F in = φ
′
in
Proof. Suppose F in > φ
′
in. Then outsider could win all customers at φout =
F in − , and would never bid anything below. Insider would then find it profitable
to undercut this by bidding F in − .
Claim 8 The constant profit to outsider over the mixture is piout = (φ
′
in − c) γ.
Proof. At φ′in outsider wins with probability 1, because there is no mass by insider.
3.A.2 Proof of Lemma 5
We want to calculate Prob(φout < φin). Start with the continuous part of the
distributions where both players mix, ignoring the mass points. With the joint
CDF fio it is possible to write formally
Pr[φout < φin] =
∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φin
φ′in
fiodφoutdφin
From earlier lemmas we can calculate the two PDF’s:
fin(φ) = F
′
in(φ) = α ·
φ− c
(φ− c)2
fout(φ) = F
′
out(φ) =
α
1− α ·
φ− c
(φ− c)2
The joint distribution because of the independence assumption is:
fio(φin, φout) = fin(φin) · fout(φout) = a
2
1− a ·
(
φ− c)2
(φout − c)2(φin − c)2
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The internal integral, with respect to φout is∫
fiodφout = − a
2
1− a ·
(φ− c)2
(φout − c)(φin − c)2∫ φin
φ′in
foidφout =
a2
1− a ·
(φ− c)2
(φin − c)2 ·
(
1
(φ′in − c)
− 1
(φin − c)
)
=
α
1− α
φ− c
(φin − c)2 −
α2
1− α
(φ− c)2
(φin − c)3
After integrating each components we get:
˜Prob[φout < φin] =
α
1− α(φ− c)
[ −1
φin − c
]φ
φ′in
− α
2
1− α(φ− c)
2
[ −1
2(φin − c)2
]φ
φ′in
After substitutions of the integral boundaries, we get the formula for the probability:
˜Prob[φout < φin] =
1− a
2
This probability only considers the mass over the continuous-part of the two distri-
butions, so it gives the probability mass of winning when insider plays mixture. In
addition, outsider wins with certainty whenever insider plays φ. Together with the
mass-point we obtain
Prob[φout < φin] =
1− α
2
+ α =
1 + α
2
Prob[φin < φout] = 1− 1 + α
2
=
1− α
2
3.A.3 Proof of Lemma 6
We calculate the expected fee offered by insider resp. outsider conditional on winning
the price competition, that is, E[φout|φout < φin] and E[φin|φin ≤ φout]. Because
there are mass-points by the insider placed on φ, we have
E[φout|φout < φin] = 11+α
2
(∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φin
φ′in
φoutfiodφoutdφin + α
∫ φ
φ′in
φoutfoutdφout
)
(3.15)
E[φin|φin ≤ φout] = 11−α
2
(∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φout
φ′in
φinfiodφindφout
)
(3.16)
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Because the joint distribution is symmetric in the two variables, the double-integral
components are symmetric and equal. For example,
∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φin
φ′in
φoutfiodφoutdφin = αφ+
1
2
(
2α2 ln[α](φ− c)
1− α − (3α− 1)(c)
)
The details of this calculation are included below:
1. The internal integral
∫ φin
φ′in
φoutfφout,φindφout =
α2
1− α
(
φ− c)2
(φin − c)2
∫ φin
φ′in
φout
(φout − c)2
dφout
=
α2
1− α
(
φ− c)2
(φin − c)2
[ −c
φout − c + ln(φout − c)
]φin
φ′in
=
α2
1− α
(
φ− c)2
(φin − c)2
( −c
φin − c + ln(φin − c) +
c
α(φ− c) − ln(α(φ− c))
)
2. The full integral: required ”ingredients”:
∫
1
(x− c)3dx = −
1
2 (x− c)2 ⇒
[
1
2
(
α(φ− c))2 − 12 (φ− c)2
]
=
[
1− α2
2α2
1(
φ− c)2
]
∫
ln(x− c)
(x− c)2 dx = −
ln(x− c) + 1
x− c ⇒
[
ln(α(φ− c)) + 1
α(φ− c) −
ln(φ− c) + 1
φ− c
]
=
ln(φ− c)
φ− c
(
1− α
α
)
+
1
φ− c
(
1− α
α
)
+
lnα
α(φ− c)
=
[
1− α
α(φ− c)
(
ln(φ− c) + 1)+ lnα
α(φ− c)
]
∫
1
(x− c)2dx =
−1
x− c ⇒
[ −1
φ− c +
1
α(φ− c)
]
=
[
1− α
α(φ− c)
]
Therefore∫ φ
φ′in
[...]dφin =
α2
(
φ− c)2
1− α
(
−c
[
1− α2
2α2
1(
φ− c)2
]
+
[
1− α
α(φ− c)
(
ln(φ− c) + 1)+ lnα
α(φ− c)
]
+
((
c
α(φ− c)
)
− lnα− ln(φ− c)
)[
1− α
α(φ− c)
])
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This simplifies significantly:
∫ φ
φ′in
[...]dφin =
−(1 + α)c
2
+ α(φ− c) (ln(φ− c) + 1)+ α lnα(φ− c)
1− α
+ c− α(φ− c) (ln[α] + ln(φ− c))
= αφ+ α(φ− c)
(
− ln[α]
1− α − ln[α]
)
+ c− (1 + α)c
2
− αc
= αφ+ α(φ− c)
(
α ln[α]
1− α
)
+ c
(
1− α− 1 + α
2
)
= αφ+
α2 ln[α]
1− α (φ− c) + c
(
1− 3α
2
)
The calculation of the unconditional expected value is relatively straightfor-
ward, so we omit details:
∫ φ
φ′in
φoutfoutdφout = c− α(φ− c) log[a]
1− a
After combining the two expressions:
E[φout|φout < φin] = 1
1 + α
(
2φ+ (1− α)(c))
This can be rewritten as
E[φout|φout < φin] = c+ 2α
1 + α
(
φ− c)
which is reminiscent to a markup-pricing formula. Similarly,
E[φin|φin ≤ φout] = c+ 2α
1− α
(
φ− c)(α ln[α]
1− α + 1
)
= c+
2α
1− α
(
1 +
α ln[α]
1− α
)(
φ− c)
Because α < 1, the mark-up is always smaller for the insider.
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3.A.4 Proof of Lemma 7
Bank’s profit
The outsider profit can be rewritten for j ∈ {1, 2} as
piout = γ−j(1− α−j)
(
α−jφ+ (1− α−j)c− c
)
= γ−jα−j(1− α−j)
(
φ− c)
The overall profit:
pij = pijin + pi
j
out = (γjαj + γ−jα−j(1− α−j))
(
φ− c) (3.17)
Notice that
γjαj + (1− γj)α−j = α ⇒ α−j = α− γjαj
1− γj
therefore
pij = (γjαj + γ−jα−j(1− α−j))
(
φ− c) = −α2 + α2jγ2j − α(1− γj + 2αjγj)
1− γj
(
φ− c)
=
[
α− α
2 + α2jγ
2
j − 2ααjγj
1− γj
] (
φ− c) = [α− (α− αjγj)2
1− γj
] (
φ− c)
whenever αj = α:
[
α− (α− αjγj)
2
1− γj
]
= −α
2(1 + γj)− 2α2γj
1− γj + α = −
α2
(
1 + γ2j − 2γj
)
1− γj + α
= −α
2 (1− γj)2
1− γj + α = α− α
2(1− γj) = α(1− α(1− γj))
= α(1− α) + γjα2
as we have
∂pi
∂γj
= α2
(
φ− c) > 0
,the profit always increases in own market share.
Whenever γ1 = γ2 = 1/2,
pij = α(1− 1
2
α)
(
φ− c)
=
1
2
α(2− α) (φ− c)
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Decomposition of profits
We decompose profits in a symmetric equilibrium into three parts: (i) profit
from myopic customers, who always stay with the Bank, irrespectively of prices; (ii)
profit on sophisticated customers because they decide to stay in equilibrium (and
pay φin), or (iii) because they switch from the other bank (and pay φout). That is,
for any given pair of equilibrium overdraft fees {φin, φout}
Epi(φin, φout) = αpi(φin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from myopes
+ pow(1− α)pi(φout)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit switching sophisticates
+ piw(1− α)pi(φin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from staying sophisticates
where pout.w and pin.w are the probabilities that outsider and insider wins the com-
petition.
Using results from previous section, it is possible to rewrite expected profit
from serving a unit myopic / sophisticated switcher / sophisticated remainer cus-
tomer as
Epimyop = α (E[φin]− c)
Episoph,switch = Pr[switch] (E[φout|switch]− c)
Episoph,stay = Pr[stay] (E[φin|stay]− c)
where
E[φin] =
∫ φ
φ′in
φinfφindφin + αφ
and the other variables are defined in the previous Lemma. The total expected
income from sophisticated customers is
Episoph = p+R+ E[φ|switch] · Pr[switch] + E[φ|stay] · Pr[stay]
After substitution and algebraic simplifications:
Epimyop = α2 (1− ln[α]) (φ− c)
Episoph,switch = (1− α)α (φ− c)
Episoph,stay = α (1− α+ α ln[α]) (φ− c)
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3.B Appendix B - Proofs, Adverse selection
3.B.1 Proof of Lemma 9
The Lemma is established through a series of claims.28 Let F θ and F θ denote the
infimum and the supremum of the support of the probability distributions Fθ for
θ ∈ {“in”, “out”}.
Claim 1 (Participation constraints) (i) Insider would never offer any φHin < c
H
for the high types, therefore FHin ≥ cH . Similarly, it would never offer any φLin < cL,
so φLin ≥ cL. (ii) Outsider would never offer any φout < cHL, so F out ≥ cLH .
Proof. (i )The bank would get negative profit if it wins. (ii) By (i), φLin ≥ cL,
and because cL > cLH , by bidding cLH or below, the outsider gets all low-types.
Therefore, even if it wins all high-types with probability 1, it would make a loss at
any φ < cLH .
Claim 2 (Common lower boundaries) (i) The lower boundaries of insider-H’s
and outsider’s distributions must coincide: F out = F
H
in := F (ii) There must be no
probability mass by outsider at the lower boundary.
Proof. (i) Suppose FHin < F out. Then insider would win at F out with probability 1,
and make strictly larger profit, contradicting equilibrium. Similarly, there cannot be
any F out < F in, since outsider could raise it to
F out+F
H
in
2 , still win with probability
1, and obtain larger profit.
(ii) Suppose F > cLH and outsider places a positive probability mass on F .
Then insider would lose at F +  with → 0 with a probability strictly larger than
0. Instead, she could improve her payoff by playing F −  and win with probability
1.
Claim 3 Insider makes strictly positive profit.
Proof. Because of Claim 2, by playing F the insider wins with probability 1.
Because F ≥ cHL due to Claim 1, insider obtains a profit at least cHL − cH > 0 on
each (high-type) customer.
Claim 4 There is a common upper boundary of the continuous parts of the distri-
butions: F i = F o := F = c
L
28This is an existence-proof, and does not address the uniqueness of equilibrium. In particular,
we ‘guess’ some properties of the equilibrium — namely that the insider fee to low-types is a
degenerate distribution at cL — and then verify that this is indeed an equilibrium. Also, continuity
of the distributions is imposed. We believe that this simplified proof carries the main intuition
while avoids less interesting technical details.
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Proof. That the upper boundaries are common is trivial. Suppose F > cL. Then
outsider obtains positive profit. By playing F outsider loses with certainty, contra-
dicting positive profit, therefore there must not be probability mass by the outsider
on F . This implies insider loses competition for high-types at F with probability
1, and makes zero profit on high-types. That cannot be part of an equilibrium, as
there is a profitable deviation to charge cHL −  and obtain strictly positive profit.
Contradiction to F > cL. Now suppose F < cL. Given that φLin = c
L, outsider
would get all low-types. If there is no mass-point by insider on F , outsider would
also lose all high-types and make negative profit, contradicting equilibrium. But
insider cannot have mass point at F , as in that case outsider must have zero mass
on F , and insider loses with certainty, and obtains lower profit than at cHL.
Claim 5 Outsider is making zero profit.
Proof. By charging cL outsider loses with certainty and obtains zero profit.
3.B.2 Proof of Lemma 10
Switching probabilities and expected fees
From the CDF’s in Theorem 3 we can calculate the PDF’s and the joint
PDF:
fin(φ
H
in) =
β
1− β
cL − cH(
φHin − cH
)2
fout(φout) = β
cL − cH
(φout − cH)2
fio(φ
H
in, φout) =
β2
1− β
(
cL − cH)2(
φHin − cH
)2
(φout − cH)2
The following computations are similar to the case with customer naivete´. The
truncated probability (over the mixture) that insider vs. outsider wins is:
P˜ r[φHin < φout] =
∫ cL
cLH
∫ φout
cLH
fiodφ
H
indφout =
1− b
2
P˜ r[φout < φ
H
in] =
∫ cL
cLH
∫ φHin
cLH
fiodφoutdφ
H
in =
1− b
2
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The (unconditional) probabilities are
Pr[φHin < φout] =
1− β
2
+ β =
1 + β
2
Pr[φout < φ
H
in] =
1− β
2
Note that the conditional probability that insider/outsider wins given mixture is:
Pr[φHin < φout|mix] = Pr[φout < φHin|mix] =
1− β
2
/(1− β) = 1
2
The expected fee of insider conditional on winning is
E[φHin|φHin < φout] =
∫ cL
cLH
∫ φout
cLH
φHinfiodφ
H
indφout + β
∫ cL
cLH φ
H
infindφ
H
in
P˜ r[φHin < φout]
=
[
1
2
(
(1− β)(cH) + 2β∆c)+ β2 ln[β]∆c
1− β + β
(
c− β ln[β]
1− β ∆c
)]
∗ 2
1 + β
= cH +
2β
1 + β
∆c
The expected fee of outsider conditional on winning:
E[φout|φout < φHin] =
∫ ub
lb
∫ φout
lb φoutfiodφoutdφ
H
in
P˜ r[φout < φHin]
=
[
1
2
(
(1− β)cH + 2β∆c)+ β2 ln[β]∆c
1− β
]
∗ 2
1− β
= cH +
2β
1− β∆c+
2β2
(1− β)2 ln[β]∆c
Finally, we need to know the (unconditional) expected fees:
E[φout] = E˜[φout] + β(cL) = (1− β)cH + βcL − β ln[β]∆c
E[φHin] = cH −
β ln[β]∆c
1− β
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3.C Appendix C - Proofs, Full model
3.C.1 No pure-strategy for L-types
For didactic reasons we give a proof sketch for the claim that for α < β there is
no equilibrium in which insider follows a pure strategy (degenerate distribution) for
low-types. For α > β, there is an equilibrium with φLin = φ. Although this also
follows from the main theorem below, this short proof provides important insight.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose that insider’s strategy to bid for low-types is a degenerate
distribution, and it places probability mass 1 on some value φLin.
Suppose first that α < β, and φLin > F
H
in . There will be no probability mass
by insider on FHin , but to guarantee at least the minimax payoff to insider, outsider
must have probability mass at FHin , loses with certainty, and makes zero profit on
high-types. Given that pricing, outsider would find it optimal to move all mass
instead to φLin − , and obtain larger profit. (At FHin and φLin −  outsider would
serve the same set of customers, but at a higher price). This is a possible deviation
whenever φLin > F
H
in . Now suppose (with slightly imprecise but intuitive notation)
that FLin = F
H
in+, so that outsider cannot profitably raise its prices as previously
described. This however cannot be equilibrium either: in this case insider would
have a profitable deviation, as by raising to FLin = φ it would obtain higher profit.
Finally, suppose α < β and φLin < F
H
in . Outsider cannot be indifferent
between φLin−  and φLin, as in the first case it would get all, in the second case none
of the low-type customers. It can be indifferent only if the profit from low-types
is zero, that is, if FLin = c
L. However, in this case insider would have a profitable
deviation to raise φ and serve only naive customers. Contradiction.
Notice that if insider charges φLin = φ and there is no mass by the outsider
on φ. Then low-types always switch. For any α > β we can show that under those
conditions there exist an equilibrium with some distributions FHin and Fout. These
distributions satisfy that sup{φ|FHin (φ) < 1} = φ and Pr[φo = φ] = 0 (that is, φ
is the upper boundary of insider-HIGH, but not played by outsider with positive
probability). Under those conditions insider cannot decrease prices for low-types
because given outsider’s distribution, the profit would be lower. Therefore, outsider
indeed obtains all low-type customers, and the proposed pricing is equilibrium.
3.C.2 Proof of Theorem 4
The Theorem is proven in 4 parts.First, we characterize the structure of equilibrium.
Then, we show that only one ‘minimax payoff’ can be binding. Finally, we derive
the distributions for α ≤ β and for α > β separately.
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3.C.2.1 PART A — Equilibrium structure
Recall that we solve for three generic, independent distributions: Fout, F
H
in and F
L
in.
We start by establishing some claims regarding the equilibrium:
Lemma 11 The three distributions, Fout, F
H
in and F
L
in must satisfy that (1) the
supports of insider’s distributions for high and low types do not overlap; (2) The
supports of insider’s distributions for high and low types cannot be disjoint. (3)
The support of Fout coincides with the union of the supports of F
H
in and F
L
in.
29(4)
There is no probability mass by the insider at the minimum boundary for any of the
distributions.
The claims are proven separately below.
Claim 1 Insiders’ two distributions for low and high type cannot have overlapping
parts, that is, F
H
i ≤ FLi .
Proof. Intuitively, the proof establishes that insider cannot be indifferent between
two fees offered to high-types to low-types at the same time, while facing with
the (same) probability distribution Fout. Suppose F
L < F
H
. As we restrict to
independent randomizations, at any φ ∈
(
FL, F
H
)
, insider must be indifferent
independently for the low-types and the high-types. That means, for an arbitrary
φ and φ′ ∈
(
FL, F
H
)
(1− Fout(φ))(1− α)(1− β)(φ− cθ) + α(1− β)(φ− cθ)
= (1− Fout(φ′))(1− α)(1− β)(φ′ − cθ) + α(1− β)(φ′ − cθ)
and
(1− Fout(φ))(1− α)β(φ− cθ) + αβ(φ− cθ)
= (1− Fout(φ′))(1− α)β(φ′ − cθ) + αβ(φ′ − cθ)
29One must be careful with the mathematical language here, because the randomization does
not necessarily happens over a compact interval. Notice however that the usual definition of the
support of a distribution, supp(F ) is the closure of the set of possible values with nonzero mesure.
That is, specifically, F := sup{x : F (x) < 1} ∈ supp(F ) even if F is never played.
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After simplifications, and rearranging terms, for each θ ∈ {L,H} we obtain:
(1− Fout(φ))(1− α)(φ− cθ) + α(φ− cθ) = (1− Fout(φ′))(1− α)(φ′ − cθ) + α(φ′ − cθ)
(1− α)(φ− φ′)− (1− α)
[
Fout(φ)(φ− cθ)− Fout(φ′)(φ′ − cθ)
]
= α(φ′ − φ)[
Fout(φ)(φ− cθ)− Fout(φ′)(φ′ − cθ)
]
= −α(φ
′ − φ)
(1− α) + (φ− φ
′)
cθ
(
Fout(φ
′)− Fout(φ)
)
= −α(φ
′ − φ)
(1− α) + (φ− φ
′)− Fout(φ)(φ) + Fout(φ′)φ′
From the last equation the contradiction is obvious, as the RHS is constant, while
the LHS is different for H and L.
Claim 2 Insider’s low and high distributions cannot be disjoint with a gap between
the two intervals, i.e. F
H
i ≥ FLi .
Proof. Suppose they are disjoint, F
H
in < F
L
in. There cannot be any probability mass
by outsider on any φ < FLin, as it would find optimal to put this mass on F
L
in − 
instead. However, this cannot be optimal for insider. As insider would win with
the same probability over high types for every [F
H
in, F
L
in), it would find it optimal
to move some probability mass to the left, and increase its payoff. Contradiction to
equilibrium.
Notice that Claim 1 and 2 together implies that F
H
in = F
L
in.
Claim 3 FHin = Fout and F
L
in = Fout
Proof. The proof is analogous to previous results. Whenever FHin < F out, insider
has incentives to put the probability mass on [FHin < F out) to Fout instead. Similarly,
if FHin > F out, outsider would place the mass - for example - on (F out,
F out+F
H
in
2 to
F out+F
H
in
2 instead. The equality of upper boundaries can be seen analogously.
Claim 4 There is no probability mass by the insider at the minimum boundary for
any of the distributions.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose there is mass on FHin by insider-high. Then outsider
loses at FHin with some positive probability. Instead of playing F
H
in, it could put all
probability mass to F −, and win with probability 1. Contradiction to equilibrium.
Suppose there is mass on φˆ by insider-low. Then outsider loses low-types
with some positive probability. Instead, it could place all mass at φˆ − , win all
low-types, and not lose on high-types. Contradiction to equilibrium.
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3.C.2.2 PART B - Only one binding minimax payoff
Lemma 12 Only one of insider’s “minimax-profit” can be binding. To be specific,
either pi(L) or pi(H) is binding, where
pi0L = αβ
(
φ− cL)
pi0H = α(1− β)
(
φ− cH)
Proof. Suppose that some φ (denoted φˆ) is played under both H and L distribution.
This exists, and as a consequence of previous claim, φˆ = F
H
i = F
L
i . Then the
required probability mass on Fo from the right of φˆ to make the bank indifferent
between playing φˆ and their minimax payoff for low and high type respectively is
different, as follows:
ρLoutβ(φˆ− cL) = αβ
(
φ− cL)
ρHout(1− β)(φˆ− cH) = α(1− β)
(
φ− cH)
As ρLout 6= ρHout, (it can be shown that ρL < ρH) only one of them can be binding.
Specifically, if insider plays φ with positive mass for the low-type, then pi(L) must
be the binding one.
3.C.2.3 PART C - The main proof, case α ≤ β
As per our assumption, insider randomizes independently for low-type and for high-
type, facing with the same probability distribution Fout. This generates two indepen-
dent indifference conditions. Suppose30 that pi(L) is binding. Then the indifference
condition for low-types is:
(
1− FLout(φ)
)
(1− α)β (φ− cL)+ αβ (φ− cL) = αβ (φ− cL)
This defines the upper part of the outsider’s CDF (against ‘low’-types):
FLout(φ) =
φ− cL − α (φ− cL)
(1− α)(φ− cL) =
1
1− α −
α
1− α
φ− cL
φ− cL
Suppose that the cutoff-point between FHin and F
L
in is some c
L < φˆ < φ and that
the outsider’s CDF over
(
F , φˆ
)
takes the functional form FHout(·). In what follows,
we write everything as a function of an arbitrary cutoff-value φˆ.
30This is the only guess-and-verify in equilibrium part left in the proof, which is enough for
existence, but cannot guarantee the uniqueness.
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The insider’s indifference condition for the HIGH-types can be written as
(
1− FHout(φ)
)
(1− α)(1− β) (φ− cH)+ α(1− β) (φ− cH)
= (1− α)(1− β)(1− FLout(φˆ))
(
φˆ− cH
)
+ α(1− β)
(
φˆ− cH
)
We can express the CDF FHout(φ) as a function of the extra argument φˆ.
FHout(φ, φˆ) =
(−φφˆ+ cL(φ− αφˆ) + αφˆφ+ cH((−1 + α)cL + φˆ− αφ))
((−1 + α)(cH − φ)(cL − φˆ))
Now we calculate the lower bound of the distribution, again, as a function of φˆ,
through the following equation:
FHout(φ, φˆ) = 0 (3.18)
This gives the (unique) solution for the lower boundary F out:
F out(φˆ) =
(αφˆ(cL − φ) + cH(cL − acL − φˆ+ αφ))
(cL − φˆ)
As at the lower boundary the outsider wins with probability 1 , we can compute
outsider’s payment as a function of φˆ, denoted by pi0out.
pi0out =
((−1 + α)(−β(cH − cL)(cL − φˆ) + α(cH − φˆ)(cL − φ)))
(cL − φˆ)
The critical threshold value φˆ must also fulfil that at this value, the insider-low
distribution has no mass-point:
FLin(φˆ) = 0
Recall outsider’s indifference condition, adapted to these two specific points:
(1− α)β(φˆ− cL) = ρin(1− α)β
(
φ− cL)
which gives the value of the mass-point of insider’s LOW-distribution, as a function
of φˆ.
ρin =
φˆ− cL
φ− cL
Whenever outsider charges φ− , with → 0, it obtains profit
ρ(1− α)β(φ− cL)
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Let pi0,Lout the limit of this profit with  → 0. Finally, φˆ is determined through the
following indifference condition equation:
pi0,Ho =
φˆ− cL
φ− cH (1− α)β(φ− c
L)
The solution of this equation is
φˆ? = cL +
α
(
φ− cL)
β
Substituting back φˆ? into FHout gives the probability mass from the left of the
critical value, that is, the probability that insider loses the high-types by playing φ.
This probability is
FHout(φˆ) =
1− β
1− α
which implies that insider wins the complementary probability (β−α1−α ), generating
the following profit from high-types:
piin = (1− β)(α(φ− cL) + β∆c)
Notice that this new equilibrium payoff exceeds the “minimax payoff” α(1−β)(φ−
cH) whenever α > β. This confirms the claim that the minimax payoff for the low-
type is binding whenever α > β. The insider can achieve larger profit in equilibrium,
than it could do with serving only naive high-types!
—Outsider-HIGH distribution—
Based on this, we can write insider’s indifference condition as
(1− FHo )(1− α)(1− β)(φ− cH) + α(1− β)(φ− cH) = (1− β)(α(φ− cL) + β∆c)
This pins down the outsider’s CDF over the interval [F , φˆ).
FHout(φ) =
φ− cH − β∆c− α(φ− cL)
(1− α)(φ− cH)
=
1
1− α −
α(φ− cL) + β∆c
(1− α)(φ− cH)
=
1
1− α −
α(φ− cH) + (β − α)∆c
(1− α)(φ− cH)
117
—Insider’s distributions—
Insider’s distributions are derived using outsider’s indifference condition: at
every φ, outsider must be indifferent between playing φ or its alternative payoff,
which is pinned down by the mass-point by insider on φ. That leads to the two
independent indifference conditions:
(
1− FHin (φ)
)
(1− α)(1− β)(φ− cH) + (1− α)β(φ− cL) = (1− α)α(φ− cL)(
1− FLin(φ)
)
(1− α)β(φ− cL) = (1− α)α(φ− cL)
so the respective distributions are:
FHin (φ) =
(φ− cH − β∆c− α(φ− cL))
((1− β)(φ− cH))
=
1
1− β −
α(φ− cL) + β∆c
(1− β)(φ− cH)
and
FLin(φ) =
β(φ− cL)− α(φ− cL)
β(φ− cL)
= 1− α
β
φ− cL
φ− cL
—Verify distributions —
It is useful to check some properties of the derived distributions. With simple
algebra it is possible to check that (i) FHin (φ) = 0 and Fout(φ) = 0 has the same
solutions; (ii) FHin (φˆ) = 1 and F
L
in(φˆ) = 0; and (iii) Fout(φ) = 1.
3.C.2.4 PART D - The main proof, case α > β
The anticipated equilibrium: insider is mixing over (φ′in, φ) for the High-type, and
according to a degenerate distribution φLin = φ for the Low-type. Outsider plays Fo
over φ′in, φ. Insider will be placing a probability mass on φ.
Customers’ behaviour: given this pricing equilibrium, low-type customers
switch to outsider with probability 1, while low-type customers according to some
probability.
Next, we establish overdraft fee distributions using the outsider’s and the
insider’s indifference property.
Outsider’s indifference property: Because there is no mass-point by the in-
sider at F , by bidding the lower boundary φ′in the outsider wins and sophisticated
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customers switch with probability 1. The profit for outsider in this case is:
pi0out = (1− α)
(
β(φ′in − cL) + (1− β)(φ′in − cH)
)
For any φ > φ′in it must be the case that
E(piout(φ)) = pi0out (3.19)
where
E (piout(φ)) =
O wins︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr
[
φ < φHin
] ∗ profit from both types︷ ︸︸ ︷(1− α)piLH(φ) + I wins︷ ︸︸ ︷Pr [φout > φHin] ∗
profit from low types︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α)βpiL(φ)
= (1− Fin(φ))(1− α)
(
βpiL(φ) + (1− β)piH(φ))+ Fin(φ)(1− α)βpiL(φ)
= (1− α)piLH(φ)− Fin(φ)(1− α)(1− β)piH(φ)
So the equilibrium equation (3.19) simplifies to
piLH(φ′in) = pi
LH(φ)− Fin(φ)(1− β)piH(φ)
Leading to the following outsider CDF:
Fin(φ) =
piLH(φ)− piLH(φ′in)
(1− β)piH(φ)
According to our specification piLH(φ) = φ− cLH , so after substitutions:
Fin(φ) =
φ− φ′in
(1− β)(φ− cH) =
1
1− β −
α
1− β ·
φ− cH
φ− cH (3.20)
This satisfies the requirement that Fin(φ
′
in) = 0. Solving Fin(φ) = 1 for φ gives:
φmax =
φ′i
β
− 1− β
β
(cH) = φ+
α− β
β
(
φ− cH)
, from which it is clear that
φmax < φ ⇔ α < β and φmax > φ ⇔ α > β
This implies that whenever α > β, the upper boundary of the mixture is φ, and
there is a mass-point by insider on φ. In this case the CDF at φ is
Fin(φ) =
1− α
1− β
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therefore, the probability mass on φ must be
pin = 1− 1− α
1− β =
α− β
1− β (3.21)
Insider’s indifference property: Outsider will never bid above φ, so when in-
sider’s offer is
(
φ, φ
)
then it serves only myopes for both types and its profit is
pi0in := αpi
LH(φ) = α
(
βpiL(φ) + (1− β)piH(φ))
To account for the possibility that F in < φ, suppose outsider is mixing over [φ
′
in, u]
according to Fout. For any offer by the insider to the high types φ ∈ {φ′in, u} the
insider wins with probability Pr(φ < φout) = 1− Fout(φ) and obtains profit
Epi = (1− Fout)
(
(1− β)piH(φ) + αβpiL(φ))+ Foutα ((1− β)piH(φ) + βpiL(φ))
= αβpiL(φ) + (1− β)piH(φ)− Fout(1− α)(1− β)piH(φ)
The equilibrium condition:
(1− β)piH(φ)− Fout(1− α)(1− β)piH(φ) = α(1− β)piH(φ)
Fout(φ) =
piH(φ)− αpiH(φ)
(1− α)piH(φ) =
1
1− α −
α
1− α ·
φ− cH
φ− cH
Solving Fout(φ) = 0 gives
φ = αφ+ (1− α)cH = φ′in
which implies the density satisfies F (φ′in) = 0 and F (φ) = 1, so there is no mass-
point in outsiders’ CDF if they mix over [φ′in, φ].
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3.C.3 Probabilities and expected values
This section provides some additional analytical characterization of the equilibrium
of the full model. The first result establishes switching probabilities. In the limit
of α → 0 and β → 0 we get back the results from the pure Adverse Selection and
Customer naivete´ models respectively.
Lemma 13 The probability that outsider (insider) wins is as follows:
• Whenever α > β (mass point by insider for low-types)
Prob[φout < φ
H
in] =
1 + α− 2β
2(1− β) Prob[φ
H
in ≤ φout] =
1− α
2(1− β)
• Whenever α < β, outsider (insider) wins HIGH types with probability:
Prob[φout < φ
H
in] =
1− β
2(1− α) Prob[φ
H
in ≤ φout] =
1 + β − 2α
2(1− α)
and wins LOW types with probability:
Prob[φout < φ
L
in] =
α2 + (β − 2)β
2(α− 1)β Prob[φ
L
in ≤ φout] =
(β − α)2
(2(1− α)β)
Proof. We want to calculate Prob[φout < φ
H
in]. First, suppose α > β. Insider is
playing φ with probability ρin, in that case outsider wins with probability 1. In case
insider is mixing (with probability 1− ρin) continuously, we have
Prob[φout < φ
H
in] =
∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φHin
φ′in
fo,idφoutdφ
H
in (3.22)
where
fin = F
′
in =
α
1− β
φ− cH
(φ− cH)2
fout = F
′
out =
α
1− α ·
φ− cH
(φ− cH)2
The joint PDF is, due to the independence assumption:
fo,i(φout, φ
H
in) :=
α2
(1− α)(1− β) ·
(
φ− cH)2
(φout − cH)2
(
φHin − cH
)2
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The internal integral of (3.22), (with respect to φout) is
31
∫ φHin
φ′in
foidφout = − α
2
(1− α)(1− β) ·
(φ− cH)2
(φout − cH)(φHin − cH)2
= − α
2
(1− α)(1− β) ·
(
φ− cH)2(
φHin − cH
)2 · ( 1φHin − cH − 1φ′in − cH
)
For the full integral we use the following interim results:
∫ φ
φ′in
1
(φHin − cH)3
dφHin =
[
− 1
2(φHin − cH)2
]φ
φ′in
= −1
2
α2 − 1
α2
1
(φ− cH)2∫ φ
φ′in
1
(φHin − cH)2
dφHin =
[
− 1
φHin − cH
]φ
φ′in
= −α− 1
α
1
φ− cH
This leads to the following formula for the likelihood that outsider wins:
LIK[φout < φ
H
in] =
1− α
2(1− β)
The overall probability, including the mass point, is:
Prob[φout < φ
H
in] =
1 + α− 2β
2(1− β)
Now suppose α < β. In this case outsider is playing φmax with probability mass
defined in Theorem 4. If playing the mass point, outsider loses with certainty. With
the complementary probability, both insider and outsider is mixing continuously over
(φ′in, φ
max] and the expression for the likelihood, the joint PDF is exactly as before,
but with an outer integral boundary changed to φmax.
Prob[φout < φ
H
in] =
∫ φmax
φ′in
∫ φin
φ′in
foidφoutdφin
This has the following solution for the likelihood, using the same steps as before:
LIK[φout < φ
H
in] =
1− β
2(1− α)
Next, we calculate conditional expected payments.
31We use here the formula
∫
f ′
f2
= − 1
f
, in the expression f ′ = 1.
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Lemma 14 Conditional on winning the competition, the outsider and insider ob-
tains the following expected overdraft fee if α ≥ β:
E[φout < φHin](1) = cH +
2α
1 + α− 2β
(
φ− cH)+ 2αβ ln[α]
(1− α)(1 + α− 2β)
(
φ− cH)
E[φHin < φout](1) = cH +
2α
1− α
(
φ− cH)+ 2α2 ln[α]
(1− α)2
(
φ− cH)
Expected overdraft fees in principle can be calculated for the α ≤ β case, but it is
analytically very difficult, and left for future work.
Proof.
We calculate expected fee offered by insider resp. outsider conditional on
winning the price competition, that is, the following conditional expected values:
E[φout|φout < φHin]
E[φHin|φHin ≤ φout]
Whenever mass points are present at the boundary, we need to consider the total
expected value as a sum of two components. From Theorem 4, if a > b insider places
a positive mass ρin =
α−β
1−β on φ and in this case outsider wins at every value φout
over the mixture. The expected values are:
E[φout|φout < φHin] =
1
Pr[φout < φHin]
(∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φHin
φ′in
φoutfoidφoutdφ
H
in + ρi
∫ φ
φ′in
φoutfφoutdφout
)
=
2(1− β)
1 + α− 2β
(
Φ +
α− β
1− β E[φout]
)
and
E[φHin|φHin < φout] =
∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φout
φ′in
φinfoidφindφout∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φout
φ′in
foidφindφout
Because the joint PDF is symmetric in the two variables, the double-integral part
123
is also symmetric, and we have
Φ :=
∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φin
φ′in
φoutfoidφoutdφin =
∫ φ
φ′in
∫ φout
φ′in
φinfoidφindφout
=
1
2
(
(3α− 1)(−cH) + 2αφ
1− β +
2α2 ln(α)(φ− cH)
(1− α)(1− β)
)
=
1
2(1− β)
(
(1− α)c+ 2α (φ− cH)+ 2α2 ln(α)(φ− cH)
1− α
)
It is relatively easy to calculate the expected φout over the entire mixture
E(φout) :=
∫ φ
φ′in
φoutfφoutdφout = c
H − α ln(α)
1− α
(
φ− cH)
Therefore the overall expectations are:
E[φout|φout < φHin] :=
2(1− β)
1 + α− 2β
(
Φ +
α− β
1− β E(φout)
)
=
2(1− α)2
(1− β)2 Φ +
α− β
1− β E(φo)
E[φHin|φHin < φout] :=
2(1− β)
1− α Φ
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Chapter 4
Fire-sale in a liquidation game
with leverage requirements
4.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the view that interconnectedness is an im-
portant determinant of financial stability became conventional wisdom among aca-
demics and policy-makers. A large theoretical and empirical literature on systemic
risk started to emphasize how various forms of business relations in the financial
sector can turn to a transmission channel through which shocks propagate in the
financial system, eventually leading to systemic bank failures and causing real eco-
nomic losses. For example, since the seminal contribution of Allen and Gale (2000),
it is well known that interbank markets facilitate liquidity risk sharing, but can also
be the source of ‘direct’ contagious failures which may eventually destabilize the
financial system as a whole.
Another potential layer of interconnectedness, which is the subject of this
paper, is indirect linkages through common investments, or ‘asset commonalities’.
If an investor is forced to liquidate their asset due to some funding pressure, prices
may depart from fundamental values. Mark-to-market evaluation of portfolios forces
other investors of the same asset to re-evaluate their portfolio, which decreases equity
value. In turn, the drop in equity induces additional funding pressure, and those -
otherwise healthy - institutions may be forced to engage in further asset liquidation.
With multiple owners of the same asset class, the situation is exacerbated by a
coordination problem: if many investors find it optimal to liquidate their asset at
the same time, the price drop may be severe enough forcing even more institutions
to sell, and pushing prices into a downward price spiral. Furthermore, institutions
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trying to avoid losses may find it optimal to sell other (otherwise unaffected) assets,
transmitting the shock to even more sectors and institutions, expanding isolated
problems to a potentially system-wide contagion. There is a strong feedback-effect
towards the direct contagion mechanism as well: depressed asset prices and increased
volatility raises haircuts on these contaminated assets in the overnight repo market,
which accelerates the ‘dry-up of liquidity’ on the interbank market, and reinforces
the need for forced asset sale at the first place.
In this paper we explicitly model the asset liquidation decision of financial in-
stitutions under funding pressure in a duopoly settings, when multiple asset classes
are available to adjust the portfolio. In the model, the ‘funding pressure’, which
is the key market friction behind this phenomenon, is captured by a leverage con-
straint: following an asset-price shock, the banking system may be forced to engage
in systemic deleveraging to restore leverage targets by selling assets and repaying
debt.1 The relevance of this mechanism in propagating crises is convincingly demon-
strated - both empirically and theoretically - in an influential paper by Adrian and
Shin [2010]. The investment portfolio on banks’ balance sheets differ in ex-ante liq-
uidity, measured as the market price impact following an asset sale during ‘normal
times’. Equity-maximizer financial institutions adjust their portfolio by choosing to
sell assets such that the impact on equity is minimized. In the presence of asset
commonalities, if all banks end up selling the same asset class (‘commonality’), liq-
uid assets suddenly may appear illiquid and can be sold only at a significant fire-sale
discount, a phenomenon which was widely observed during the financial crisis. This
endogenous determination of the fire-sale price has to be taken into consideration
by rational financial institutions.
The joint deleveraging decision of interlinked financial institutions induces
a non-cooperative game which we dub ‘the liquidation game’. The main result
of this paper is that as long as the equilibrium liquidation decision of the banks
is non-trivial in the sense that liquidating only one single asset does not strictly
dominate, the emerging Nash-equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal. Individual banks
could achieve higher ex-post equity value by choosing another feasible liquidation
strategy, which, however, cannot be maintained as an equilibrium. The market
outcome in equilibrium is reminiscent to a Prisoner’s dilemma: cooperation, which in
this context would mean self-restraint in selling the more liquid asset commonalities
and relying more on idiosyncratic but less liquid assets to restore leverage, could
increase the payoff for each players, but cannot be maintained as an equilibrium. In
1The model can be generalized to other sources of similar funding frictions: for example, there is
strong empirical evidence that decreasing value of asset-under-management induces fund outflows
for investment funds, which forces them to liquidate part of the portfolio, even at diminished prices.
126
the unique Nash-equilibrium banks ‘defect’, and over-liquidate the commonality.
The comparison of the equilibrium and the social planner’s optimal solution
reveals an even more striking feature: the potential loss from the inefficient equilib-
rium may even be larger, if markets appear to be ex-ante more liquid. Intuitively,
more liquid commonality raises the incentives to tilt the liquidation strategy towards
that asset class, which leads to an even larger equilibrium price effect, and further
diminishes equity. This finding has slightly uncomfortable consequences for financial
stability: higher liquidity, although almost unanimously called for by policy-makers
after the crisis, can even be detrimental in highly integrated markets, if fire-sale
decisions following a potential shock are jointly determined in an equilibrium.
There is a growing literature on deleveraging and asset liquidation strate-
gies. Many of these papers extend the now-standard framework of Eisenberg and
Noe [2001], originally designed to characterize a payment equilibrium in a network
of borrowing-lending relationships between economic agents. The general models
provide important characterization of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, but
do not emphasize the strategic inefficiencies arising as a consequence of decentralized
decision making, which is the main contribution of this paper. Specifically, in most
of the existing models banks respond deterministically to shocks, and strategic in-
teractions are not taken into consideration. In contrast to the existing literature and
complementing some recent results, the purpose of this paper is to characterize the
welfare aspects of equilibrium deleveraging, and demonstrate possible inefficiencies.
We focus on contagion due to asset fire sale in a multiple asset commonality settings,
and ignore direct contractual obligations or interbank markets and cross-holdings
on the liability side. Although we acknowledge the importance of the mutually
reinforcing effects between contagion channels due to multiple network layers, our
focus is the welfare loss caused by the behaviour in crisis, namely the deleveraging
decisions, instead of mechanical network externalities and other contagious effects
which are more extensively studied elsewhere.
4.2 Literature review
Asset-price contagion: Theoretical models of deleveraging financial institutions de-
scribe how the presence of asset commonalities and mark-to-market evaluation can
lead to negative fire-sale spillovers as a source of contagion in the banking sector.
The seminal work is due to Cifuentes et al. [2005], who extend the Eisenberg-Noe
framework (Eisenberg and Noe [2001]) of financial contagion with an illiquid as-
set and leverage-targeting banks. They prove the existence of clearing vector and
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fire sale prices as a solution of a fixed point problem.2 The fixed-point technique
of these papers become standard in the systemic risk and network literature. A
highly influential paper by Acemoglu et al. [2015] shows that small shock and large
shock regimes may have different effect on regular network structures in a framework
which incorporates the possibility of early liquidation of banks’ investment, and ex-
ogenous liquidation prices. Glasserman and Young [2015] considers various network
structures and shock distributions to characterize the network effects of contagion.
In a recent paper, Awiszus and Weber [2015] incorporates the contagious effects
of bankruptcy costs, fire sale losses, interbank networks and cross-holdings into a
comprehensive structural model of systemic risk. All of the above mentioned papers
however feature only one illiquid asset, and banks are not strategic, decision-making
actors. The recurring scheme in the literature is to assume proportional repayment
on interbank loans, limited liability, and in case of cash shortage, a liquidation of
the single illiquid investment, which may or may not be partial. Multiple asset
extensions are rare in the literature since they complicate the analysis considerably.
Greenwood et al. [2015] considers a fairly general framework with multiple
assets classes, but they assume that the bank maintains a fixed portfolio structure
during deleveraging, and instead of solving for equilibrium, they consider domino-
like contagion effects. Furthermore, they do not analyse the impact of heterogeneity
in the ex-ante illiquidity of the assets. The model is designed for empirical appli-
cations, and their illustrative calculations, as well as the application and extension
by Duarte and Eisenbach [2014] demonstrate the sizeable impacts of fire-sale losses
on banks’ equity. By making the proportional deleveraging assumption, however,
in this model the bank is still a passive participant in the sense that it only suffers
the exogenous shock and respond according to a deterministic rule. Therefore the
methodology of these papers is insufficient to study equilibrium actions.
A similar model by Caccioli et al. [2014] focuses on the stability of various
network structures. Using simulation techniques they demonstrate that the system-
wide stability is ‘hump-shaped’ as a function of diversification (a result similar to
Elliott et al. [2014]), and crucially depends on the leverage and the ‘crowding’ pa-
rameter (number of assets versus institutions) of the network. Their theoretical
analysis of stability, which borrows its methodology from the epidemics literature,
leads to similar results. In contrast to our paper, banks have no active role and
an insolvent bank always liquidates all of its assets. Caccioli et al. [2015] applies
a stress-testing framework to emphasize the importance of interactions of the two
main contagion channels (and the two layers of networks), and show that the pres-
2The uniqueness of this equilibrium under mild conditions is proven by Amini et al. [2016].
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ence of counterparty risk (direct connections), although not considered very risky
on its own, strongly amplifies the risk inherent in common asset holdings.
A significant step toward genuinely multi-asset extensions is Chen et al.
[2014], who study asset-price contagion with the possibility of rebalancing the in-
vestment portfolio. Their model characterizes the contagion chain caused by an
exogenous change of the state of the economy. Fire-sale prices are determined en-
dogenously through asset market equilibrium conditions. The authors’ focus is op-
timal asset holding network structures, and they show that in a low-leverage regime
more diversification, while in the high-leverage regime more idiosyncratic asset hold-
ings are beneficial for the systemic contagion perspective. The most closely related
papers to ours are Feinstein [2015] and Feinstein and El-Masri [2015] who consider
equilibrium liquidation strategies as an explicit generalization of the Eisenberg-Noe
framework, prove the existence of equilibrium, and characterize the equilibrium via
numerical examples. Our paper considers a simpler setup, but goes further in char-
acterizing the equilibrium outcomes and its inefficiency under certain circumstances,
by comparing the equilibrium with a social optimum benchmark.
The network externalities also question the standard risk-mitigating effect
of diversification, by introducing excess covariance due to common assets. For ex-
ample, Raffestin [2014] derives analytically the covariances in a framework where
banks are subject to stochastic shocks and connected by a network with home bi-
ases. He finds that intermediate number of bankruptcies are less likely under high
diversification, but the probability of extreme failures is large, therefore little diver-
sification may be socially optimal. Tasca et al. [2014] brings in leverage into the
picture by using the Merton-model to calculate joint default probability of banks,
and focus on the trade-off between the effects of leverage and diversification (asset
commonalities). In the ‘safe’ regime diversification can compensate for increased
leverage, but not in the ‘risky’ regime. The key regulatory insight is that the in-
dividually optimal diversification might be systemically under-diversified. Wagner
[2011] shows that the risk of joint liquidation (essentially the coordination problem
with asset commonalities) and the resulting fire-sale prices (due to limited cash in
the market) creates incentives for investors to hold heterogeneous portfolios, so the
classical optimality of full diversification breaks down.
Financial Networks and Systemic Risk: The paper is also related more
generally to the research on network effects and systemic risk. Studies on the impact
of interconnections between financial institutions and their role in propagating crises
have been booming in the last decade, and it might be surprising why recognizing
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its importance and formal modelling started relatively late. The sluggish start of
this stream of research may be attributable to the fact that mainstream economists
had to overcome the classical view on the ‘macroeconomic effects of microeconomic
shocks’, namely, that small idiosyncratic shocks cancel each other out on average,
and macroeconomic consequences are negligible. Solid theoretical background to
disprove this view is only given in the influential papers by Gabaix [2009] and
Acemoglu et al. [2012]. Similarly, Stiglitz [2010] describes a fairly general framework
to emphasise that full integration - as a tool for risk sharing - is generally not optimal
in the presence of nonconvexities.
In the banking research, a large body of empirical and theoretical literature
focuses on the direct (interbank) linkages as a mechanism for facilitating contagion.
Early papers include Allen and Gale [2000] and Freixas et al. [2000]. For example,
Allen and Gale [2000], building on their previous liquidity-based crisis models [Allen
and Gale, 1998] show that the effect of liquidity shocks and the extent of a crisis
depends crucially on the connections within banks: a more completely connected
market is more robust than an incomplete network structure. On the contrary, oth-
ers argue -especially the branch of literature which considers contagion in financial
market as an ‘epidemic’ and draws the analogy that a systemic crisis is similar to
the spreading out of a disease - that dense interconnections increase the likelihood
of a system-wide contagion. This approach naturally led to an extensive search for
the ‘key player’ (see Zenou [2014] for a recent comprehensive review), the banks
who are ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’, and a vast simulation-based literature (Upper
[2011]). Conflicting views are somewhat reconciled in the recent papers by Acemoglu
et al. [2015] and Elliott et al. [2014] who give novel characterization of the effect of
interbank network connections to systemic risk. Acemoglu et al. [2015] distinguishes
two shock-size regimes, and shows that completely connected networks go through a
phase transition, becoming from the most resilient to the least resilient networks as
the shock switches from small to large. The basic intuition is that for small shocks
the system-wide excess liquidity is sufficient to absorb it, and more connected net-
works can facilitate the utilization of system-wide cash reserves. However, for a
large shock, ‘weakly connected’ networks turns out to be more resilient, because a
second shock-absorber - senior claimants - can be forced to bear losses to protect
the rest of the system. Elliott et al. [2014] explores the integration and diversifi-
cation properties of network structures, and shows that intermediate levels of both
integration and diversification makes the network more suspicious to system-wide
contagion. Similarly to earlier intuition, larger diversification helps to utilize more
counterparties to bear the losses of external shocks.
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Fire-sale spillovers: Early theoretical models of fire sale go back to Shleifer
and Vishny [1992], who characterize fire sale as a situation in which assets are sold
on a price lower than their ‘value in best use’ (i.e. fundamental value). In this
sense the concept is a strong relative to asset illiquidity. Their classic interpretation
is the following: when firms under distress are forced to sell assets, it is likely
that similar firms - potentially the highest valuation users of the asset - are also
under pressure, and likely not be able to raise sufficient funding to purchase it.
Therefore, it must be sold to outsiders, with lower valuation (for example, because
of information asymmetries, or the lack of expertise to operate the given asset). In
their original model the inability to raise funding by the insider firm comes from
debt overhang (Hart [1993], Hart and Moore [1995]). Exacerbating the situation, it
is very likely that under a sectoral shock all owners of a specific asset type has to
liquidate simultaneously, causing an even larger downward price pressure.
This paper was followed by a large empirical and theoretical literature on
fire sale and its consequences on asset prices, emergence of financial crises and
the real macroeconomic feedback effects. This literature is recently reviewed by
Shleifer and Vishny [2011]. Notable follow-up research in the context of recent
crisis emphasizes the connection to the limits of arbitrage (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny
[1997], Gromb and Vayanos [2002]): when fire sale occurs, financiers may not be
able to distinguish illiquidity from fundamental price drop and withdraw funds from
arbitrageurs exactly when they need it to exploit the mispricing. If this withdrawal is
simultaneous, investors unwind positions simultaneously exacerbating the mispricing
and causing severe fire sales.
Diamond and Rajan [2011] extends the literature with many interesting as-
pects. Fire sale offers highly profitable investment opportunities to arbitrageurs
with liquid cash. In anticipation of future fire sale, those investors find it optimal
to withhold from buying the asset now. As a result, prices should decrease immedi-
ately - even before the actual insolvency -, increasing the expected rate of return for
the whole market, which explains the ’adverse effect of future illiquidity on current
lending’. They show that management has strong incentives to risk-shifting: ’hold
on’ to the illiquid asset and risking the future fire sale and insolvency (’illiquidity
seeking’).
The fire sale phenomenon also links to the literature emphasizing the con-
nections between market liquidity and funding liquidity. Acharya and Viswanathan
[2011] emphasizes how the possibility of risk shifting implied by the combination of
short-term debt and leverage leads to credit rationing and forced deleveraging, which
- in the framework of limited market participation a’la Shleifer and Vishny [1992]
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and cash-in-the-market pricing a’la Allen and Gale [1994] leads to the increased
severity of crises. Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009] connects the market liquidity
and funding liquidity more directly: tightening funding liquidity makes investors
reluctant to open capital-intensive positions, which lowers the market liquidity and
increases volatility. In response to the growing illiquidity, financiers - following their
risk models - increase margins, reinforcing the negative spillover of prices.
Empirical evidence on asset-price contagion: There exists considerable em-
pirical evidence that asset-price contagion exists. For example, De Marco [2013]
estimates how the European sovereign debt crisis spilled over to a supply shock
on commercial bank’s asset side causing a contagion from one asset class to the
other. Manconi et al. [2012] provides evidence of the contagion from securitized
bonds to corporate bond market: when securitized bonds became toxic, institu-
tional investors sold corporate bonds, lowering prices on an otherwise healthy asset
class. Duarte and Eisenbach [2014] estimates that an exogenous price shock of repo-
financed assets leads to a significant drop on the equity, using a panel-extension of
the cross-sectional framework in Greenwood et al. [2015]. Jotikasthira et al. [2012]
considers international fund flows and shows that global funds reallocate invest-
ments on fire sale prices as a reaction of changing fund flows and this reallocation
takes place on fire sale prices especially on emerging markets, inducing a sizeable
excess correlation between those markets, and also with the domestic country of the
global funds.
Focusing a bit more closely to our research question, Merrill et al. [2014]
analyses the residential mortgage-backed securities market during the crisis and
shows that some institutions were in many cases indeed incentivized to sell the
illiquid (i.e. further from fundamental price) asset due to the risk-sensitive capital
requirement regulations: if the illiquid asset induces high capital requirements, the
bank might be better off selling it rather than the liquid, but non-risky asset.
As an interesting insight, Cella et al. [2013] traces back the issue to the
different objectives between agents with different investment horizons: during crisis
periods short-term investors -in the fear of short-term price declines - are expected to
coordinate on selling, which is not offset by the amount of liquidity provided by long-
term investors (who, as usually argued, are probably also facing equity problems ).
Empirical tests show significant differences between price impact functions of assets
primarily held by investors with various investment horizon. An implication for
the theoretical research stream is to keep in mind that not only network structure,
but the type of nodes (here: short- or long term investors) could be an important
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determinant of systemic risk.
Hau and Lai [2012] documents compelling evidence for significant price con-
tagion via common asset ownership in the US stock market. They show that funds
with large exposure to distressed financials were forced to sell nonfinancial assets on
fire sale prices, mainly because of funding constraints, and find that discounts are
the largest for those stocks that performed well during (i.e. were fundamentally not
exposed to) the crises. This implies that banks indeed optimize and choose assets to
avoid capital losses (i.e.: sell liquid assets, as illiquidity is understood as deviation
from fundamentals), with obvious real-economic consequences.
The direct network connections also matter in selling decision: for exam-
ple Favara and Giannetti [2015] shows that lenders differ in internalizing fire sale
externalities: those with a larger share of collateralized debt internalize more the
feedback effects on collateral values, and have more incentives to renegotiate debt
instead of turning to asset sales.
The research question of optimal deleveraging during a crisis is only relevant,
if crises are at least partially related to the solvency of institutions. I discuss to
empirical contributions which confirm this view. Boyson et al. [2014] directly tests
two competing hypotheses on the nature of crises namely whether the crisis of origin
on individual bank level is liquidity shortage, or insolvency-driven, and the evidence
provided supports rather the latter one. Consistently with this view, they find that
banks asset selling choice reflects ’cherry picking ’, namely they select asset for sale
where the selling do not deplete the capital, and in effect, stabilize solvency position
in the first place.
Finally, I close the empirical background review with a great insight by
Adrian and Shin [2010]. This paper provides direct empirical evidence for the
connection between deleveraging and fire sales. The authors show that leverage
is procyclical in financial institutions, that is, bank’s increase leverage during good
times and -more importantly- deleverage during bad times, when prices fall. On
aggregate the consequences could be massive fire-sale.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the model
and assumptions. Section 3 solves for equilibrium and for social optimum. Section
4 provides a numerical characterization of the results, while Section 5 concludes.
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4.3 Model
4.3.1 Motivating example
To fix ideas, we start with a stylized, illustrative example. Consider an economy with
two banks and two asset classes: a ‘pooled’, or ‘common’ asset (e.g. treasury bonds),
which represents the asset commonality, and a ‘bank-specific’ asset class (e.g. loan
portfolio), the idiosyncratic, uncorrelated assets of the two banks. The structure is
illustrated in Figure 4.1. We assume that ex ante the common asset is perceived
as more liquid, that is, in the ’business-as-usual’ regime it can be liquidated with a
smaller price impact.
Figure 4.1: A stylized banking system.
Bank 1
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
Bank 2
We start by emphasizing the game-theoretic nature of the problem. The two
banks simultaneously decide whether to sell their illiquid specific assets, or the more
liquid common asset. By this we model a hypothetical ‘crisis’ situation when the
whole banking system is engaged in a systematic de-leveraging, after the economy is
hit by an (unmodelled) shock. Let the payoff matrix of the induced non-cooperative
game be as follows:
S C
S -3,-3 -5,-2
C -2,-5 -4,-4
where ‘S’ and ‘C’ denote the action of liquidating the specific or common asset re-
spectively. This illustrative payoff matrix is intuitively plausible in a crisis situation:
selling the specific asset is costly (-3), but does not impose any negative external-
ities to the other player. Selling the (more liquid) common asset is less costly, as
long as only one player chooses to do so, but in this case the other player suffers
both from the high price impact of the specific asset (-3) and is hit by the negative
price shock as a result of the other player’s liquidation of the common asset (-2). If,
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however, the players coordinate on selling the liquid asset, they both suffer from the
externality and the liquid asset becomes ex post illiquid, as a result of the coordina-
tion problem. The payoff matrix describes a standard prisoners’ dilemma situation:
the only Nash-equilibrium of the (one-shot, not repeated) game is (C,C), and the
equilibrium outcome is not Pareto-optimal.
From this illustrative discussion one would expect that to the extent that
optimal decision of banks exhibit similar characteristics, there will be too much liq-
uidation in equilibrium from the liquid asset, which is therefore not Pareto optimal.
In the following we build foundations for the payoff-matrix arbitrarily imposed in
this section to demonstrate that this is indeed the case.
4.3.2 The banking model
Consider the following environment: Banks are financed with a combination of debt
and equity, and invest into two asset classes: a ‘specific’ (type s) and a ‘common’
(type c) asset.3 Banks are subject to a leverage constraint: the ratio of total asset
over equity must not exceed a pre-defined, bank-specific level `i. We do not interpret
this necessarily as a regulatory requirement: it could be an internal target chosen
by the bank’s investment strategy. We consider a two-period model (t ∈ {0, 1}).
In period 0 the leverage target is not satisfied (following for example an exogenous,
unmodelled drop of asset prices). Banks respond by liquidating some of their assets,
from which the proceeds are fully used to repay debt and thereby shrink their balance
sheet, and importantly, decrease leverage, as documented in Adrian and Shin [2010]
(see Figure 4.2). Asset prices in period 1 (denoted by p(1)) are determined for each
asset independently, by an inverse demand function which depends on the total
liquidated asset. We start the analysis with a two-bank two-asset economy, which
we refer to as the ‘2x2 model’.
Figure 4.2: Shrinking balance sheet
as a result of deleveraging
3An alternative interpretation is that common assets are investments into highly correlated
portfolios, or for example in a market index.
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In the model the banks are free to choose the liquidated quantities from
each assets and rebalance the portfolio during the deleveraging process, which is
consistent with empirical evidence discussed earlier (for example, Hau and Lai [2012],
Boyson et al. [2014]). Banks’ liquidation decisions are restricted only by being non-
negative4, and by a short-selling constraint.
We introduce the notation p
j(t)
i for the price in period t ∈ {0, 1}, for asset
j ∈ {s, c} of bank i ∈ {1, 2} where i may be omitted for the common asset. The
total assets of bank i in period 0, with initial quantities wsi , w
c
i from specific and
common asset respectively is therefore
A0i := w
s
i p
s(0)
i + w
c
ip
c(0)
while in period 1, after liquidating quantities xsi , x
c
i it is
A1i := (w
s
i − xsi )ps(1)i + (wci − xci )pc(1)
All proceeds from liquidation are used to repay debt, so if D0i denotes initial debt
for bank i, the new debt level in period 1 is:
D1i = D
0
i − xsips(1)i − xcipc(1)
Equity (E) is expressed as total assets minus debt. Each equity-maximizer bank
i ∈ {1, 2} maximizes after-liquidation equity, subject to the leverage constraint,
resource constraints and the no short-selling constraint. Formally, the problem of
Bank i is:
maximize
xci ,x
s
i
(wsi − xsi )ps(1)i + (wci − xci )pc(1) − (D0i − xsips(1)i − xcipc(1))
subject to
(wsi − xsi )ps(1)i + (wci − xci )pc(1)
(wsi − xsi )ps(1)i + (wci − xci )pc(1) − (D0i − xsips(1)i − xcipc(1))
≤ `i
0 ≤ xsi ≤ wsi
0 ≤ xci ≤ wci
(4.1)
Intuitively, banks maximize after-sale equity which satisfies the leverage constraint
under the new equilibrium asset prices. The objective function simplifies to wsi p
s(1)
i +
wcip
c(1) (see Appendix), which also implies that banks’ objective is equivalent to
4Relaxing this constraint by allowing negative liquidation (i.e. asset buy) would simplify the
mathematical problem, but make the interpretation of results less straightforward, due to the
possibility of positive price impacts and the emergence of ‘bubbles’ due to the extra demand.
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minimizing (subject to constraints) the weighted price impact where the weights
are the initial asset holdings. This is an economically important observation: the
banks’ loss, which must be written off against equity, is only the value loss due to
decreasing prices; asset liquidation and debt repayment per se do not change equity
value.
Our goal is to identify equilibrium selling strategies as a solution of each
bank’s optimization problem, which are linked by the joint determination of asset
prices. This is formally the Nash-equilibrium of induced non-cooperative game.
Definition 1 (Liquidation equilibrium.) A ‘liquidation equilibrium’ in the 2x2
model is a pair of selling vectors x1 ∈ R2, x2 ∈ R2 such that each vector is a solution
of the maximum problem (4.1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, taking the other player’s action x−i as
given. It is thereby the Nash-equilibrium of the induced game.
In a liquidation equilibrium, none of the banks have incentive to deviate from the
current liquidation strategy, taking the other player’s decision as given.
Our objective is to analyse the effect of strategic behaviour and equilibrium
decision of banks. Therefore, we restrict attention to environments where the equi-
librium action is not constrained by the bank’s original endowments, or any other
parameters of the model in a trivial way. Before stating the assumptions on the pa-
rameter space, we introduce a convenient notation for the leverage constraint. Let
wi := (w
s
i , w
c
i ), xi := (x
s
i , x
c
i ) and p
(t)
i := (p
s(t)
i , p
c(t)), and a subscript (−i) denote
the player other than i. Then rearranging the leverage constraint leads to
Λi(xi,x−i) := (1− `)wi′p(1)i − x′ip(1)i + `iDi ≤ 0
Assumption 1 (Sufficient resources.) Each bank i can restore leverage even if
the other bank (−i) liquidates all of its assets. Furthermore, for any liquidation
choice of the other bank (−i), each bank i can restore leverage either by selling only
specific, or by selling only common assets. Formally5:
∀i : Λi((wsi , 0),x−i) < 0 ∀0 ≤ x−i ≤ w−i
and
∀i : Λi((0, wci ),x−i) < 0 ∀0 ≤ x−i ≤ w−i
Assumption 1 ensures that the leverage constraint can be satisfied by selling either
the common or the specific asset. It guarantees that the equilibrium action pro-
5We apply the convention that ≤ denotes element-wise relation when applied to vectors.
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file is not restricted by the available resources in the economy. As a result, our
analysis focuses on social inefficiencies which characterize banks’ optimal equilib-
rium behaviour. The assumption as stated ensures that our results does not simply
reflect unbalanced investments on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheets.
Now we formalize the ‘interesting problem’ assumption. We will require that
each bank is forced to liquidate a non-negative amount from at least one asset. This
should be seen as a rather technical assumption ensuring that banks start from
a situation in which the constraints are not satisfied, i.e. from a ‘shocked’ state
- thereby it replaces the explicit modelling of an economic shock. Typically, this
could be the result of a system-wide drop in asset prices.
Assumption 2 (Interesting problem.) Without selling any assets, the leverage
constraint is not satisfied.
∀i : Λi(0,x−i) > 0 ∀x−i ≤ w−i
By assumption 2 we formally restrict the parameter space such that banks are
forced to engage in strictly positive deleveraging, thereby make the formal problem
interesting and consistent with our narrative. The next assumptions characterize
the price impact function.
Assumption 3 (Linear price impact.) The price impact is a linear function of
the total quantities offered for sale. That is, for each assets j
p
j(1)
i = p
j(0)
i + ξ
j
i
(
2∑
k=1
xjk
)
(4.2)
where p
j(0)
i is the original price, ξ
j
i is a price impact coefficient, x
j
1 and x
j
2 are
liquidated quantities, pj(1) is the updated (equilibrium) price of asset j for j ∈ {c, s}.
Assumption 4 (Small price impact) We assume that the price impact is rela-
tively small. Precisely, we assume the following expression to be positive:
∀i ∀j : pj(0)i + ξj
(∑
i
wji
)
+ liw
j
i ξ
j > 0
Intuitively this assumption requires that even a hypothetical ‘leveraged’ short sale
(which means more liquidation that is allowed by our constraints) would keep the
prices in the positive range.
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4.3.3 Model solution
We start solving the model with a detailed characterization of the mathematical
problem:
Lemma 1 The maximum problem 4.1
(i) under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, maximizes a linear functional over a convex
set. Thereby, the optimum must be at the boundary of the constraint set.
(ii) The constraint Λi (·) is monotonously decreasing in xi under the (sufficient)
assumption (4).
(iii) Under assumptions 1 and 2, in optimum, the leverage constraint is binding,
and fulfils with equality. The ‘no-short-selling’ constraint wj > xj is always
non-binding.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.1
The Lemma is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The formal proofs are in Appendix,
here we discuss only the intuition. Item (i) follows from simple algebraic manipu-
lations. Item (ii) is a key technical condition to ensure that asset liquidation and
debt repayment indeed improves leverage. Item (iii) intuitively says that since the
objective function by construction is decreasing in the quantity offered for sale, it
is never optimal to liquidate more assets than the minimum quantity which just
restores leverage. As a consequence, it will be binding in optimum.
Figure 4.3: Illustration of the geometry of the optimum problem
The fact that in optimum the leverage constraint is binding makes it possible
to consider an equivalent problem, in which the value of required liquidation of
139
specific assets is given as a function of the liquidated quantity of common assets.
This formalization allows us to express the induced game in an equivalent form
with one-dimensional strategy spaces. In this equivalent model bank’s choose the
quantity of common assets (the ‘liquidation game’), and the required quantity of
specific assets for liquidation is determined as the minimum quantity which solves
the leverage constraint with equality for each banks. This, in turn, determines the
payoff of a given strategy profile.
Lemma 2 For each action profile xc ∈ [0, wc1]× [0, wc2] ⊂ R2 there is a unique value
of xs1 and x
s
2 which solves the model. It will be denoted by the function x˜
s (xc) :
[0, wc1]× [0, wc2]→ [0, ws1]× [0, ws2], and can be expressed in analytical form as:
x˜s =
ps − (1− `)wsξs −
√
[ps − (1− `)wsξs]2 + 4ξs ((1− `) (wsps(0) + wcpc(1))− xcpc(1) + `d)
−2ξs
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.3
Lemma 2 states that xsi can be written as a function of the strategy profile
xc := (xci , x
c
−i). Substituting back to the optimization problem, for each player
i, taking the action of (−i) as given, it becomes a one-dimensional, parametric,
constrained maximization, equivalent with our original problem:
maximize
sci
wsi p
s(1)
i (x˜
s
i (x
c)) + wcip
c(1)(xc)
subject to wci ≥ xci ≥ 0 < µ >
wsi ≥ x˜si (xc) ≥ 0 < λ >
(4.3)
The optimization problem of the reduced-form 2x2 model can be solved an-
alytically using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality. The optimum is charac-
terized with the following first-order conditions (i suppressed for simplicity):
∂L
∂xc
= wsξs
∂xs
∂xc
+ wcξc + λ
∂xs
∂xc
≤0
λ ≥ 0;xs ≥ 0 but λ(−xs) = 0 < CS >
xc ≥ 0 but xc
(
∂L
∂xc
)
= 0 < CS >
We solve these conditions in the next Lemma. The optimum solution for
each player i, viewed as a function of other player’s (−i) selling decision, is the
best-response function of the liquidation game.
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Lemma 3 (Best response function) The best response function of the induced
liquidation game, — a solution of problem 4.3 as a function of sc−i —, is a contin-
uous, piecewise defined quadratic expression. The analytical form can be found in
Appendix 4.A.4
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.4
Figure 4.4: Some best response functions
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Figure 3 provides an illustration of a range of best response functions for
some values of the ex-ante perceived illiquidity of the common asset. For small
price impact, only the common asset is liquidated, and therefore the best response
function is increasing as the price shock by other player’s action hits the player. For
intermediate price impact (0.11−0.13 in the figure), the common asset is liquidated
exclusively only as long as the counterparty liquidates relatively little: for large
enough actions of player 2, player 1 gradually substitutes it by liquidating the specific
asset. In the range 0.135 − 0.15 both assets are liquidated and the best response
function turns to decreasing. Clearly, in this range the player partially substitutes
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liquidation of common assets with idiosyncratic assets. Finally, for the largest price
impacts on the diagram, Player 1 liquidates only the specific asset, and the best
response function changes to flat at zero.
The illustrative best response functions illuminate a key aspect of the liq-
uidation game. When player 2 increases the amount of liquidated common assets,
there are two effects in force, which are reminiscent to standard microeconomic
theory. First, there is an ‘income effect’, which is the straight network externality
caused by common asset ownership: increased liquidation by some investors hurt
other investors due to market price impact and mark-to-market evaluation, so they
need to increase asset sale, which induces strategic complementarity. For sufficiently
high ex-ante liquidity the optimum is to liquidate exclusively the common asset, and
this is the only effect in place, therefore, the best response functions are increasing.
However, in a multiple asset settings we can identify a second effect, which we can
dub as ‘substitution effect’: as a result of increased liquidation by other market
participants, investors may find it more attractive to increase the weight of specific
assets in the liquidated portfolio and decrease liquidation from the common asset.
The substitution effect may dominate the income effect, which leads to decreasing
best response function and the appearance of strategic substitutes.
Our first theorem proves the existence of Nash-equilibrium of this game.
Theorem 1 In the 2x2 model with linear price impact (assumption 3), for a given
set of parameters Θ := {W,p0, D0, `, ξ} fulfilling assumptions 1 and 2, there exist a
liquidation equilibrium as a fixed point of the best-response correspondence.
Proof. Consider the best-response correspondence
Φ(sc1, s
c
2) : [0, w
c
1]× [0, wc2]→ R2
Our assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that
Im Φ(·) ⊆ [0, wc1]× [0, wc2]
That is, the image of the fixed point correspondence is a subset of the domain of
Φ(·). Lemma 3 establishes continuity of best response functions, so the mapping
Φ(·) is a continuous function. We have a continuous function which maps a compact
convex set into itself, so the Brouwer fixed point theorem guarantees the existence
of a fixed point.
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4.3.4 The social planner’s problem
The key insight from this paper is the inefficiency of the Nash-equilibrium of the
liquidation game. To illustrate this point, we compare the equilibrium outcomes
with a solution to a social planner’s problem who maximizes joint equity of the
two banks. The main result of this section demonstrates that a social planner, for a
significant subset of the parameter space, could achieve a strictly better outcome and
improve on the coordination failure in a market equilibrium. This is improvement
in a a Pareto-sense, not just on aggregate equity, as in the social planner’s optium
solution all individual players will be better off.
We start with formalizing the social planner’s problem which maximizes the
joint equity subject to the leverage constraints, no-short-selling and nonnegativity
assumptions. To write the problem compactly we extend the notation with
W =
(ws1,0,wc1
0,ws2,w
c
2
)
, X =
( xs1,0,xc1
0,xs2,x
c
2
)
, d =
(
D1
D2
)
and p =
(
ps1,p
s
2,p
c
)′
The social planner’s problem can be written as
maximize
X
1′
(
Wp(1) −D
)
subject to (1− `i)wi′p(1) − si′p(1) + `iDi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2} < λi >
wji ≥ sji ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}∀j ∈ {s, c} < ηji >
where 1 = (1, 1, 1)′. The objective function is the total after-liquidation equity of the
financial system. The first set of constraints are the rearranged leverage constraints,
which must hold for all institutions individually. The last set of constraints are the
usual ‘no-short-selling’ and ‘no-buy’ constraints.
The solutions of the social planner’s problem are characterized with the usual
first order conditions (see Appendix 4.A.5). The main result of this section com-
pares the socially optimal solution with the liquidation equilibrium in the previous
subsection:
Theorem 2 The liquidation equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal in all such cases in
which in equilibrium a positive quantity is chosen from both assets for liquidation.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.5
Intuitively, we are in a prisoners’-dilemma like situation as demonstrated in
the introduction: the Pareto-optimal liquidation strategy is not individually optimal,
therefore cannot be maintained as equilibrium, since banks have incentives to deviate
and sell more from the relatively liquid common asset. However, if both are doing
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this, the asset becomes relatively illiquid, and the total payoff is lower.
Theorem 2 only characterizes the situation in which a positive quantity is
chosen from both assets. The following theorem establishes the optimality of corner-
solutions as well:
Theorem 3 The ‘liquidation equilibrium’ coincides with the social planner’s solu-
tion in all such cases when
i zero quantity is chosen from the common assets for liquidation in equilibrium.
ii zero quantity is chosen from the specific asset by the social planner
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.6
4.4 Model analysis
In this chapter we analyse and illustrate the equilibrium solution and compare with
social planners’ outcome. The derivation of our main result has no restriction what-
soever on the parameter values of the economy apart from Assumptions 1...4. To
make the comparison more transparent, without loss of generality, we can introduce
a few normalizations on the parameter space.
First, note that absolute price levels do not play a role in this context, only
relative price changes determine the result. Therefore, we can normalize all initial
prices to one:
p(0) := 1
We cannot, however, normalize all initial quantities, since that would pin down
the investment proportions of idiosyncratic versus common asset. Without loss of
generality, however, we can normalize idiosyncratic asset quantities to one, and
leave the total quantities of common assets as a variable. In this section we focus
on symmetric equilibrium with ex-ante identical banks. 6 We set wc = wc as a
parameter, and normalize
ws = 1
In the main model, the debt amount D0 was also treated as a free parameter.
It is however easier to interpret and compare the outcomes for different parameter
settings if instead of the amount of initial debt, the initial leverage (following the
initial shock) is parameterized. In particular, we define (without loss of generality)
6Otherwise another parameter would be required which determines the allocation of common
asset between the two banks.
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a new variable, ‘shock size’, defined as κ := `
0
`
. With this definition, the initial debt
level is:
D0 = A− A
κ`
For example, if we normalize all p
j(0)
i = 1, w
j
i = 1 and l = 2, a ’10% shock ’
corresponds to a shock-size of κ = 1.1 which implies an initial debt of 1.1, and an
initial leverage of `0 = 2.22. This should be restored to ` = 2, a 10% decrease in
leverage.
Finally, we can slightly modify the definition of the price impact parameter
(ξ). So far ξs and ξp could be arbitrary numbers. For the purpose of numerical
analysis, it is better to tie their values to total asset quantities. Intuitively one
would expect that a given (numerical) quantity for sale must have smaller price
effect, if it is a relatively small portion of the total asset. In order to incorporate
this to the model without any affect to the validity of proofs, we introduce a new
variable
φj =
ξj
W j
with W j being the total quantity of asset j, and in all numerical illustrations we
apply the price impact formula with φ in place of ξ.
p(1) = p(0) + φXj
To sum up, after introducing the normalizations the economy can be described by
the following parameters:
ΘN := {ξ,W c, κ, l}
The most critical assumption of this model is the ‘sufficient resources’ assumption,
which allows us to ignore cases where a selling decision is made due to inefficient asset
holdings, not by optimal choice. Intuitively, this requirement can be interpreted as
a constraint on the price impact coefficients which we can meaningfully consider in
the numerical analysis. The larger the leverage (left) or the larger the total asset
commonality in the economy (right), the smaller price impact coefficients is sufficient
to satisfy the assumptions.
In the following sub-sections we illustrate the effect of various parameters
of the economy on the equilibrium liquidation quantity (thick blue and red) and
the social optima (dashed blue and red) curves (top figures). Further, we calculate
the value of equity in equilibrium (blue) versus social optimum (red) equity levels,
expressed as a percentage of the original equity (bottom figures).
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Figure 4.5: Equilibrium as a function of common asset price impact
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4.4.1 Common asset price impact
We start by varying the common asset price impact coefficient (ξc), while keeping
other parameters, notably the price impact for the specific asset, fixed. As discussed
before, the portfolio is symmetric and normalized (ws1 = w
s
2 = 1, w
c
1 = w
c
2 = 1) and
initial prices are normalized (pc = ps = 1). By the symmetry of the problem, the
figures can be understood as the outcome for both i = 1, 2. The leverage constraint
is set to ` = 3 and the banking sector starts from a ‘shocked’ state where the leverage
constraint is not fulfilled by a factor of κ = 1.1 which we can interpret as the size
of shock. Therefore, `0 = κ`.
Figure [4.5] presents liquidated quantities (top figure) for equilibrium (solid)
and socially optimal (dashed) solution, and after-liquidation equity for optimum
(red) and equilibrium (blue) as the specific asset’s price impact is fixed at ξs = 0.15
and the common price impact varies in the range ξc ∈ {0.05, 0.2}.
For very high ex-ante common asset price impact (the right of axis x), the
equilibrium action is to liquidate only specific asset. In this region, obviously, any
further increase of the common price impact coefficient ξc has no further effect on
the optimal choice or the equity value. Note however, that this region does not
comply with the ‘narrative’ of the paper, that is, that usually the common asset is
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perceived as ex ante more liquid. As the price impact decreases to the interesting
region (towards the left of x axis), the equilibrium action is to sell a combination of
the two assets (there is an internal solution to the optimum problem). In this case
the negative externality pushes down the new equity value below previous levels.
As the price impact coefficient of common asset further decreases, it becomes
more-and-more attractive to substitute for it, which exacerbates the coordination
problem. As a result, counter-intuitively, banks’ fire-sale losses increase as the (ab-
solute) price impact decreases, that is, more liquid markets eventually hurt the
banks. Intuitively, assets which are perceived as more liquid attracts more sellers,
therefore they become more illiquid ex post. That means formally, the derivative
of the objective function at optimum with respect to the price impact function of
common asset is negative.7 This is a key result, so we state this as a theorem8:
Theorem 4 Let
Φ(x) = (wsi − xsi )ps(1)i + (wci − xci )pc(1) − (Di − xsips(1)i − xcipc(1))
denote the objective function of maximum problem (4.1). Then, under assumption
4 we have
∂Φ?
∂ξc
< 0
for the interior optimum region, where Φ? = Φ?(x?(ξ?)) is the optimum value of the
objective function viewed as a function of equilibrium selling quantities.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.7.
In contrast to the equilibrium outcome, a social planner could avoid the
increased fire-sale losses by selling the specific asset for both banks for the critical
range of price impact coefficients.
Finally, the left-side of the diagram illustrates that for sufficiently low levels
of common asset price impacts the optimum is the same as the equilibrium, as
predicted by Theorem 3. If the common asset is sufficiently liquid, the benefits from
liquidity outweigh the costs associated with network externalities.
So far the the price impact for the specific asset was fixed at an arbitrary
level. Figure 4.6 illustrates the role of overall liquidity profiles (combinations of
price impact coefficients). The left figure is the equilibrium of the liquidation game
7This is not obvious, since ∂Φ
∂ξc
> 0.
8In the appendix, I formulate the statement of the Theorem and give an analytical condition
which guarantees the Theorem to hold. Unfortunately, this condition cannot be expressed in a closed
analytical form, so instead of a full analytical proof, I provide an illustration that the condition
indeed holds in the interesting parameter region.
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Figure 4.6: Equilibrium as a function of price impacts
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(common assets offered for sale), while the right figure demonstrates the associated
equity loss. It is not surprising that higher overall illiquidity leads to larger equity
losses. The notable result is that increasing illiquidity of specific assets largely
extends the problematic region in both directions, but more significantly, for larger
(absolute) common price impacts. The conclusion is that an overall deterioration of
market liquidity involving all assets in the market, makes it more likely (for a larger
subset of parameters) that banks end up in an inefficient liquidation spiral, an effect
which is beyond the simple consequences of deteriorating liquidity.
4.4.2 Weight of the common asset
In this chapter we vary the total quantity of common asset in the market keeping the
weight of specific assets normalized at wsi = 1, and all other parameters constant.
The total quantity of common asset W c can be interpreted as a simple measure of
diversification on the market: since wsi is normalized, the larger W
c is, the higher
percentage of wealth is invested in the (perfectly correlated) common asset, so the
larger is the correlation between the two banks’ total asset portfolio. To interpret
the results we note that by the normalization we adopted for numerical analyses,
varying quantity of common asset on the balance sheet while keeping prices and all
other parameters fixed also changes the absolute size of the balance sheet.
The diagram is topologically similar to varying the price impact parameter.
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Figure 4.7: Equilibrium as a function of asset commonality
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The reason is fundamental: as it is obvious from the form of the objective function,
bank’s are concerned about weighted price impacts, so increasing weight of common
asset has a similar effect as increasing price impact of common assets. The interpre-
tation is, however different, and is analogous to earlier findings in the literature (e.g.
Elliott et al. [2014]), which points out that financial networks are most susceptible
for contagion for intermediate levels of diversification.
Although this model is based on completely different principles than earlier
literature, the intuition is the same: for high levels of diversification, banks inter-
nalize a relatively high proportion of network externalities, and optimally choose to
sell the specific asset, and reach the optimal outcome. For relatively low levels of
diversification, the network externality is small, and does not dominates the bene-
fits from better liquidity of the common asset. The banking system is subject to a
possibly inefficient equilibrium outcome for intermediate levels of diversification.
4.4.3 Varying leverage
Next we analyse the effect of varying leverage levels of banks (see figure 4.8). We
start the graph from the limiting case ` = 1. By definition in this case d0 = 0
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Figure 4.8: Equilibrium as a function of leverage
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(a) Low-ξc regime
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(b) High-ξc regime
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(c) Low-ξc regime
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Leverage requirement
Eq
ui
ty
 v
a
lu
e
Variable
Equilibrium
Social Planner
Market value
After−liquidation equity
(d) High-ξc regime
so there is no liquidation, and no equity loss.9 Note how Theorem 2 holds for the
depicted case: optimal liquidation of common asset are always below the equilibrium
levels. The relative equity levels (bottom figure) show that the inefficiency sharply
increases for larger levels of leverage. Note that we kept the relative shock size
constant in the numerical analysis, and not the absolute shock size. I repeated the
analysis with fixed absolute shock size, and the results are similar (although the
absolute magnitude is obviously smaller).
In figure 4.9 we illustrate the effect of leverage and market diversification
(total asset commonality) on the relative equity loss of prevailing equilibrium com-
pared to the social optima. It is not surprising based on the previous figure that
larger leverage may have significantly larger negative effect, and this diagram also
makes clear that the potential parameter region susceptible to inefficient equilibrium
is much larger as well. In addition, if leverage is higher, the ’worst outcome’ tend
to occur for lower levels of market diversification.
4.4.4 Varying shock size
The shock in this context should be understood as how far the initial position is
from fulfilling the leverage requirement. The effect on equity is straightforward:
higher shocks induces more liquidation. The composition of optimal selling vector
in figure 4.10 demonstrates that it is not scale-free with respect to the shock size.
9Formally our assumptions are not fulfilled at this point, so we consider it as a limiting case.
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Figure 4.9: Equilibrium as a function of leverage and commonality
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For small shock, it is optimal to sell only the specific asset, while for larger shocks,
a substitution towards common asset starts.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we analysed a simple banking system with fire-sale spillovers due
to common illiquid asset holdings when banks have multiple illiquid assets and
choose the liquidation strategy optimally. Even the very simple, two-bank model
can produce interesting and counter-intuitive results. Our main theorem states
that for a large range of parameter values the only prevailing equilibrium of the
’liquidation game’ is in which banks sell too much of the common asset, compared
to what a social planner would find optimal. The most striking result is that in
these situations, at least under symmetric equilibrium, the socially optimal solution
is a Pareto-improvement as well, that is, banks individually would get better off by
choosing the liquidation strategy designed by the social planner, but this cannot
be maintained as a Nash-equilibrium. Even more counter-intuitively, the efficiency
losses due to coordinating on the inefficient equilibrium are larger when the market
conditions improve: if the common assets are perceived more liquid, the temptation
to coordinate on selling it is higher, and the ex-post illiquidity and induced equity
losses are higher.
Our illustrative numerical analysis indicate that even this simple model can
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Figure 4.10: Equilibrium as a function of shock size
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suggest two findings which are analogous to earlier theoretical results in the finan-
cial contagion literature. First, the equity losses are most severe for intermediate
levels of market diversification; in contrast, for very large diversification the fire sale
externalities are sufficiently internalized, while for very low levels of diversification
the externalities are sufficiently small and do not influence outcomes. Note that
our setup intentionally excludes the ’extremes’ (like a perfectly diversified banking
sector), in which pure resource constraints would alter our conclusions. By exclud-
ing those parameter regions by assumption, our results are purely due to bank’s
strategic considerations. The second result is a weak confirmation of the findings of
Chen et al. [2014]: as the system becomes more leveraged, it can benefit more from
less diversification and more idiosyncratic portfolios.
152
4.A Appendix - Proofs
4.A.1 Notation
Consider the optimum problem 4.1. After straightforward algebraic simplifications,
and switching to matrix notation the problem of bank i can be written as:
maximize
xi
w′ip
(1)
i (xi)−Di
subject to (1− `i)w′ip(1)i − x′ip(1)i + `idi ≤ 0 < λ >
xi ≥ 0 < η >
wi − xi ≥ 0 < µ >
(4.4)
where the t=1 price p
(1)
i is determined by the linear price impact (Assumption 3)
p
(1)
i (xi + x−i) = p
(0)
i + 〈ξi〉 (xi + x−i)
The vectors {wi,xi} denote Bank i’s asset endowment and liquidation decision, x−i
is the other bank’s (total) liquidation from the same assets, pi denotes prices of
these assets, while 〈ξ〉 is a diagonal matrix constructed from the price impact vector
ξ . To simplify discussion we introduce some further notation. Let Λi(xi) : R2 → R
denote the ex-post (after liquidation) leverage constraint (RHS of the constraint
associated with λ) in the optimization problem of Bank i given that a selling vector
xi is chosen, that is,
Λi (xi) := (1− `i)wi′p(1)i (xi)− xi′p(1)i (xi) + `iDi
Furthermore, let the objective be
Φi (xi) := w
′
ip
1
i (xi)− di
Note that p
(1)
i = p
(1)
i (xi, x−i) is a function of the liquidated asset quantities in both
expressions. With this notation we can describe the decision problem of each banks
i in a compact form, as a standard constrained maximum problem:
maximize
xi
Φi(xi)
subject to − Λi(xi) ≥ 0 < λ >
xi ≥ 0 < η >
wi − xi ≥ 0 < µ >
(4.5)
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These optimum problems are linked by the joint determination of asset prices
p
(1)
i = p
(0)
i + 〈ξ〉 (xi + x−i)
For notational simplicity we suppress the dependency of value function and con-
straint on all other parameters describing the economy until the chapter dealing
with comparative statics. For completeness, these parameters are
Θ := {ξ,p(0),W,d, `}
Both the objective and constraint, therefore the optimum depends on the liquidation
choice of the players, x−i. If we want to emphasize this relationship, we write
Φ(xi, x−i) and Λ(xi, x−i) respectively. The object of interest is the set of maximizers,
interpreted as a function of other bank’s decision, denoted by x?i (x−i). This is the
best response function of the game.
4.A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (item i)
The objective function Φi(xi) is obviously a linear functional. Substituting
the price equation into the constraint we get
Λi(xi) = (1− `i)w′i
(
p
(0)
i + 〈ξ〉 (xi + x−i)
)
− x′i
(
p
(0)
i + ξ (xi + x−i)
)
+ `idi (4.6)
The right-hand-side is a 2-variable continuous, twice differentiable function. We
compute the Hessian with respect to the two variables x
(j)
i : j ∈ {s, c}:
∂Λi(xi)
∂xji
= (1− l)wji ξji −
(
p
(0),j
i + ξ
j
i
(
xji + x
j
−i
))
− sji ξji
∂2C
∂x(j)
2 = −2ξji > 0
∂2C
∂x(j1)∂s(j2)
= 0
By definition the price impact is negative (ξ < 0), so the Hessian is positive semi-
definite10. This proves that Λi(xi) is convex. The epigraph of a convex function is
convex by definition of convexity, so the (leverage) constraint set is convex in R2.
Proof. (item iia)
We state conditions under which Λ(x) is decreasing in x, that is, selling assets
10The geometric figure is an infinite paraboloid, the epigraph is ellipsoid
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and repaying debt is leverage-decreasing. A sufficient condition is ∀j ∈ {s, c}:
∂Λi(xi)
∂xj
= (1− l)wji ξj − (p(0),ji + ξj(xji + xj−i))− xji ξj < 0
This holds whenever the price impact is sufficiently small, that is:
p
(0),j
i + 2ξ
jxji + ξ
jxj−i − (1− l)wji ξj > 0
We replace x with w > x to get a sufficient restriction on exogenous the parameter
space instead of restricting the endogenous action space:
pj + 2ξjwji + ξ
jwj−i − (1− l)wji ξj > 0
which is stated in assumption 4.
Proof. (item iib)
The sufficient resources assumptions make the constraint associated with µ in the
general set-up obsolete. The choices (wsi , 0) and (0, w
c
i ) is clearly in the attainable
set of the optimization problem, by Assumption 1. Take the first case (the second is
proven analogously). Assume the optimum is some (xs?i > w
s
i , x
c?
i > 0). This, how-
ever, cannot be optimum, because Φ(xi) is strictly decreasing in xi. Contradiction.
Furthermore, Assumption 1 and the continuity and monotonicity of Λ implies
the existence of unique values xci and x
s
i which exactly solves the leverage constraint.
Λ(xci , 0) = 0 and Λ(0, x
s
i ) = 0
Clearly any choice xji > x
j cannot be optimal.
Proof. (item iii) Assumption 1 and 2 together guarantees that
R2− ∩ {xi : Λ(xi) ≤ 0} = ∅
To sum up, we formalized the assumptions in such a way which ensures
that (i) the problem can be solved if and only if banks liquidate a positive amount
of assets, (ii) optimum is always on the boundary of the constraint set (iii) this
boundary is always given by the leverage constraint, which is fulfilled with equality.
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4.A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Focus on bank i = 1 decision problem, taking bank i = 2 decision as given. Since the
leverage constraint fulfils with equality (lemma 1), any choice of xp1 clearly defines
the required sale from xs by the equation
Λ(xc1, x
s
1, ·) = 0
Denote this quantity for each bank i by x˜si (x
c
i ) : [0, w
(c)]→ [0, w(c)]
Assumption (1) and consequently 1 ensures that s˜si (s
c) can be derived ana-
lytically by solving the constraint as equality for ss as a function of sp and sp−i:
0 = (1− `i)wi′p1 − x′ip1 + `di
0 = (1− `)ws (ps + ξsxs) + (1− `i)wc
(
pc + ξcxc + ξcxc−i
)
− xs(ps + ξsxs)− xc(pc + ξcxc + ξcxc−i) + `d
0 = [−ξs] (xs)2 + [(1− `)wsξs − ps]xs + (1− `)wsps
+ (1− `)wc (pc + ξcxci + ξcxc−i)− xc (pc + ξcxc + ξcxc−i)+ `d
This is
x˜s =
ps − (1− `)wsξs −
√
[ps − (1− `)wsξs]2 + 4ξs
(
(1− `)
(
w′p + wcξc(xci + x
c
−i)
)
− xc
(
pc + ξc
(
xc + xc−i
))
+ `d
)
−2ξs
The geometry of the problem implies that we only need to consider the (-) sign.
Note that the expression for s˜si (s
c) is not guaranteed to be positive for every
possible action profile sc. It is just the quantity which solves the constraint with
equality. Negative values will be ruled out as possible solutions as part of the solution
of the ’reduced’ optimum problem discussed as part of the next lemma.
4.A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
From the previous Lemma xsi can be written ∀i ∈ {1, 2} as a function of the strategy
profile xc := {xci , xc−i}. Let this function be x˜si (xc) : R2 → R. Substituting back
to the optimization problem, for each player i taking the action by −i as given, it
becomes a one-dimensional, parametric constrained maximization program, which
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is equivalent with our original problem. For all i,
maximize
xci
wsi p
1s(x˜si (x
c)) + wcip
1c(xc)
subject to 0 ≤ xci ≤ wci < µ >
0 ≤ x˜si (xc) ≤ wsi < λ >
(4.7)
This leads to the following KKT first-order conditions (i and function arguments
suppressed for simplicity):
∂L
∂sc
= wsξs
∂x˜s
∂xc
+ wpξp + λ
∂xs
∂xc
≤ 0
λ ≥ 0;xs ≥ 0 but λ(−xs) = 0 < CS >
xc ≥ 0 but xc
(
∂L
∂xc
)
= 0 < CS >
The usual ’generic’ approach to analytically solve the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions is to evaluate all possible combinations with respect to the positivity of
Lagrange-multipliers, then check whether the results are consistent with the im-
posed conditions. Finally, eliminate those which are not consistent, and evaluate
the objective function over the set of candidate solutions. Following this method,
we have to consider four cases:
λ η Intuition
Case 1 λ = 0 η = 0 Non-binding constraints: xs > 0 and xc > 0
Case 2 λ > 0 η = 0 Binding constraint on xs ⇒ xs = 0
Case 3 λ = 0 η > 0 Binding constraint on xp ⇒ xp = 0
Case 4 λ > 0 η > 0 Both constraints binding: ruled out by assumption
Note that Case 4 is ruled out by the ’interesting problem’ assumption. Below we
solve case 1 to 3 in turn.
Case 1 If λ = 0 the first-order condition gives the interior optimum:
∂L
∂xc
= 0
from which we obtain the solution
∂xs
∂xc
= −w
cξc
wsξs
(4.8)
157
This can be solved analytically. First, we calculate the partial derivative
∂xs
∂xc
= −
(1− l)wcξc −
(
pc + ξxc−i
)
− 2ξcxc√
[(1− l)wsξs − ps]2 + 4ξs
[
(1− l)wsps + (1− l)wc
(
pc + ξc
(
xc + xc−i
))
− xc
(
pc + ξc
(
xc + xc−i
))
+ ld
]
After rearranging equation (4.8), we obtain
[
wsξs
wcξc
]2 (
[(1− l)wcξc − (pc + ξxc−i)]2 − 4 [(1− l)wcξc − (pc + ξxc−i)] ξcxc + 4 (ξcxc)2
)
=
= [(1− l)wsξs − ps]2+4ξs [(1− l)wsps + (1− l)wc (pc + ξc (xc + xc−i))− xc (pc + ξc (xc + xc−i)) + ld]
We express the solution for xc implicitly as
A[xc]2 +B[xc] + C = 0 (4.9)
where after solving the previous equation,
A = 4(ξc)2
[
wsξs
wcξc
]2
+ 4ξsξc
B = −4ξc [(1− l)wcξc − (pc + ξxc−i)] [wsξswcξc
]2
− 4ξs ((1− l)wcξc − pc − ξcxc−i)
C =
[
(1− l)wcξc − (pc + ξxc−i)]2 [wsξswcξc
]2
− [(1− l)wsξs − ps]2
− 4ξs [(1− l)wsps + (1− l)wc(pc + ξcxc−i) + ld]
The value of xc in 4.9 is the optimum solution as long as x˜s(xc?) > 0
Case 2 The first complementarity slackness condition implies with λ 6= 0
(that is, if the constraint is binding and ss = 0) that sp is a similar quadratic formula
with the coefficients.11
A = −ξc
B = [(1− l)wcξc − (pc + ξcxc−i)
C = [(1− l)wsps + (1− l)wc(pc + ξcxc−i) + ld
Corollary: The best response function is continuous.
Proof. Both xccase1 and x
c
case2 are piecewise continuous. Furthermore, x˜
s(xc) is
also continuous and monotone by assumption 4. We need to prove that there
11The easiest way to calculate these coefficients is to solve the leverage constraint Λ with equality
and with xsi = 0.
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are no ’jumps’ when the optimal solution switches from case1 to case2. We have
xs(xccase2) = 0 by construction. The continuous, monotonic function x
s(xc) crosses
zero at most once, and at this point, by construction, xccase2 = x
c
case1
Case 3 Finally, with η 6= 0 therefore xc = 0. We note that the corresponding
value for xs is coming from equation 4.A.3.
To sum up, the optimal solution of the problem is:
xc?i (Θ, x
c
−i) =

xc?case1
(
Θ, xc−i
)
if xc > 0 and xs > 0
xc?case2
(
Θ, xc−i
)
if xc > 0 and xs = 0
0 otherwise
In this highly parametric form it is impossible to decide more precisely ana-
lytically which of the three cases are consistent with the condition and which of them
provide the global maximum. Numerical methods are implemented for illustration
in section 4.4.
4.A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
The Pareto-optimal outcome maximizes the joint equity subject to the leverage
constraints and nonnegativity. To formalize this problem we extend the notation
with W =
(w′1
w′2
)
and X =
( x′1
x′2
)
. The problem can be written as
maximize
X
1′(W′p1 − d)
subject to (1− `i)wi′0p? − xi′p? + `di0 ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2} < λi >
xji ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}∀j ∈ {s, c} < ηji >
Similarly to the equilibrium case, this also can be written in a reduced form, maxi-
mizing with respect to xc
maximize
xc
(w1
s + w2
s)ps + ws1ξ
s
1s
s
1 + w
s
2ξ
s
2s
s
2 + (w
c
1 + w
c
2)p
c + wc1ξ
c(xc1 + x
c
2) + w
c
2ξ
c(xc2 + x
c
1)
subject to xc ≥ 0 < η >
xs ≥ 0 < λ >
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The Kuhn-Tucker method leads to the following first-order and complementarity
slackness conditions:
ws1ξ
s∂x
s
1
∂xc1
+ ws2ξ
s∂x
s
2
∂xc1
+ (wc1 + w
c
2)ξ
c + λ1
∂xs1
∂xc1
+ λ2
∂xs2
∂xc1
= 0
ws1ξ
s∂x
s
1
∂xc2
+ ws2ξ
s∂x
s
2
∂xc2
+ (wc1 + w
c
2)ξ
c + λ1
∂xs1
∂xc2
+ λ2
∂xs2
∂xc2
= 0
λi ≥ 0;xs ≥ 0 but λi(−xsi ) = 0 < CS >
xc ≥ 0 but xc
(
∂L
∂xc
)
= 0 < CS >
(Interior optimum): Consider the case where λ1 = λ2 = 0 (interior opti-
mum). Using the analytical expression for xi and earlier results we start by deriving
the partial derivatives:
∂xsi
∂xci
= ± (1− li)w
c
i ξ
c − (pc + ξxc−i)− 2ξcxci√
[(1− li)wsi ξs − ps]2 + 4ξs [(1− li)wsi ps + (1− li)wcipc? − xcipc? + lidi]
∂xsi
∂xc−i
= ± (1− li)w
c
i ξ
c − ξcxci√
[(1− li)wsi ξs − ps]2 + 4ξs [(1− li)wsi ps + (1− li)wcipc? − xcipc? + lidi]
This is a sufficient implicit characterization of the social planner’s solution.
(Compare with equilibrium): Recall that the conditions for an interior opti-
mum (i.e. non-binding constraints, λ = 0) of the liquidation equilibrium (see 4.A.4):
∀i ∈ {1, 2}
wsi ξ
s∂x
s
i
∂xci
+ wci ξ
c + λ
∂xsi
∂xci
= 0
Consider i = 1. The difference between the equilibrium and optimum FOC’s is
D1 := ws2ξs
∂xs2
∂xc1
+ wc2ξ
c
clearly D1 < 0 as long as
∂xs2
∂xc1
> 0
Consider the first FOC. Assumption 4 guarantees that
∂xs1
∂xc1
< 0. The terms not
containing the partial derivatives are constant - only depend on parameters. As
long as D1 < 0 the first order conditions imply that[
∂xs1
∂xc1
]OPT
>
[
∂xs1
∂xc1
]EQ
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This implies [xc1]
OPT > [xc1]
EQ as long as the derivative is increasing in xc, that is,
∂xsi
∂xci∂x
c
i
> 0
Consider the partial derivative
∂xsi
∂xci
. Denote by (arg) the expression under
√
in the
expression for
∂xsi
∂xci
for simplicity. Then
∂xsi
∂xci∂x
c
i
=
(
−2ξc
√
(arg)−NOM ∗ 1
2
√
(arg)
∂(arg)
∂xci
)
∗ 1√
arg2
This is positive as long as
∂(arg)
∂xci
= 4ξs ((1− li)wci ξc − pc? − xciξc) > 0
which is positive by Assumption 4. Therefore, the second derivative is positive.
4.A.6 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. There is only one value of xsi which solves Λi(x
s
i , 0) = 0, so the theorem is
trivial if both equilibrium and optimum induces zero liquidation of common asset.
We just need to prove that
(i) it is never optimal to sell common asset by the social planner if it is not optimal
by the individual banks.
(ii) it is never equilibrium action to sell specific asset if the social planner does
not sell it
Proof of part (i):
The second complementarity slackness condition of bank’s problem implies that
xc = 0⇒ ∂L
∂xc
< 0
that is
wsξs
∂xs
∂xc
+ wcξc + λ
∂xs
∂xc
< 0
but by Assumption 2 here λ = 0, so the condition for interior optimality of the
social planner’s problem implies:
D1 > 0
but D1 < 0 was established under the proof of earlier Theorem. Contradiction.
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Proof of part (ii):
We need to prove that λsoc > 0⇒ λeq > 0. That is, a binding constraint (xs = 0) in
the social planner’s problem implies binding constraint in the equilibrium problem.
The social planner’s problem first order conditions rearranged:(
ws1ξ
s∂x
s
1
∂xc1
+ wc1ξ
c
)
+
(
ws2ξ
s∂x
s
2
∂xc1
+ wc2ξ
c
)
+
(
λ1
∂xs1
∂xc1
+ λ2
∂xs2
∂xc1
)
= 0
We have established earlier that
∂xs1
∂xc1
< 0 and
∂xs2
∂xc1
> 0 by assumption 4. We also
know that |∂xs1∂xc1 | > |
∂xs2
∂xc1
|. In a symmetric equilibrium λ1 = λ2 so the third bracketed
term is negative. The second term is also negative. The first term must be therefore
positive. As a consequence, the optimum-problem can only be fulfilled if λopt is
positive.
4.A.7 Proof of Theorem 4
Consider the objective function
Φ = w′ip
(1) − di
We write out explicitly (without indices for simplicity):
Φ = ws(ps + ξsxs) + wc(pc + ξc(xc + xc−i))− d
In optimum, we can write the derivative w.r.t. ξc as
dΦ
dξc
= wsξs
dx˜s?
dξc
+ wcξc
(
dxc?1
dξc
+
dxc?2
dξc
)
+ wc(xc?1 + x
c?
2 ) (4.10)
As we focus on symmetric equilibrium, we can impose the following identities:
∂xc?1
∂ξc
=
∂xc?2
∂ξc
:=
∂xc?
∂ξc
xc?1 = x
c?
2 := x
c?
Recall that x˜s is a function of xc (and xc−i), which also hold in any equilibrium. We
write the total derivative w.r.t. ξc as
dss?
dξc
=
∂x˜s?
∂ξc
+
∂x˜s?
∂xc
∂xc
∂ξc
+
∂x˜s?
∂xc−i
∂xc−i
∂ξc
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The term ∂x˜
s?
∂ξc and
∂x˜s?
∂xc−i
is straightforward to calculate. The term ∂x˜
s?
∂xc is given by
the equilibrium condition which must be hold for equilibrium quantities:
∂x˜s?
∂xc
= −w
cξc
wsξs
Using this, we can rewrite the first term in (4.10) as:
wsξs
(
∂x˜s?
∂ξc
− w
cξc
wsξs
∂xc
∂ξc
+
∂x˜s?
∂xc−i
∂xc−i
∂ξc
)
= wsξs
∂x˜s?
∂ξc
+
(
wsξs
∂x˜s?
∂xc−i
− wcξc
)
∂xc
∂ξc
The condition for the theorem becomes therefore
Ψ := wsξs
∂x˜s?
∂ξc
+
(
wsξs
∂x˜s?
∂xc−i
+ wcξc
)
∂xc
∂ξc
+ 2wcxc < 0 (4.11)
This can be fully calculated analytically in a straightforward way. We proceed with
calculating the term ∂x
c?
∂ξc . We depart from the implicit analytical expression for x
c?.
Since we study symmetric equilibrium here, we can replace x−i by xc and so the
implicit equation takes the form of (note that the arguments of A,B,C stand for
the other player’s action here):
A(xc)[xc]2 +B(xc)[xc] + C(xc) = 0
For notation let the LHS be function g(ξc, ·). Using the implicit function theorem:
∂xc
∂ξc
= −∂g/∂ξ
c
∂g/∂xc
The two partial derivatives are:
∂g
∂ξc
=
∂A
∂ξc
[xc]2 +
∂B
∂ξc
[xc] +
∂C
∂ξc
∂g
∂xc
=
∂A
∂xc
[xc]2 + 2A(xc)[xc] +
∂B
∂xc
[xc] +B(xc) +
∂C
∂xc
All elements of the expression are trivial to calculate. The derivatives w.r.t. ξ:
∂A
∂ξc
= 4ξs
∂B
∂ξc
= 4
(
xc − (1− l)wc −
[
ξsws
ξcwc
]2
pc
)
∂C
∂ξc
= −2ξ
s
(
(l − 1)ξcξspcwc[ws]2 − 2(l − 1)ξc3[wc]3xc + ξspc[ws]2(pc + ξcxc))
ξc3[wc]2
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The derivatives w.r.t. x
∂A
∂xc
= 0
∂B
∂xc
= 4ξsξc + 4
(
ξsws
wc
)2
∂C
∂xc
=
2ξs
(
2(l − 1)ξc2wc3 + (l − 1)ξcξswcws2 + ξsws2(pc + ξcxc))
ξcwc2
Using these numerical results it is possible to establish analytically the first two
terms in Ψ are negative. Unfortunately, it is not possible to analytically show that
Ψ < 0, so I use numerical illustrations. The following figure shows that whenever
the conditions for an interior equilibrium holds, the value of Ψ (green, thick curve)
remains negative. This is true for every parameter combinations tested during
numerical analysis.
Figure 4.11: Value of Ψ in an interior equilibrium
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
This thesis included three essays on banking theory.
The first essay described a novel mechanism which demonstrates how bank-
ing regulation might affect banks’ incentives to exert risk management through an
informational channel. Our research contributes to the broad literature on bank
liquidity and capital management, and their role in financial stability. The mecha-
nism we uncover in the paper is potentially of great interest for central banks and
other regulatory bodies, as it investigates nontrivial, and possibly overlooked general
equilibrium consequences of micro-prudential regulatory interventions. A potential
follow-up research could extend significantly our preliminary empirical work. The
new liquidity regulation introduced in Basel III is gradually rolled out to more and
more countries, which creates the potential for extensive empirical research. It is
important to mention that liquidity regulation is also being introduced in the asset
management industry, which also creates a laboratory for empirical testing. Method-
ologically, the paper combines signalling with global games in a novel and tractable
way. We consider the paper primarily a contribution to the banking literature,
rather than to economic methodology, and keep the complexity of the interaction
between signalling and global games as simple as possible. It is, however, of great
interest to study the universe of possible models this machinery could produce in
follow-up research.
The second essay departs from the empirical observation that pricing of retail
banking products is significantly different across countries with otherwise compa-
rable level of financial development. It is especially puzzling that these differences
persist within the European Union, inside the single market for services. We be-
lieve there is no plausible theory yet to explain those country-wise differences. The
model we propose in this paper takes the same basic view on retail banking mar-
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kets as the previous theoretical literature, namely that personal current accounts
are loss-leader primary markets, and banks recoup the costs on less competitive
aftermarkets. However, we model this with an important distinction by incorporat-
ing aftermarket competition, and explicitly modelling two sources of market power
which are specific to banking: customer naivete´, and adverse selection. We demon-
strate that the competitive aftermarket assumption guarantees the existence of ‘free
banking’ equilibrium even with relatively low number of naive customers, an effect
which is not present in the previous literature. Furthermore, we show that the two
forces in the model interact in equilibrium and reinforce each other. Specifically, the
presence of adverse selection makes even more likely that base prices hit the lower
bound. We believe the paper could be a starting point to a more in-depth analysis of
the possible impacts of recently introduced regulations, both empirically and theo-
retically. For example, the Payment Services Directive introduced by the European
Commission, and the ‘Open banking’ program in the UK specifically aims to reduce
adverse selection in banking markets by requiring banks to develop API-s to access
customer data by third parties as per the customers’ request. The model predicts
that this effort might lead to the end of free banking - which, perhaps surprisingly
for many, is actually a welfare-improving intervention. The current version of our
work leaves open further theoretical analysis of the welfare effects and the impact
of regulatory intervention, which is left for future work. The gradual introduction
of new programs in the EU offers an opportunity for extensive empirical research in
understanding the nature of competition in retail banking.
The third essay identifies a ‘liquidity trap’ situation in the presence of asset
commonalities. When financial institutions engage in selling part of their correlated
portfolio as a result of a systemic shock, strategic interactions generate a game which
is reminiscent to a Prisoners’ dilemma, where players over-liquidate the more liquid
asset commonality. In this thesis I derive the results for a simple case in a duopoly
model of banking with an idiosyncratic asset and a common asset. Preliminary
calculations, not included in the dissertation suggest that the results can be gener-
alized to an arbitrary bipartite network structure of asset holdings. Perhaps even
more interesting follow-up work could be to empirically test the economic relevance
of the uncovered effects. The mutual fund portfolio database provides an excellent
laboratory for these tests, which could be a basis of a follow-up empirical project.
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